










































The economic approach to crime issues is a recent field of research, which spawned 
from Becker’s (1968) seminal work. In this PhD thesis we contribute to the existing literature 
with three original research papers. 
The first paper deals with an under-explored field of research, namely the origins of the 
Sicilian Mafia. We follow an approach closer to that of historians such as Lupo (2004) and 
Pezzino (1987). In their work, Mafia was strictly linked with the socio and economic 
struggles amongst emerging classes which took place after the end of feudalism. We tested 
this hypothesis using a new measure of Mafia activity and new explanatory variables 
derived from previously under-explored primary sources. Our key findings are that Mafia 
was likely to be active in councils dominated by large properties, with high land values, 
lower density of population and where there were few peasants who owned the land. 
In the second paper, we explore the channels that favoured the expansion of Italian 
gangs in the centre and north of Italy in the second half of the XX century. We empirically 
investigate the role of forced re-settlement and migration through the creation of a panel 
dataset at the provincial level for the period 1983-2008, again using data from previously 
under-explored primary sources. Consistent with the community network approach (Bauer 
and Zimmermann, 1997; Moretti, 1999), we find that migration is by far the most important 
predictor of Mafia presence in the hosting provinces.  
In the final paper, we evaluate the impact of trust on crime in five Caribbean countries: 
Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Dominican Republic. We use 
individual data taken from Americas Barometer for 2010, which contains information on 
victimization experiences. In order to tackle endogeneity we employ an instrumental 
variable approach. The results show that our measure of trust exerts a crime reducing effect 
on property but not violent crimes. 
As we argue in the introductory chapter, all three contributions could be considered in 
the light of the new institutional economics approach. In particular, both organised crime 
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“Pareto is saying, sure, you can produce goods for the purpose of mutually 
beneficial exchange with other parties—OK, that's Marshall's “ordinary 
business.” But there's another way to get rich: you can grab goods that 
someone else has produced. Appropriating, grabbing, confiscating what 
you want–and, on the flip side, defending, protecting, sequestering what 
you already have–that's economic activity too. Take television. Cops chase 
robbers, victims are stalked by hitmen (or should I say hitpersons?), posses 
cut off rustlers at the pass, plaintiffs sue defendants, exorcists cast spells 
against vampires. What is all this but muscular economics? Robbers, 
rustlers, hitpersons, litigants —they're all trying to make a living. Even 
vampires are making economic choices: sucking blood is presumably the 
cost-effective way of meeting their unusual nutritional needs”. 





1.1 Introduction   
 
This dissertation consists of three original research papers on different topics related 
the economics of crime. The first deals with the origins of the Sicilian Mafia in the second 
half of the XIX century. We employ a new dataset to verify the characteristics most likely to 
have led to the birth of such an organisation. The second is on the migration of Mafia from 
the southern Italian regions to the central and northern ones in the post war period. We 
study the factors that might have facilitated this migration. The third analyses how social 
capital, and trust in particular, affects contemporary crime levels in five selected Caribbean 
countries.  We follow insights from the economic theory, tested in different economic 
periods and apply econometric techniques to verify such hypotheses.  
Apart from making a contribution to the economics of crime literature, there are two 
further distinct contributions of this research to the literature: the first two papers are on 
organised crime and the last is on standard “not organised” crime. In this introduction, we 
argue that they have many similarities and they can best be analysed and understood 
through the new institutional economics lens. Both organised crime and social capital can 
be considered as extra-legal social arrangements for securing property rights and enforce 
contracts.  
This introduction is organised as follow: we first review the main ideas of the new 
institutional economics, focusing on how crime can be considered to be an economic issue. 
We then present an overview of the contents of the chapters which give the reader an idea 
of the topics covered in the dissertation. We further apply the insights of the new 
13 
 
institutional economics to explain how these motivate and explain the importance of our 
research. The last section concludes. 
 
1.2 The New Institutional Economics: a selected review  
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) has been one of the most influential theories in 
economics in the last decades. For example, four of the last Nobel laureates in economics 
belonged to this school of thought1. The ideas behind this approach were formulated as a 
response to the paradigms postulated in the neoclassical school. 
Neo classical economists2 treated economies as being composed of perfectly rational 
agents who have complete information over all sets of alternatives. They assumed that 
property rights are secure and contracts perfectly enforced. Their main focus was on the 
production process, i.e. how firms maximize their profits given some inputs and constraints. 
The new institutionalists questioned these assumptions and focused on the institutional 
environment in which economic transactions take place3. As Klein (1999, p.457) argued, the 
new institutionalists are interested in the “social, economic and political institutions that 
govern everyday life”. This new approach to economics aimed at explaining what 
institutions do, how they arise, how they evolve and how they behave. As it has evolved, NIE 
has come to embrace a number of scholarly specialism, ranging from transaction costs 
theory to the positive political theory. Here, we discuss those insights from NIE that are 
particularly relevant to this research. We consider first North’s macro approach and then 
the micro approach of Coase and Williamsons4. 
 
1.2.1 North’s view 
 
The main contribution by North, related to institutional setting and the role of the state, 
distinguishes between institutions and organisations. The former are the centre of his 
analysis and are defined as “the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, are the 
                                                 
1
 In chronological order: Ronald Coase (1991), Douglass North (1993), Elinor Ostrom (2009) and Oliver 
Williamson (2009). 
2
 Such as Jevons and Walras. 
3
 However, it is agreed that the neoclassical and institutional approach are not antagonistic. Rather, the latter 
expanded the former’s analysis (Menard and Shirley, 2011). 
4
 This classification is typical in the NIE analysis (Menard and Shirley, 2011). 
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humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p.3). Institutions, 
according to North, are fundamental in defining the space of actions of economic agents. 
Moreover, and significantly, they reduce uncertainty and provide incentives for agents to 
trade. North (ibid., p.3-4) argues that  
 
“In the jargon of the economist, institutions define and limit the set of 
choices of individuals. Institutional constraints include both what 
individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what 
conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. 
They are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive 
team sport”.  
 
Institutions in formal terms comprise laws, such as constitutions and property rights. 
However, they also comprise informal institutions such as social conventions, norms and 
behavioural rules which may not be explicitly written down. Such informal institutions are 
crucial in our analysis on social capital, as they can work as substitutes for formal rules, 
especially in developing countries. 
However, there are also the organisations, referred to as governance structures, which 
are the so-called players of the game. Amongst these, we include firms, trade unions and 
universities. North recognised that, as in any tautological definition, is difficult to draw a 
clear-cut line between organisations and institutional arrangements. This is because some 
organisations, such as universities, might at time belong to both classes. As we will see, in 
some situations organised crime can be considered as a player of the game that operates in 
weak states. 
North’s analysis has been mainly devoted to the exploration of institutional 
arrangements, which are often considered as the macro analyses. Micro applications, as 
applied to, for example, organisations have been the subject of much work by Coase and 
Williamson. We discuss this approach in the next section. 
 
1.2.2 Coase and Williamson  
 
The 1937 paper by Coase “The nature of the firm” is often regarded as the foundation 
of NIE. In this seminal work, the author criticized the neo classical view of the economy as 
an equilibrating process of supply and demand through the price mechanism. In neoclassical 
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economics, the firm is a black box that transforms inputs and outputs depending on 
technology and constraints. Coase concentrated on the governance issues of the firm rather 
than on production. The author postulated that all the transaction costs5 involved in trade 
influence the firm’s structure and organisation. Thus, Klein (1999, p.464) argued that “the 
decision to organise transactions within the firm as opposed to on the open market- the 
‘make or buy decision’- depends on the relative costs of internal and external exchange.” 
Williamson (1985)6 built on this approach to provide a complete framework of the role of 
transaction costs in the economy. His idea was that any kind of economic exchange involves 
some costs. For example, firms have to spend time bargaining and securing that the 
business traders behave well. Firms consider all these potential costs when they decide their 
governance and choose the one that minimize such costs. In this respect, Williamson (1996, 
p. 46), argued that the aim of an economic organisation is to “align transactions, which 
differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way”. Therefore, 
firms will choose amongst a series of institutional alternatives. Business firms, long-term 
contracts, public bureaucracies, nonprofit organizations and other contractual agreements 
are typical examples. Williamson believed that transaction costs not only affect firms but 
also shape the entire economy7.  
Based on this assumption, the author developed his own classification of institutions. 
Williamson (2000) identified four levels of social analysis. The first is the social 
embeddedness level which refers to norms, mores and traditions. This level is similar to the 
informal agreements described by North. These types of social arrangements are slow to 
change, as shown by Putnam et al (1993) in his study of civicness in Italy. Level two is the 
institutional environment which includes “the executive, the legislative, judicial and 
bureaucratic function of government as well as the distribution of powers across different 
level of government“ (Williamson, 2000, p.598). The third one is “where the institutions of 
governance are located” (ibid., p.599). This level concentrates on the governance of 
contractual relationships and how they align with transactions. Finally, the last level is the 
one at “which the neoclassical analysis works” (ibid., p.600). This includes production, 
                                                 
5
 These could be considered as the sum of production and organisation costs. 
6
 Amongst the other works. 
7
 In fact, Williamson thought that transaction costs apply not only to firms, but to all economic agents who 
trade and live in a specific institutional setting. 
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employment and market equilibrium. For our analysis, we are mainly interested in levels 
one to three. Level one is strongly related to social capital, which is the topic of our third 
research paper. Moreover, the analysis of level two and three analysis help us to understand 
why organised crime emerged and how it could prosper. In fact, these two levels deal with 
property rights and contract enforcement which need to be well protected and enforced in 
order for a society to develop (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
Coase was the first scholar to focus specifically on property rights. In fact, the author 
assumed that when people are trading, they are de facto dealing with property rights. 
Williamson went further by arguing that the neo classical view wrongly assumed that the 
protection of property rights is costless and that they are perfectly enforcable. Williamson 
argued that, given that human beings are opportunistic, they are subject to predation 
(Menard and Shirley, 2011, p.8). Moreover, since legal enforcement is quite costly, people 
will prefer to resort to private measures. This analysis is close to that of Dixit which we will 
analyse in detail shortly. Similar arguments were applied to contract enforcement. 
Williamson rejected the standard view of contracts as being both complete and perfectly 
enforced. He claimed that this view fails to take into account the reality of human 
behaviour. In real markets, contract enforcement is far from being perfect because people 
will adopt opportunistic behaviour which will lead to increased costs. In this respect, 
Williamson (2000, p.599) argues : “Costless court ordering being a fiction, much of the 
contract management and dispute settlement action is dealt with directly by the parties- 
through private ordering”. Indeed, in Sicily in the XIX century (or in some parts of today’s 
Italy) people preferred to resort to private arrangements, rather than going to court.  
So far, we have examined the main contributions of the NIE. Extensions of such 
concepts led to the economic analysis of crime we review in the next sections.   
 
1.2.3 Law and economics   
 
As we have seen, the NIE places a great emphasis on the rule of the games. Amongst 
them, the legal environment has received particular attention. The specific economic field 
which deals with this interaction is the well-known of law and economics8.  
                                                 
8
 For a review on law and economics see Polinsky (1983). 
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Law and economics analyses the impact of laws, or legal frameworks in a broad sense. 
However, the impact does not necessarily need to be on markets or prices. Rather, its being 
subject of economic analysis lies in the fact that it uses the standard economic approach of 
incentives in predicting the agents’ (legal) behaviour9. Law and economics’ applications are 
numerous and range from antitrust policy to the economics of marriage. In our case, we are 
interested in the criminal law perspectives developed first by Becker, in his already-
mentioned 1968 paper. In this seminal work, the Nobel laureate models the market for 
criminal offences using a standard economic framework. Criminals are rational individuals 
who maximize their expected utility. In particular, a person will commit a crime if the 
expected utility from committing a crime exceeds that of not doing so. This utility function 
depends (positively) on the financial rewards of the criminal act, such as the money stolen. 
It further depends (negatively) on the deterrence variable, i.e. the probability and severity 
of punishment. Finally, it depends on a series of socio-economic variables which increase 
(decrease) the utility stemming from illegal behaviour10. The greater the probability of being 
caught, because of, for example, an efficient police, the fewer people will decide to become 
criminals. This approach has been tested in many works (Levitt, 1998; Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2004). In general, there is consensus on the role played by the deterrence 
variable, much less on the socio-economic ones. The paper on trust and victimization in the 
Caribbean shows an application of the Becker model to the Caribbean countries. However, 
due to a lack of available deterrence variables we focus on socio-economic determinants of 
crime.     
 
1.2.4 Lawlessness and economics  
 
Another way of looking at crime connected to the NIE approach is the one that follows 
directly the view proposed by Williamson (1979, 1985). Contrary to the mainstream 
neoclassical view, the author recognises that individuals often have opportunistic 
                                                 
9
 Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989, p. 1068) argue that this theory “treats laws, like prices, as incentives for 
behaviour”.  
10
 A review of such literature is in chapter three and four. 
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behaviour11. A natural extension of this approach is to consider appropriative behaviour, 
such as theft and extortion, which are important to our analysis of crime. This type of 
analysis offers a different perspective on how crime might be integrated in economic 
analysis. 
In the next sections we review two major contributions which deal with these issues. 
The first is the one by Hirshleifer (1989, 1995)  and the second by Dixit (2004). Hirshleifer’s 
starting point is the rent seeking literature developed by Tullock (1980). In Hirshleifer’s 
models, individuals have some initial resources, R. However, contrary to the neoclassical 
view, someone’s resources might be deprived by predatory behaviour by other individuals. 
Alternatively, the same individual might himself engage in predatory activities. Therefore, 
an individual uses part of his endowment in production and part in “fighting”. Analytically 




Where E represents the productive effort and F the fighting efforts. The last one is 
devoted to predatory activities or defence from other people’s predatory behaviours. a and 
b are unit cost of transforming resources into productive or fighting efforts. This formula 
shows how destructive interaction might be included in an economic model. The quantity of 
resources that each individual get from predatory activities is given by the Contest Success 




Where m is the decisiveness parameter of the fighting technology. Therefore, according 
to the individual’s ability to “fight”, he/she will receive a greater share of the contestable 
resources. This led Hirshflier to formulate two of his most famous theories. One is the 
paradox of power (1995), which says that even the weakest party (in terms of resources) 
                                                 
11
 Williamson says that the concept of opportunism is quite different from the standard self interested 
individual depicted in the mainstream economics. It can be derived from the Machiavelli’s analysis in the book 
“The Prince”. 
12
 See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a review of contest success functions and the economics of conflict. 
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might end up better than his initial position if he fights hard. Therefore, fighting (stealing, 
committing crimes, etc) is sometimes more convenient than producing. The other one 
states that, under certain circumstances, anarchy can be an equilibrium outcome. By 
anarchy, the author means an “order in which participants can seize and defend resources 
without regulation from above” (Hausken, 2006, p.267). This applies to the analysis of 
organised crime we conduct in the first and second paper in this dissertation. In fact, the 
state authorities were so weak to generate an anarchic situation, which was exploited by an 
organisation as the Mafia.  
The second important contribution to the understanding of crime in economic terms is 
that of Dixit (2004). The author starts his analysis by acknowledging that in certain situations 
the government/state fails completely to ensure the protection of property rights and to 
enforce contracts. For example, this could be due to chronic inefficiencies in the judicial 
system. In all these cases, individuals who want to trade will find it very costly to do so and 
seek alternative models of economic governance13. Dixit defined this as lawlessness and 
economics. In this regard, Dixit (ibid., p.3-4) argues:  
 
”of course, economic activity does not grind to a halt because the 
government cannot or does not provide an adequate underpinning of the 
law. Too much potential value would go unrealized; therefore, groups and 
societies have much to gain if they can create alternative institutions to 
provide necessary economic governance. They attempt to develop, and 
sometimes succeed in developing, such institutions of varying degrees of 
effectiveness”. 
 
The examples of such alternative ordering, very similar to the one proposed by 
Williamson, are numerous. Dixit recognises that self-enforcing governance through 
repeated interaction is the solution that game theorists have analysed most. Thus, if players 
value the future highly enough, the temptation to cheat might be mitigated by the future 
gains. Therefore, players can always punish deviant traders in future stages (meetings). 
However, in reality, many transactions involve one-shot14 interaction with different actors at 
each stage. In the case the traders belong to the same group, the fact that a trader cheated 
will become common knowledge amongst the group. As a result, the next cheater’s trading 
                                                 
13
 Dixit (2004, p. 14) says: “the need for governance arises because, in its absence, individuals pursuing their 
own interests would generate an inferior equilibrium outcome”. 
14
 Single interactions with no repletion. 
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partner will always deviate and not cooperate. All future playoffs of the cheater will be 
reduced. When people get in contact with agents outside their group, such information is 
not available. Therefore, self-governance is not feasible anymore. One possibility of dealing 
with this is to use third parties that provide information on individuals’ trading history. This 
is the example of credit-rating agencies or arbitration. Moreover, trading parties require 
that contracts are enforced. In the absence of law, as we will see shortly, organised crime 
might function as a contract enforcer. Its efficiency is based on its reputation of preventing 
people from cheating and not respecting the contracts. This is the analysis we review in 
section 1.4. 
Finally, we provide support to the claim that crime matters in the economic literature 
and should be taken into account in the mainstream analysis. The NIE and close theories, 
with their challenges to neoclassical economics, offer a theoretical framework to do so. In 
the next section, we will give an overview of the contents of the three research papers, and 
consider the applications of NIE for our understanding of the research questions we 
address. 
 
1.3 Summaries of the papers 
 
The first paper (second chapter) is titled Emerging Classes and the Fight for Resources: 
an Empirical Investigation into the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia. It deals with an under-
explored field of research, that is, the origins of the Sicilian Mafia. The abolition of feudalism 
(1812) and the Unification of Italy (1861) changed many of the institutional and social 
settings in Sicily. In particular, violence and banditry became widespread, mainly because 
the state was not able to impose its authority. This is a typical example of anarchic situation 
discussed above. Moreover, the institutional changes created and embryonic market for the 
land and new political and commercial opportunities.  
In her seminal work, Bandiera (2003) exploited such features to describe the market for 
protection. Bandiera adopted a principal agency model in order to analyse such market. 
Thus in her approach, each landowner is willing to pay more to be the only or one of the few 
protected. This is because unprotected landowners will certainly be robbed of their goods. 
The main findings of the model are that the presence of Mafia is higher where the land is 
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more fragmented and with greater value. Bandiera tested these hypotheses empirically and 
found evidence to support them. We propose a slightly different theoretical approach, 
closer to that of leading historians such as Lupo (2004) and Pezzino (1987). This is because 
they provide a more comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon. These authors focused on 
the new business and political opportunities created by the changes in the status quo. Since 
the new State was not able to secure property rights or enforce contracts, social actors used 
violence to take advantage of such opportunities. Mafia developed as an instrument for 
emerging elites in their quest for commercial and political power. These struggles were 
particularly harsh in the rural part of Sicily because of greater opportunities in the market 
for the land. We test this hypothesis employing a new dataset. We overcome the issues on 
the measurement of Mafia presence by combining data from two parliamentary enquiries, 
as Damiani (1881-1886) and Bonfadini and Borsani (1968). Moreover, we use new variables 
which are helpful in explaining organised crime presence. The key results are that Mafia is 
likely to be active where there are large properties, which is our proxy for new opportunities 
for these emerging classes. Also, according to the protection view, Mafia is more present 
where land value is higher. We also find that organised crime is active in less populated 
councils and where there were few peasants who owned the land. 
In the second paper (third chapter), Migrating Mafia, we deal with a new field of 
research, the migration of criminal organisations outside their original regions. From the 
1970s onwards, several criminal organisations transplanted from their southern base to not 
traditional areas, such as Piedmont and Lombardy. At the beginning, they were mainly 
interested in profitable illegal markets such as those for drugs and gambling. Soon after, 
these groups started to control legal markets such as construction and hospitality. In recent 
times, they managed to establish some relationship with corrupted political actors (DNA, 
2009). Despite growing alarms in the media, no one has ever quantitatively studied the 
drivers of Mafia migration. We try to answer such questions. Amongst others, Varese (2006) 
recognised two factors as having played a major role in the spread of Mafia. The first is the 
migration of southerns to the North during the period of Italian industrialization. The second 
is the policy of forced re-settlement of criminals, which consisted in sending North Mafiosi 
with the aim of “redeeming” them. We empirically investigate this hypothesis creating panel 
data at the provincial level for the period 1983-2008. The dataset contains original data 
from previously under explored primary sources. Our new data on forced re-settlement 
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have never been used in any quantitative study before whilst our new data on migration 
have never been employed before in any economic study. We add controls in line with 
Becker’s model of crime. Consistent with the community network approach (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1997; Moretti, 1999) we find that migration is by far the most important 
predictor of Mafia presence in the hosting provinces. Not only, has migration from Mafia-
infested regions seemed to have an even stronger effect on subsequent level of Mafia 
activity. Contrary to the expectations, we do not find that forced re-settlement significantly 
affected Mafia expansion. We argue that probably what mattered was not the number of 
Mafia members sent to the North, but their role in the organised crime hierarchy given their 
ability to create criminal networks.  
The last paper is Trust and Victimization: Evidence from five Caribbean Countries. This 
paper draws from the rich literature on social capital which spawned from Putnam (1995)’s 
seminal work. This kind of capital has been associated with many positive socio – economic 
outcomes, such as development, trade and investment (Keefer and Knack, 1997; Guiso et 
al., 2009). However, few works (Buonanno et al., 2009, and Fajnzylber and Lederman et al., 
2002) analysed how social capital affects crime levels. These studies found some evidence of 
crime reducing effects. Social capital might work as a deterrent to crime as it reduces 
transaction costs and the possibility of conflicts. These works mainly employed macro data 
and, so, few observations which leads to a loss of precision in estimation. Moreover, none of 
them focused specifically on trust. In our paper, we evaluate the role of trust on crime in 
five Caribbean countries: Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Dominican 
Republic. Given that social capital is a multi-faceted concept, we decided to focus exclusively 
on trust. We use individual data taken from Americas Barometer for 2010. This is an opinion 
poll conducted by Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in several American states 
every two years. The crime data were taken from a question on victimization experience. 
Given that trust might be endogenous to crime experience, we employed an instrumental 
variable approach. As single instrument, we considered trust in the election system. We ran 
different regressions for all types of crime and, then, separately for property and violent 
crimes. As sensitivity analysis, we regressed different specifications. The results show that 
our measure of trust (worthiness) exerts a crime reducing effect on property but not on 
violent crimes. In particular, a one percent increases in our measure of trust leads to a lower 
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probability of being a victim of property crimes by 0.286%. We also ran the model for single 
countries, with much heterogeneity in the results. 
Each of these three contributions explores a specific topic of the economics of crime 
literature. However, they share similarities in the sense that they can be classified through a 
common theoretical background. 
 
1.4 The New Institutional Economics in this context 
 
The topics treated in this dissertation rely on the insight that often the criminal law 
system cannot deter criminal actions, fully or partially. As a consequence, individuals resort 
to “extra-legal” solutions to protect property rights and reduce uncertainty in market 
transactions. As shown by Dixit, there are several possible alternatives methods to do so. In 
this dissertation, we deal with two of them: organised crime and social capital. The former is 
a private entity which substitutes to institutional failure by providing some sort of state 
functions. Social capital is the typical example of informal agreements (institutions) which 
alter the incentives of committing crimes. In the next two sub sections, we review how the 
NIE, and similar theories, fit each of these cases.  
 
1.4.1 Papers on organised crime 
 
The analysis of organised crime presented in the first two papers embrace different 
aspects of the new institutional economics approach. It is consistent with Williamson’s 
opportunism view explored by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995). Moreover, it involves the 
lawlessness and economics approach by Dixit (2004) and finally the transaction cost 
analysis15. Each of these contributes to understand both the origins of Sicilian Mafia in the 
XIX century and the migration of Mafia in the second half of the last century.  
Skaperdas and Syropulos (1995) present the origins of organised crime as forming out 
of an anarchic16 situation. The authors affirmed that Mafia17 emerged in situations of power 
                                                 
15
 Also, we could have analysed it through other perspectives but we decided to consider the most significant 
ones. In chapter two and three we present extensive evidence of different theories on organised crime.  
16
 As explained by Hausken (2006). 
17
 They argued that the same applies to primitive states, i.e. “young” states where the role of law is weak. This 
is similar to the definition of natural states by North et al (2009). 
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vacuum due to the inability of the state to protect property rights. The reasons of such state 
failure18 could be due to geographical, economic and social distance. The author developed 
an anarchic model similar to the one reviewed in section 1.2.4 by Hirshleifer (1989). There 
are two agents who can devote part of their resources for production and the remaining can 
be converted in guns, i.e. fighting effort. However, in this case all the resources produced 
are subject to predation, depending on each agent’s probability to win. Those who 
contribute more to the total production, because they are harder workers or more 
technologically advanced will receive a smaller share of the total contested pie. ”The 
incentives for productive innovation are few, if any, relative to ideal perfectly competitive 
economies where innovation is rewarded” (ibid., p.67). Instead, those who are unproductive 
but have a competitive advantage over violence will become predominant in the anarchic 
situation. 
The view developed by Skaperdas and Syropulos pictures well what happened in Sicily 
after the end of feudalism and the Unification of Italy. In fact, the situation in the island at 
that time was similar to an anarchic one. The public authorities were not able to secure 
property rights and enforce contracts at all. As a consequence, banditry and violence 
became widespread. In such a scenario, Mafia could exploit its competitive advantage over 
violence19 and emerged as a major social actor. As the insights of the model suggests, it 
formed a perverse equilibrium in which the most violent individuals could enjoy revenues 
even though they were less productive. In fact, Mafia did not contribute to the production 
process, rather it lived out of so called rent capitalism. It extorted money from landowners 
but also sustained emerging classes in their quest for power. For example, the gabellotto20, 
which is a central figure of the Mafia, lived off sub-rents from peasants without investing at 
all in agrarian technology21.  
In the third chapter, we present a different context in which organised crime operates. 
We deal with Mafia transplantation from the Italian southern regions to the developed and 
industrialized central and northern ones. The scenario looks different from the anarchic one 
described in the model by Skaperdas and Syropoulos. However, even in highly developed 
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 As also explained in Skaperdas (2001). 
19
 This advantage was due to the fact that it was composed of former private guards and bandits. 
20
 See chapter two for a definition. 
21
 The situation of Sicily at that time has been compared to the one of Russia in the aftermath of the 
communist era. In Varese (2005), the author argued that the state could not fully protect property rights and, 
so, private protection was necessary to survive in the transition to a market economy. 
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countries such as the USA, Canada or Australia Mafia could settle. The reason is probably 
that the state is not able to secure property rights in all markets, and Mafia exploits failures 
in such grey areas. A typical example is the one of illegal business. By law, the state does not 
interfere in such markets but only punishes traders in such activities. Still, even in the 
underground world there is a necessity for securing property rights. As a consequence, 
Mafia could step in and regulate such “anarchic” situation through its power. This is what 
happened in the central and northern regions in the post-war period with the flourishing 
drug market, or in the USA with prohibitionism. Mafia then expanded in legal sectors such 
as construction or hospitality and now it is supposed to be involved in almost all economic 
activities. Again, this reflects that there are grey areas even in the formal economy where 
the state is not able to impose its authority22. Mafia, with its competitive advantage over 
violence, can enforce contracts or secure property rights better than the state23.The chronic 
deficiencies of the Italian judicial system do help Mafia in this respect. 
The second contribution we consider is the one by Dixit (2004), which is complementary 
to the one presented above. As we have seen earlier, Dixit specifically considered a situation 
of lawlessness. In this scenario, the state is completely unable to secure property rights and 
alternative ordering emerges. Organised crime is the typical example of this. Dixit developed 
some interesting models which could be applied to organised crime and that are useful in 
our context. In particular, the author distinguished two functions of the Mafia: as a provider 
of information and as a contract enforcer. He modelled the problems faced by traders in 
such situations similar to a prisoner dilemma. Let us suppose we have two players, who 
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 This happened in USA as well. In fact, Mafia was particularly active in legal sectors such as the carting one. 
23
 Of course, pursuing its own interests. 
24
 Of course, this is situation is different from that with the same actors repeating the same game. In this case, 
co-operation could be achieved by the Folk theorem if actors value future outcomes relatively high.  
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Table 1.1 Prisoner’s dilemma  
 
 Player 2 
Comply                         Deviate 
           Comply 
 Player 1  
   Deviate                   
C,C L,W 
W, L D,D 
 
These satisfy the chain of inequalities:  W>C>D>0>L. The players left to themselves 
always choose to deviate. In order to achieve better outcomes there is an intermediary 
(Mafia) who steps in and offer its services for profit to customers. Dixit considered two 
types of services separately: in the first, the Mafia sells information about trading history of 
traders to its customers for a fee. In the second, Mafia can also deter cheating by using 
violence, or the threat of it, charging again a fee. As in every repeated game, it is important 
the rate of discount of future outcomes. The ideal situation (equilibrium) is: everybody is a 
customer of the Mafia, the Mafia reveals the information truthfully and the customers 
follow the strategies proposed by the mafioso. However, in order to have an equilibrium fee 
(or a range of equilibrium fees) the author considers all the possible deviations from this 
equilibrium. The main findings of the models suggest that in the case both types of 
intermediations are possible, the fees (revenues) that an enforcer imposes are higher than 
the ones for the information intermediary. As a consequence, the profits are higher when 
Mafia is also an enforcer, which leads to higher violence.  
The analysis by Dixit applies very well to the first paper as it describes a situation of 
complete state failure. Again, Mafia is a reaction to this situation and help achieve better 
outcomes than pure anarchy. The issue of information is central to the analysis of organised 
crime as expressed by Gambetta (1993)25. The enforcement role is also one of the key 
features of the Sicilian Mafia in the XIX century. As shown by Bandiera (2003), Mafia 
invested many resources in reputation, which is fundamental in scaring potential cheaters.  
Mafia groups in the central and northern Italy have similar functions, although operate 
in a different context. Of course, the number of clients is much smaller than in the regions 
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 We review Gambetta (1993) analysis in chapter two. 
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were Mafia is dominant26. Still, in some situations Mafia have such functions. As we will see 
in detail in the third chapter, Mafia could develop because of the extensive migration 
networks created in the post war period. Inside such communities, it is likely that Mafia 
worked as guarantor of peoples’ trustworthiness and, obviously, as an enforcer to 
contracts27. Indeed, even in such regions it could be applied to the concept of lawlessness in 
specific segments of economic activity.  
The last contribution we consider is the one by Anderson (1995) who applied 
transaction cost analysis to contemporary Sicilian and American Mafia28. The author first 
addressed why Mafia should be considered as a governance structure rather than a firm. In 
particular, she emphasized how organised crime has governmental functions, such as law 
enforcement and justice, along being a key player in illegal businesses. Summarising, 
Anderson (ibid., p.40) said: “its governance hierarchy was thus not the same as its economic 
structure. It used violence and negotiations to monopolize a territory within which its 
members operated certain illegal enterprises (especially gambling), thus functioning as a 
government, albeit an incomplete government”. She then provided evidence to show how 
the aim of minimizing transaction costs led Mafia to have such an organisational structure. 
First, the author affirmed that the family governance of most of southern based Italian 
Mafia is “suitable to low-trust environments “(ibid., p.43). Moreover, Mafia have always 
been centred on the male members of the nuclear family. Anderson then considered how 
disloyalty and cheating are particularly relevant and how they impose high costs to such 
organisations. In order to reduce these transaction costs, criminals prefer to have small 
organisations. In turn, this goes against the feasible economy of scale suitable to the illegal 
markets. Finally, she recognised that the cupola (body of leading members of Mafia families) 
might have helped to reduce internal warfare amongst criminals.  
The transaction cost analysis employed by Anderson is easily applied to our case. This is 
despite the fact Anderson’s analysis the focus was on contemporary Sicilian and American 
Mafia29. In fact, the organisation of Sicilian Mafia in the XIX century shares many traits with 
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 This is because Mafia in southern regions is more entrenched in the society compared to the one in the 
Centre and the North. 
27
 There are cases where this happens also in non-traditional areas, although to a very small extent. 
28
 Even Dick (1995) conducts a similar analysis. He affirmed that the mainstream view on organised crime as a 
monopoly does not match with the empirical evidences. Therefore, he proposes to use transaction costs 
analysis to explain the firm’s choice of market supply or self- supply of illegal goods.  
29
 The paper is of 1995 so does not consider the most recent evolutions of such organisations.  
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the one Anderson described. In particular, the low level of trust30 and consequently the high 
risk of disloyalty played a major role in shaping the structure of Mafia. Moreover, there was 
a well-defined hierarchical structure and a governance structure which reflected the need of 
minimizing transaction costs.   
Even in the contribution on Mafia migration, we see that transaction cost analysis is a 
powerful tool in explaining the organisation’s features. These gangs present a structure 
which reflects the need of optimizing on transaction costs. In particular, family governance 
and the small size of the gangs are some of the main characteristics of the most powerful 
Mafia: the ‘Ndrangheta. Many juridical reports (DNA, 2009) evidence how the main unit of 
such group, the so-called ‘ndrina, is the family. This works as a deterrent for whistleblowers 
who are discouraged from testifying against their own relatives31.  
The application of transaction costs to Mafia might be an interesting topic for future 
research. For example, it would be interesting to explain heterogeneity in organisational 
structures amongst the four major Italian Mafias32. Moreover, this could be linked to the 
differences between institutions and organisations proposed by North. In fact, in some parts 
of the south of Italy, Mafia acts as an institution and enjoys some sort of popular consent. 
On the other hand, in the North Mafia is more business orientated. So, it is closer to an 
organisation. These differences constitute an agenda for future investigation. 
As we have seen, different approaches based on the NIE, are helpful and provide a 
theoretical framework for our analysis. In the next section, we argue that this is also the 
case for social capital in developing countries, as for those in the Caribbean. 
 
1.4.2 Paper on trust and victimization in the Caribbean  
 
In the first two papers, we have dealt with a possible alternative of securing property 
rights and enforcing contracts to the state: the Mafia. However, organised crime or private 
enforcement agencies are just one type of social arrangement which might deter crime. In 
the third paper, we take a step further in the analysis of institutions and deal with social 
capital. In particular, as we have seen in section 1.2 we study how trust, one of the main 
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 As highlighted also by Gambetta (1993). 
31
 We know that the the Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta , Camorra and Sacra Corona Unita have different structures. 
However, such an analysis is well beyond the scope of this introduction and thesis.  
32
 As an example, the Neapolitan camorra has a more flexible structure compared to that of the ‘Ndrangheta 
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aspects of social capital, affects victimization levels. This is an important example of how 
extra-legal arrangements might function as a deterrent for committing crime in developing 
countries. 
In paper three, we will give a comprehensive overview of the definition of social capital 
and trust. For the moment, we employ Gambetta’s (1988, p.217-8) definition:  
 
"there is a degree of convergence in the definition of trust which can 
be summarized as follows: trust is a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of 
agents will perform a particular action. When we say we trust someone or 
that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that 
he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us 
is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation 
with him". 
 
Therefore, from an economic point of view, this view is similar to the risk approach 
used by Williamson (1993). In fact, this author considered trust as similar to risk because the 
lower the level of trust, the higher is the risk to engage in a relationship (transaction) with 
somebody. 
The concept of social capital so far explained could easily fit the definition of informal 
arrangements which has been developed both by North and Williamson. The former places 
a great emphasis on their role and recognises its important position in the institutional 
framework. North (1990) said that formal rules represent just a small part in defining the 
constraints that influence choices. On the other hand, “the governing structure is 
overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions” (ibid., 
p.36). From a theoretical point of view, such agreements could be thought of Nash equilibria 
of repeated games played where members of a society interacts continuously.  
As discussed in section 1.2.2, Williamson (2000) puts the social embeddedness level at 
the top of his institutional ladder. In it, the author inserts informational institutions, 
customs, traditions, norm and religion. In particular, Williamson assigned a fundamental 
role to religion. The author believed that such institutions were taken for granted by 
economists. They change very slowly over time, in the order of century and millennia. Also, 
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Williamson believed that they originated spontaneously, “which is to say that deliberative 
choice of a calculative kind is minimally implicated” (ibid., p.597). However, Williamson 
seems to place less emphasis on their role compared to North33.  
What relationship is there between informal and formal institutions? North (1990) 
claims that good quality formal institutions encourage greater and better informal 
arrangements amongst citizens. However, in developed countries people think that formal 
rules are predominant, whereas in North’s view, informal ones are at least as important. 
This approach is shared by other scholars who recognise how “social control” might be more 
effective than formal law to achieve positive socio-economic outcomes. For example, 
informal arrangements are important in lowering transaction costs and promoting welfare. 
In our paper, we argue that such beneficial effects might also be played in reducing crime. In 
fact, dense social capital networks and high levels of trust might provide efficient deterrents 
of crime and substitutes for legal forces, such as the police and the judicial system. This is 
particularly true, especially considering that we are dealing with developing countries as in 
the Caribbean. In fact, these are countries where the rule of law, or formal institutions, is 
also very weak34. As a result, informal agreements or social control might complement the 
role of the criminal law system. Interestingly, Ollson et al. (2009) in their study on the role of 
formal and informal institutions on growth, found that social capital exerts a bigger impact 
on growth at low levels of institutional development. On the other hand, its effect it is not 
that important when institutions become strong. Therefore, it is legit to think that social 
capital has a very important role in weak states where formal institutions are not really 
developed.  
Our analysis confirms this, as we found a strong negative deterrent effect of trust on 





This introductory chapter presents a framework which is helpful to contextualize the 
contributions made in the thesis. In particular, we argue that our research could be better 
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 In fact, Williamson (2000) said that NIE is mainly interested in levels two and three of his ladder. 
34
 This is shown by various governance indicators, such as those of the World Bank.   
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understood applying the new institutional economic approach. In the neoclassical view, 
property rights and contracts are supposed to be perfectly secured and enforced. However, 
in reality, this does not happen and there will be thefts, violence and insecurity. NIE theory, 
and its extensions, shows how criminal behaviours can be taken into account in economics 
(Becker, 1968; Dixit, 2004; etc). Moreover, crime is generally a sign of the inability of states 
to protect property rights and enforce contracts. In such situations, societies develop 
alternative ways to provide security in economic transactions. In this thesis, we present two 
of them: organised crime and social capital. The former is a for profit private organisation 
that substituted for the state in some fundamental functions (Dixit, 2004). We consider 
Mafia in two different contexts: in the second chapter, we analyse the origins of the Sicilian 
Mafia in the XIX century. This is the typical example of how the inability of the state to 
secure property rights led to alternative ordering. Following North’s (1990) definition, at 
that time Mafia could have been considered an institution, not only as an organisation35. In 
the third paper, we consider the factors that could explain the migration of Mafia from the 
south to the central and northern Italian regions. Again, the new institutional approach 
helps to understand their structure. It also contributes to our understanding of how such 
organisations could survive and prosper outside their original territories. We argue that 
even in developed contests, the state is not able to secure property rights in all markets. The 
fourth chapter takes a step further and investigates how informal rules might deter criminal 
behaviours. In fact, we consider how trust affects victimization in five selected Caribbean 
countries. This is particularly interesting as we are dealing with developing countries where 
the rule of law is absent or loosely enforced. Therefore, social control might become a good 
substitute to the criminal law system in increasing the costs of being criminals and, so, 
reduce crime.   
Finally, in this first chapter we have proposed a common theoretical approach to better 
understand the thesis. However, each paper presents its own literature review which is 
specific to the topic treated. Therefore, this introduction should be seen as complementary 
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Chapter 2: Emerging classes and the fight for resources: an 


































2.1 Introduction and motivations 
 
Mafia imposes serious socio-economic costs to societies (Pinotti, 2012). Despite this, 
the literature on organised crime is still scarce (Daniele, 2009; Skaperdas, 2011). In 
particular, there is no consensus on the factors which favoured the birth of such 
organisations. We decided to assess the origins of probably the most known Mafia, the 
Sicilian Cosa Nostra. The only paper to date which deals with this topic is that of Bandiera 
(2003). As her main theoretical background, Bandiera considers the work of Gambetta 
(1993), which focuses on the view of Mafia emerging as a protection agency, and Mafiosi 
being the entrepreneurs of the “good” protection. Based on this theoretical background, 
Bandiera developed a common agency model which predicts that Mafia is more likely to 
emerge where land is fragmented and has higher value. She then tested these findings 
empirically using data on 70 western councils which support this intuition.  
Our paper considers a broader view of the origins of the Sicilian Mafia, closer to that by 
leading historians such as Lupo (2004) and Pezzino (1987, 1995a.b). Along with the 
protection view, these authors consider Mafia as the army employed by the emerging social 
classes to capture the lords’ legacy against rival factions. This difference is not trivial. In fact 
considering Mafia only as a protection agency we would expect, as found by Bandiera, that 
Mafia is more likely to be present mainly in the proximity of the cities. This is where land 
was more fragmented and agriculture was richer. In contrast, we expect Mafia to be present 
where land income is higher but also, and mainly, in the countryside. This is because it was 
in such areas that the greatest opportunities emerged for new social actors to capture the 
lords’ legacies36. 
In order to empirically verify this approach, we use a new measure of Mafia activity. 
The main reason for not relying exclusively on Jacini (Damiani, 1881-1886), the one 
employed by Bandiera, is that it could misrepresent the true Mafia presence, especially for 
the western section of the island. Therefore, we combined these data with those from the 
Bonfadini enquiry (Borsani and Bonfadini, 1968) in order to give a better “picture “of the 
phenomenon. We further consider two specifications: one with all the Sicilian provinces and 
the other with only the four western ones. Moreover, we include variables which have 
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 As we will review soon, by lords’ legacy we mean all the economic and political powers which lords are 
slowly loosing after the institutional changes. 
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never been used before. The results are that Mafia seems to be present not only in councils 
with rich agriculture but also where there are large properties and cereal cultivation, with 
less density of population, where the 1860s37 reform had more impact on the division of 
land and where there are fewer peasant owners of the land. In general, we find evidence to 
support the view of Mafia originating where the fight for resources by the emerging classes 
was greater. These results show that the market for protection is part of the story and that 
our approach seems to be more adequate in explaining the origins of the Sicilian Mafia. 
Finally, in order to provide robustness to our analysis, we compared Sicily with Sardinia. 
We chose the latter because, as Sicily, it experienced very high crime rate after the end of 
feudalism38. Despite having favourable conditions for the creation of a market for 
protection, this did not lead to the birth of a Mafia-type organisation. The reasons for this 
might be that, amongst others, in Sardinia the end of feudalism did not lead to the 
competition of resources as in Sicily because of a different land system and labour market 
conditions and lower density of population.  
The paper is organised as follows: section two reviews the relevant literature. In 
particular, it focuses on the end of feudalism and its consequences. The third section 
presents the data and explains the variables considered. Section four illustrates the 
econometric methodology and results. The fifth section concentrates on the comparison 
between Sardinia and Sicily. Section six concludes. 
 
2.2 Historical background and literature review 
 
The origins of the Sicilian Mafia cannot be traced to a particular date. As suggested by 
Marino (2007, p.20), it is generally agreed to be a “long period phenomenon”. The first 
mention of the word Mafia was in the play I mafiusi della Vicaria in 186339. From that year 
                                                 
37
 The reforms aimed at dismantling the large estates system and encouraging the creation of small and 
medium landowners. In the next section, we will revise in detail how these reforms intended to end feudalism. 
38
 Feudalism was a typical form of political organisation in Europe in medieval time. It emerged because it was 
difficult to rule over large empires and, as a result, more power was given at the local level, particularly to the 
lords. These elites were assigned the control over some fiefs which comprised of villages, churches, granaries 
and various types of fields. The lords had jurisdictional, military and financial power over all the people and 
belongings in such area. Although feudalism was typical of the middle age, in some regions survived this 
period, as in Sicily. For more reference on feudalism, check Bloch (1989). 
39
 In reality the first account of the Mafia is provided by the judge Pietro Cala’ Ulloa in an 1838 document. 
However, he never mentioned the word Mafia and refers to generic brotherhood associations. 
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on, it was extensively used, even with inappropriate purposes (Falcone, 1981). For our 
analysis, it is important to note that our data refer to 1882, so we are not dealing with its 
origins, rather with its first development period40. 
As the emergence of the Mafia is a “long period phenomenon”, it is useful to take a 
step back and explain the background in which it originated. In particular, we need to 
consider the pre-Unitarian situation under the Bourbonic Kingdom and how the end of 
feudalism links with the origins of the Mafia. 
The 1812 constitution41, which abolished feudalism, lead to two major changes in the 
status quo: the shift of the monopoly over violence from the lords’42 hands to the state and 
the creation of an embryonic market for the land. As a consequence, the years after 1812 
witnessed a substantial increase in banditry, and in particular armed gangs, as testified by 
Fiume (1984)43. In this section and for most of the paper we talk without distinction of 
bandits/Mafia. The reasons for doing so is that , especially until the 1861 unification of Italy, 
the phenomenon of organised banditry and Mafia cannot really be set apart as it would be 
possible to do it later44. 
We next consider in more detail the two major changes brought up by the 1812 
constitution and how they are linked with the origins of the Mafia.  
 
2.2.1 State failure 
 
After the 1812 constitution, the state formally held the monopoly over violence but it 
was not able de facto to protect people and belongings, to secure property rights and 
enforce contracts. The reasons for this failure are various: lack of a good organisation, 
                                                 
40
 This is mainly due to the lack of organic data for the previous periods. 
41
 It was the first in pre-Unitarian Italy. It also introduced a parliament with two chambers as the English one, it 
separated the legislative, executive and juridical powers, it created the new figures of judges and a new 
“militia”. In general, it deceased many of the privileges that lords had enjoyed until then. Similar reforms had 
been adopted in 1791 in France and in 1815 in the Netherlands. 
42
 In this work we refer indistinctly to lords, barons, nobles and aristocrats. 
43
 Her work analysed the geographical presence of these gangs for the period 1819-1849, and it is surprising to 
note that their “action ground” is almost identical to the one of the Mafia in the years following the unification 
of Italy. Undoubtedly, it is plausible that armed gangs evolved into Mafia, and this phenomenon was 
accelerated by the newly born Italian state. 
44
 The reason is that mafia is a long period process that gradually evolved from banditry to a more organised 
and sophisticated form as Mafia. 
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complicity between public officials and bandits and also complicity between the population 
and bandits. This was the case for both pre and post –Unitarian Sicily. 
In terms of organisation, we can broadly divide law enforcers into two categories: the 
governmental forces, such as the gendarmes and the carabinieri, and, on the other side, the 
nongovernmental ones, such as the mounted militia45 and field guards46. The former forces 
were composed of individuals from outside Sicily and were ineffective because they did not 
know the places, did not speak the same language as the Sicilians, and were ignorant of the 
culture and traditions of the island (Franchetti, 2006)47.The problem of ignorance of the 
local traditions did not apply to the mounted militia and field guards, which were composed 
of the indigenous population48. Their task was to “maintain public order in the countryside 
and in the farm clusters” (Fiume, 1984, p.116)49. However, they mainly were composed of 
criminals or individuals with tight links with Mafia50. The success of the state was harmed by 
the limited co-operation that the population gave to the public forces to find the bandits. 
Often people offered the bandits protection and support51. Unfortunately, we do not have 
data on the presence of these forces at the council level in order to assess its real impact on 
the Mafia activity.  
Whereas in other countries the increase in banditry followed by the end of feudalism 
was well repressed by the public authorities, in Sicily this did not happen. Instead they 
became “part of the society”, an institution which it was necessary to deal with in all aspects 
                                                 
45
 They were introduced during Garibaldi’s dictatorship. Before that, they were called Armed Companies.  
46
 However, the same speech applies to highly ranked officials. 
47
 Franchetti (2006, p. 53), referring to the carabinieri, says : “They live in the middle of the people a and are 
isolated as if they were in the desert; they see and hear without understanding, and they are like a statue of 
justice in the middle of a gang of bandits”.  
48
 Regarding the field guards Catanzaro (1992, p. 71) says: “the fields guards were private campieri who had 
been organised as municipial police in 1866. They were employed by the councils but received a salary which 
came from contributions by the landowners”.  
49
 Moreover, talking about the Armed Companies, Fiume added: “We can find them almost in all the important 
villages [..] the companies are directly supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. Their duties are to guarantee 
quick and efficient repressive actions” (Fiume, 1984, p. 116). 
50
 Each company was composed by 12 individuals who were chosen directly by the captain of the company. 
The latter was responsible for any thefts which happened on his district and was obliged to refund the victims 
with his own salary whenever stolen properties had not been recovered. This rule was an incentive for 
captains to hire mainly individuals who had strong connections with criminals. Often they hired the criminals 
themselves, in order to recover the highest number of stolen properties. Moreover, the rule favoured the 
creation of strong links between criminals and law enforcers which lead to “disastrous consequences to the 
public order” (Franchetti, 2006, p. 53) 
51
 Franchetti (2006, p.113) argues that: “In Sicily [...], or at least in the areas where the offences are most 
frequent, the details of each crime are known by the entire village’s population. However, people are not 
willing to help the public authorities neither directly nor indirectly, leaving  open space for those who are 
interested in leading them on the wrong way” 
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of private and public affairs52. As the model by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) showed, it 
created a perverse equilibrium where the state was not able to secure property rights and 
enforce contracts. As a consequence, those who had a competitive advantage over violence 
could benefit even though they were less productive or completely unproductive. For 
example, if two people wanted to buy the same piece of land, often the one who was 
backed by the most violent bandits would get it (Lupo, 2004). As the Mafia was tacitly 
recognised by all social groups as a necessary instrument they had to deal with, it is not 
surprising that all groups asked for its services and, voluntarily or not, supported it. This is 
the crucial element that distinguishes Sicilian Mafia from common criminality. The former 
lords required the services of this “industry of violence” to protect their properties that the 
same bandits would attack if the lord did not support them. Moreover, Mafia was important 
for the nobles to keep some of their powers, threatened by the institutional changes. The 
middle class was deeply involved with Mafia as we will discuss below. For the moment it is 
important to say this class used the bandits to “obtain richness, or achieves his desires and 
ambitions” (Bonfadini and Borsani, 1968, p.30). However, it not only used it but also 
belonged to it. In fact, many prominent Mafiosi, especially of the high Mafia53, belonged to 
this class. Finally, the lower classes, which represented the large majority of the population 
at that time, were more likely to be the army of the Mafia. In particular, in the spirit of 
Ehrlich (1973), the harsh living conditions of this class provided an incentive to join Mafia. In 
fact, for the most violent individuals, the opportunity cost of staying at work was too high. 
 
2.2.2 The creation of the land market 
 
So far, we have examined how state failure led to the emergence of Mafia and how all 
social classes used it, even if with different purposes. Next we seek to link its presence with 
the creation of the market for the land, and its role in the emergence of the Mafia. As 
mentioned earlier, the end of feudalism created the conditions for a market of the land 
which did not exist before 1812. The large estates which belonged to the lords were slowly 
split up and could be sold to not aristocrats. This principle was reaffirmed by the newly born 
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 Franchetti (2006, p. 83) further notes that  “banditry is [...] a regular and recognised institution, more or less 
voluntarily depending on the situations, but always taken into account” 
53
 As defined by Marino (2007). 
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Italian state (1861), with the sales of the properties of the church and communes54. The aim 
of the state was to dismantle the economic system based on large estates and to create a 
numerous class of middle and small landowners, as it happened before throughout Europe. 
However, these land reforms did not yield the expected results. Even though many former 
lords’ fiefs disappeared, this did not mean that the large properties and the latifundia55 did 
too (Catanzaro, 1992). On the contrary, the few members of the middle class that had 
enough capital to buy these lands reinforced the existence of large and medium properties. 
The peasants were excluded from these auctions because of their inadequate capital and 
the frequent corrupt practices the higher classes engaged in to win the auctions, often with 
the use of Mafia (Lupo, 2004). Thus, after the reforms, the total land cultivated with cereals, 
a synonym for latifundia, did not change greatly (Marino, 2007)56. Still, these reforms, 
especially the ones after the unification, brought a substantial increase in the number of 
new landowners and gave new opportunities to an emerging bourgeoisie to improve their 
wealth and power. The link between these emerging classes and Mafia is critical in 
understanding the origins of the Sicilian Mafia. 
Except for a few examples (Romeo, 1950; Prestianni, 1947), there are not many works 
which provide good quality data to evaluate the impact of these reforms. Table 2.1 below 
shows the results of the survey made by Rizza (1981) which refers to the 160’000 hectares 
of estates forcibly sold to creditors under the terms of the 1824 law57. 
 







  High nobility 93,5 58,3 
Low and rural nobility 5,3 13 
University 0,5 0 
Church 0,4 18,1 
Bourgeoisie 0,3 10,5 
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 Marino (2007) said that following the 1862 and 1867 laws, about 250,000 hectares of land were set to be 
distributed to privates. However, in 1882 only 50’283 hectares were actually sold.  
55
 Large landowners’ estates. 
56
 At page 215, he affirmed that at the beginning of the 1880s the total area cultivated with cereals was 
663,308 hectares and at the beginning of the XX century it was between 700’000- 750’000. 
57
 This law obliged indebted landowners to sell part of their properties to pay back their debts. Since most of 




Note: [1] Source: Cancila (1990) [2] The table shows evidence of the effects of the 1824 law which forced indebted 
land owners to sell part of their properties to raise money. 
 
As we can see, it was mainly the nobility who took advantage of the land reforms of the 
Bourbons. However, even if the share of the bourgeoisie is limited, its meaning “goes 
beyond the nude value of the properties assigned” (Cancila, 1990, p.221). They were finally 
able to access the land market whereas peasants were completely cut off from land 
property. The importance for our analysis is twofold: a real middle class did not formed58, 
and these emerging classes joined the nobility as the dominant class. Moreover, as already 
mentioned, the relationship between this emerging classes and organised bandits59 is a key 
element in understanding the origins of the Mafia. We can broadly divide this middle class 
into an agrarian and urban one. The former is mainly composed of borgesi60 and a few 
middle to small landowners who existed before the end of feudalism. The latter is 
composed of city traders, intermediaries and public administration employees. These 
individuals competed to buy the land, made possible by the land reforms. However, these 
emerging classes also started to compete amongst themselves not only in land but also in 
other markets, such as the very profitable one of gabelle61 and for other key private and 
public roles. For example, they would compete for the administration of the sulphur mines 
or to become (or impose) guardians of the profitable citrus gardens in the surroundings of 
Palermo and Trapani. They also competed for the public roles that the newly Italian state 
                                                 
58
 By this concept, we mean that the size of the middle class was very small compared to other European 
countries.  
59
 When we talk about organised banditry, we refer to the embryonic Mafia. Of course, this does not have to 
be confused with petty criminals who lived in Sicily at that time.  
60
 The peasants who held just a portion of land. 
61
 The gabellotto would rent one or more fiefs and then would divide it and sub rent to peasants, mainly to 
villains. He would not make any investment on the land and would only profit by the difference between the 
money, or grain, paid by the peasants and the rent paid to the owner of the land. 
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had opened up, especially in the rural areas62. The success in this competition depended on 
the possibility to dispose of Mafia or being themselves part of it63. 
Briefly summarising, the creation of a market for the land did not achieve its aim of 
creating a class of small landowners. However, it certainly opened up new opportunities for 
a limited number of the bourgeoisie, who began to compete for predominance. This 
competition happened both in the areas surrounding the cities but especially in the 
countryside where many opportunities64 had opened up. In the absence of a strong state, 
the necessary condition to exploit these opportunities was to be backed by Mafia or to be 
directly involved in it. In turn, these associations of bandits would control the market for the 
land (both sales and rent), but also other markets such as the labour one (imposing 
guardians to owners) or the strategic water one. This paper follows exactly this approach: 
we consider whether Mafia was more likely to be active where the opportunities for the 
emerging bourgeoisie were greater.  
 
2.2.3 The eastern provinces 
 
The scenario so far described is typical of the western provinces of Sicily, i.e. Palermo, 
Girgenti, Caltanissetta and Trapani even though to different extents. The other three 
eastern provinces were, in fact, less touched by this phenomenon. However, the laws that 
ended feudalism were exactly the same as in the western section. In addition, the number 
of crimes did not differ greatly amongst the two areas, which meant that the State failed to 




                                                 
62
 Fiume (1984, p. 39) argued: “It has been claimed that the phenomenon of banditry emerges [...], as an 
essential feature of the political fights that the feudal elites conducted for the conquest, enlargement and 
conservation of their power. These fights (were) set against peerages and family groups for the supremacy 
over strategic geographical areas, for the control over the produced resources or for their transit towards 
points of trade or for the military control; for the assignation of the highest public roles of the reign and of the 
key jobs in the most prestigious public and public institutions, which all ended to increase the family assets”. 
63
 As we noted in the introduction when we proposed the model by Dixit (2004), Mafia plays a major role as a 
contract enforcer. In the XIX century Sicily, this aspect was particularly relevant. In fact, the use of violence (or 
its threat) scared off all potential cheaters in the transactions where Mafia was involved (directly or indirectly).  
64
 Both for business and political power. 
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Figure 2.1 Crimes by province per 1’000 inhabitants in 1881 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Jacini (Damiani, 1881-1886). 
 
What are, then, the differences that might explain the presence of these powerful 
associations of criminals in one specific part of Sicily? Many scholars have tried to offer 
explanations. For example, Franchetti (1996) argues that in the east “the upper class has 
managed to preserve the monopoly over force and has so far prevented villains rising from 
the lower classes from sharing it” (ibid., p.55). By contrast, Lupo claimed that “it does not 
seem that here (east) the landowners show a greater military attitude than those of the 
surroundings of Palermo” (Lupo, 2004, p.90). A convincing explanation is offered by the 
economist Sylos Labini (2003, p.246) who argued that in “eastern Sicily the feudal system 
began its crisis and started to transform by an inner process various centuries before than in 
western Sicily. Especially, because of its more abundance of water and the possibility of 
making cultivation more intensive, it emerged earlier an agrarian middle class that started 
to “crumble the fief”. The formation of this middle class led to a first organisation of the 
public thing, a diffusion of the so-called sense of justice” (ibid., p.252). By contrast, in 
western Sicily the feudal system lasted longer: “the classical Mafia stays always linked with 
the fief” (ibid., 2003, p.253). Indeed, there are some economic differences between the two 
areas. In the eastern part, the land is more divided and profitable than the west because of 
more citrus and vineyards. On the other hand, in the west, except for the coastal area or in 
the areas surrounding the city, cereal cultivation dominated. This can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
At that time and for many years to come the east was more developed and richer than the 







































Property Crime Violent Crime
42 
 
higher level of exports, compared to the west which was specialized mainly in citrus and 
sulphur. 
 
Figure 2.2 Cereals vs. rich agriculture cultivation in the seven Sicilian provinces in 1881 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Jacini (Damiani, 1881-1886). 
 
Since Mafia emerged in the poorer of the two sections, it suggests that it is not the 
presence of wealthy markets which explains that emergence. Mafia emerged mainly where 
the fight amongst the middle classes was greatest, and was undoubtedly the result of the 
“backwardness” of the western part compared to the eastern one. However, this fight had 
economic determinants, but not only in terms of protection of valuable lands; rather Mafia 
is more likely to emerge where the rents stemming from the institutional changes were 
higher. Or to quote Marino, the fight for gabelle was made in order to get a “highly 
remunerative job“ for the emerging classes, but the grain in itself was the less remunerative 
agricultural good (Marino, 2007, p.214) 65. 
 
2.2.4 Related literature  
 
The view on the origins of mafia that has been so far discussed, is close to the 
interpretations of Lupo (2004) and Pezzino (1989). However, the already mentioned work by 
Bandiera focuses mainly on the view developed by Gambetta (1993), who identified the end 
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of feudalism as a crucial determinant in the origins of the Sicilian Mafia. Gambetta considers 
Mafia as a protection agency and Mafiosi as “entrepreneurs in one particular commodity-
protection” (ibid., p.19). With the abolition of feudalism, supply and demand for protection 
“intersected and flourished” (ibid., p.19). In particular, there was a breed of potential 
suppliers of protection which became autonomous, such as “vigilantes, former soldiers, 
private guards, bandits, and prison inmates” (ibid., p.79). On the other hand, the end of 
feudalism, which formally introduced private properties in Sicily, increased the number of 
potential customers that required the service of these entrepreneurs in order to protect 
their properties from thieves that populated Sicily at that time. Moreover, Gambetta 
affirmed that the origins of the Mafia do not need to be necessarily associated with 
latifundia (as historians usually do), because the view of “the Mafia as originating in 
prosperous agricultural areas, in lively commercial environments, and among a variety of 
traders is not only empirically founded but theoretically convincing, since healthy markets 
are naturally associated with opportunities for commerce in many commodities, including 
protection” (ibid., p.89).  
On this basis, Bandiera (2003) used a two-stage common agency model with 
landowners and Mafia as players. In the first stage, identical landowners decide the money 
they are willing to give to Mafia for each combination of protected/unprotected 
landowners. If the landowner is unprotected, he has 100% of probability that his land will be 
stolen. On the other hand, if he is protected, he has a probability of his land being stolen 
inversely related to the number of landowners protected. Obviously, landowners are more 
willing to pay if they are the only ones protected or if few landowners are protected. 
Therefore, they compete for protection, because each new “protected” landowner 
increases the probability of land being attacked by thieves. In the second stage, the Mafia 
looks at what the preferences of the landowners are and decides on the number of 
customers to serve in order to maximize its utility function. In equilibrium, the increase in 
the number of landowners, which in turn increases competition for protection, and the 
increase in land income lead to an increase in Mafia payoff and, consequently, Mafia 
activity. The author tested this model using data on 70 towns in western Sicily, taken from 
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Jacini (Damiani, 1881-1886). She found evidence that Mafia activity i.e., higher payoffs, is 
greater where the land is more fragmented and where the land income is greater66. 
The natural conclusion of Bandiera’s work is that Mafia is mainly active in the outskirts 
of the cities because it is there that land is more fragmented and rich (Sonnino, 1996). 
Although we agree that mafia offered a crucial protection function, we believe that our 
approach, which focuses on the competition over resources, which took place in the 
countryside, is more able to explain mafia presence.  
In order to empirically verify this proposition, we use a new measure of Mafia activity 
and new variables. The following section presents the data employed and the results 
obtained. 
 
2.3 Data and results 
 
2.3.1 Mafia measure 
 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on the creation of a new dataset 
incorporating information from a variety of previously under exploited primary source 
materials. Unification prompted a number of enquiries into socio-economic conditions 
within the new nation. A particular concern was to explore the reasons for Italy’s economic 
backwardness compared to the more developed European countries67. The enquiries and 
their findings provide invaluable information on a range of social and economic indicators 
pertinent to this research. One such enquiry, which yielded important data, was the 
Parliamentary enquiry into the conditions of the rural classes in Italy (Damiani, 1881-1886). 
Another such enquiry which provided important information were the Bonfadini (Bonfadini 
and Borsani, 1968), Lorenzoni (1904) and, for Sardinia, the Pais Serra (1894) one. In addition 
to the public enquiries, there were a number of private enquiries most importantly that of 
Franchetti and Sonnino (Franchetti, 1996; Sonnino, 1996).  
However, the main data sources are those of Jacini and Bonfadini. The former lasted 
around five years and was concluded in 1882. Its aim was to identify the state of agriculture 
and the living conditions of the peasants. The enquiry had an official status, with responsible 
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 She uses the ratio of vineyards on the total area cultivated. 
67
 Parliamentary enquiries had been extensively used by more developed countries as England and France.  
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officials in charge of the research. For Sicily, it was Damiani. In this paper, we refer to it as 
Jacini or Damiani survey. The Jacini enquiry was made by accessing a range of contemporary 
source materials. The sources can be divided between “official” and “unofficial”. The 
statistics derived from contemporary ministries, notably those relating to Agriculture, 
Industry, Business and Public Works. The General Bureau of Statistics also provided data68. 
The crucial unofficial sources are two monographs on the Sicilian provinces. One examined 
the conditions in the provinces of Palermo, Trapani, Caltanisetta and Girgenti. The other 
considered the provinces of Catania, Messina and Siracusa. The final source of information 
is that of questionnaires, sent to public authorities and people with deep knowledge of the 
Island69. In some instances, the questionnaires invited open answers, as we will see in the 
case of Mafia; in other instances, possible answers were suggested. The results of the 
questionnaires provide a useful complement to the data encompassed in the official and 
unofficial enquires noted above. Together these sources provide information from which we 
can compile a comprehensive picture of the reality of the agriculture and the conditions of 
peasants in the late nineteenth century Italy70.  
Based on the data available, a database was constructed using both the quantitative 
and qualitative information available in the above sources. We have hence extracted data 
on Mafia from questionnaires sent to the chief prosecutors of the towns. The prosecutors 
were asked to comment, inter alia, on whether Mafia was active in their town and, if so, to 
what extent. Based on the information provided by the prosecutors, we coded them into 
four categories, where 0 is “no Mafia activity” and 3 means that “Mafia is very active”71. The 
following figure shows the geographical distribution and intensity of the phenomenon 
according to this codification72.  
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 Not to be confused with the modern Italian national bureau of Statistics (ISTAT), created in 1926. 
69
 The methodology consisted in sending questionnaires to people with a deep knowledge of the public and 
private affairs in Sicily such as the majors of councils, chief prosecutors, magistrates, etc. They were also sent 
to fourteen privileged observers such as university professors, lawyers, politicians and entrepreneurs.  
70
 Often the “official” data were integrated, sometimes even corrected, by those in charge of summarising the 
statistics. This was done in order to have the required level of disaggregation (in fact we have data on a town, 
district and regional basis). 
71
 For example, in some councils they reported that “Mafia rules as a king” while in others “Mafia exists but to 
a limited extent”. The first towns would get 3 while the latter 1. 
72
 For a descriptive analysis see the appendix in 2.7. 
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Note: This map shows the data on Mafia activity using only the Jacini survey. Categories range from 0 (no 
Mafia activity) to 3 (lots of Mafia activity). 
 
Figure 2.3 and the Table 2.2 in the appendix show how the highest presence of Mafia 
was located in the western part of Sicily. Amongst the provinces, Girgenti is the one with the 
highest number of “threes”. However, there are issues relating to the reliability of these 
data. Many commentators have suggested that the findings may be flawed insofar as many 
chief prosecutors, especially in areas with high density of Mafia, might have had an interest 
in understating the phenomenon. In some councils, concerns to avoid retaliation from the 
Mafiosi could have led to biased responses and the tendency to classify Mafia as a “normal” 
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criminal problem73. In particular, it seems that the results for the province of Palermo look 
unrealistic for councils like the Petralie or even Caccamo which do not figure as having Mafia 
presence. Girgenti has the highest concentration and this could be a confirmation of the 
tendency of associating Mafia with normal criminality. Moreover, it is interesting to note the 
great number of councils with no data on Mafia, which per se would be worth analysing. 
The data on mafia presence taken by Jacini are those employed by Bandiera( 2003). 
Given such a low-level picture and the evident biases of the chief prosecutors’ answers, we 
feel the need to improve such measure. In fact, the overall results found in Bandiera( 2003 
might be driven by large measurement errors. In order to do so, data from the Jacini survey 
were combined with those collected in another parliamentary survey, the so-called 
Bonfadini enquiry (Bonfadini and Borsani, 1968). As with the Jacini enquiry, it was based on 
both official and unofficial sources. In particular, it accessed information derived from more 
than 1000 interrogations to a number of local authorities74. The data on Mafia are taken 
from these reports. For example, the prefect of the province of Trapani says: “The town in 
which Mafia mostly manifests are: Mazzara, Castelvetrano, etc” (Bonfadini and Borsani, 
1968, p.36). For the former, the Jacini enquiry reported that Mafia was not active, (0 in the 
ranking), while in the latter report, the information is that Mafia was quite active, which 
means a value of two. For the purposes of this research, I changed their previous values 
with three, which represents the highest level of Mafia activity. We should comment that 
even the analysis of Mafia in this enquiry has been criticised75. However, the reports show a 
deeper and more articulated study of the phenomenon, which helps us to get a better view. 
One problem with this enquiry is that it did not list the villages with Mafia and the ones 
without, but it just mentioned the ones with a high density of Mafia activity. Therefore, it 
could have not been possible to completely substitute the data from Jacini with the latter 
ones; hence we combined the information from the two surveys. Another problem in using 
this source could be the lag period between the two surveys. The Jacini survey was 
published in 1882, whereas Bonfadini in 1876. Therefore, there is a temporal gap where we 
cannot quantify the evolution of Mafia. However, it is reasonable to believe that Mafia 
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 This is mainly the critic by Pezzino (1987). 
74
 For a complete list of the people, and their profiles, see Iacchello (1987, p. 30). 
75
 For example, Iacchello (1987, p. 60) says that Mafia has been considered as a sect, similar to the camorra in 
Naples, or the squadracce (gangs) of Bologna and Ravenna. 
48 
 
increased its geographical influence rather than reduced it over this period. Figure 2.4 
shows the geographical concentration of Mafia using this new database: 
 




Note: This map shows the data on Mafia activity combining Jacini (Damiani, 1881-1886) and Bonfadini and 
Borsani (1968). Categories range from 0 (no Mafia activity) to 3 (lots of Mafia activity). 
 
 
The eastern regions have similar values as before, except that for four towns now listed 
with a value of one, whereas previously they were classified as without Mafia activity. 
Indeed, the major changes resulted in the western part and, in particular, for the provinces 
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of Palermo and Trapani. It is now clear where the Mafia was more active and the 
geographical continuity between councils with high levels of Mafia activity. Table 2.2 and 
2.3 report some statistics regarding the distribution of our Mafia data. 




















       Sicily 359 149 17 11 25 96 
4 Western 
Provinces 
166 75 16 10 12 37 
3 Eastern 
Provinces 
193 74 1 1 13 59 
By Province 
 
Trapani 20 15 0 3 3 9 
Girgenti 41 16 7 4 3 2 
Siracusa 32 22 0 0 4 18 
Messina 98 25 0 0 5 20 
Caltanissetta 28 16 3 1 6 6 
Catania 63 27 1 1 4 21 
Palermo 77 28 6 2 0 20 
 
Table 2. 3 Data on Mafia activity combining Jacini (Damiani, 1881-1886) with Bersani and  
Bonfadini (1968)  parliamentary enquiry 
 
 
Total number of 
Towns 




3= a lot of  
Mafia  
activity 
2=Mafia is  
quite  
active 




 Mafia  
activity 
       Sicily 359 160 48 8 25 79 
4 Western 
Provinces 
166 86 47 7 8 24 
3 Eastern 
Provinces 
193 74 1 1 17 55 
By Province 
 
Trapani 20 15 9 0 0 6 
Girgenti 41 22 14 4 2 2 
Siracusa 32 22 0 0 4 18 
Messina 98 24 0 0 5 19 
Caltanissetta 28 16 4 1 6 5 
Catania 63 28 1 1 8 18 




The new ordinal variable we created has been labelled as Mafia Index. In the empirical 
analysis we also considered a binary variable named Mafia Binary, which is one if there is 
any sign of Mafia activity.  
 
 
2.3.2 Independent variables 
 
Our aim is to verify whether there was more Mafia where the competition over 
resources by new actors was greatest. Unfortunately, there is not a proxy which would 
capture such competition. We know that the countryside is where the end of the feudal 
system opened up the biggest opportunities for new actors. Therefore, as a main 
explanatory variable we consider whether in the towns (and surroundings) big properties 
dominated. We constructed a dummy variable, Large properties, which takes value 1 if the 
majors of the town answered that the land was dominated by large properties and 0 
otherwise. As argued in the theoretical part, the various reforms failed to create a class of 
small and middle owners. On the contrary, they reinforced the system of large estates and 
latifundia, with the difference being that a small number of actors could now exploit these 
opportunities. In large estates, the intervention of Mafia was particularly needed, because 
these new owners76 needed Mafia to win over rival social actors77. This is because of the 
presence of a profitable market to buy and rent land. Also, because the loss of power of the 
nobility and the creation of the new Italian state created opportunities to compete for 
political power.  
As an additional proxy for opportunities in the countryside, we also consider the 
proportion of the total area cultivated with cereals to the total cultivated area, which we 
call Cereals. Again, higher values could be associated with more competition in the market 
for the land and, so, competition for control over resources.  
We also include a proxy for land income, Rich Agriculture. This represents the total 
proportion of the area cultivated with citrus trees, olive trees, vineyards to the total 
cultivated area. Mafia is likely to be more active there because the competition to get 
                                                 
76
 But also some sections of the nobility. 
77
 We are aware that this is not the perfect proxy for the presence of opportunities (and conflicts) to exploit 
but we are constrained by the limited number of variables in the survey. 
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guardians78 jobs was very high. In fact, in that period the citrus market (Dickie, 2004) was 
booming and Mafia imposed their men as guardians of these gardens. This is in line with the 
view by Bandiera which suggested that where land income was higher, Mafia presence was 
greater. 
Continuing, we included Density of population. Since the competition for resources is 
especially harsh in the countryside, we expect a negative relation with the presence of 
Mafia. We also included Little influence of reforms. Majors were asked in which way the 
1860s sales of church and state estates affected the division of land. We created a dummy 
with value equal to one if the answer “none” and “a little”. We do not expect any sign a 
priori, since if these reforms had a positive impact on the fragmentation of the land this 
could have increased tensions as reported by Lupo (2004). In turn, this might have called for 
Mafia intervention in land disputes. On the other hand, a little or no influence could mean 
that Mafia might have played a role in the auction and favoured the large landowners. 
However, it is worth keeping in mind that we are not referring to the first set of laws which 
ended feudalism, but to subsequent reforms. The last variable we include is Few peasants 
landowners. Respondents to the questionnaires were asked whether in the councils there 
were none, very few, few, many, and very much peasant owners of the land. A dummy 
variable has been created using 1 for the first two categories. We expect a positive sign 
because the key social actor was the emerging middle class. Therefore, we would expect 
that peasants did not use Mafia as an instrument to achieve their aims79. Summary statistics 









                                                 
78
 Guardians refer to the employees that patrolled and protected rich agriculture fields such as citrus gardens 
and wine yards. 
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Deviation Min Max 
      Mafia Index 160 1.156 1.315 0 3 
Mafia Binary  160 0.5 0.502 0 1 
Large Properties 136 0.213 0.411 0 1 
Cereals 159 0.577 0.292 0 1 
Rich Agriculture 159 0.287 0.26 0 1 
Density of Population 160 1.746 2.527 0.13 18.2 
Little Influence of Reforms 118 0.602 0.492 0 1 
Few Peasants Landowners 137 0.409 0.493 0 1 
 
The independent variables are taken from the Jacini enquiry (Damiani, 1881-1886). In 
the absence of an institute of statistics, these are the best possible data for this period of 
time.  
 
2.3.3 Comparison with Bandiera (2003) 
 
We first re-estimated the same model that Bandiera (2003) tested in her work80 to 
verify the goodness of our data.  
The author ran regressions on the presence of the mafia considering only the western 
part of the island. This comprises four provinces: Palermo, Girgenti, Trapani and 
Calatnissetta. The author considered two explanatory variables: land fragmentation, which 
is the proxy for the presence of small properties; and vines which represents the proportion 
of land cultivated with vineyards. As dependent variable, the author used an ordinal 
measure which takes value 0 if there is not mafia presence and three if there is lot of mafia 
presence. Again, data are at the council level and are taken exclusively by the Jacini’s 
enquiry which is also the same source of the agricultural data. Table 2.5 reports the results 
of this exercise. In column two, we find that the coefficient for land fragmentation is not 
that different from the one Bandiera obtained. However, there is a major difference 
regarding the coefficient of vineyards. As a further robustness check, we substituted it with 
rich agriculture and its value is much similar to the one found by Bandiera. It is important to 
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 Unfortunately, we did not access those data. 
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note that there is a difference of 7 observations which in such kind of historical database 
could have an important impact on the results. Also, there could be heterogeneity in the 
codification of the discrete variables.  Finally, the author does not specify which provinces 
represent the dummies prov1, prov2 and prov3. This could providw another explanation of 
our different results. 
 
Table 2. 5 Comparison Bandiera‘s results with my data 
 
 [1]Bandiera [2]Mine [3]Mine 
    Land 
Fragmenation 
0.59* 0.4 0.24 
 [0.3] [0.27] [0.27] 
Vines 1.56 0.45  
 [1.12] [0.85]  
Rich Agriculture   1.22* 
   [0.62] 
Prov 1 -0.33 -0.21 -0.35 
 [0.33] [0.34] [0.37] 
Prov 2 -0.49 0.93 -0.9 
 [0.36] [0.43] [0.39] 
Prov 3 -0.55 -.05** -.08** 
 [0.39] [0.87] [0.35] 
Observations 70 63 63 
R squared 0.17 0.13 0.19 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] Column 1 reports the results from Bandiera (2003). Column 2 is the 
replication of the model 1 with my data. Column 3 substitutes Vineyards with Rich Agriculture.  
 
We next analyse the econometric challenges in our empirical analysis. Indeed, we 
expect different results from the ones obtained by Bandiera. The reason is that we will 
employ a different measure of mafia activity. 
  
2.4. Econometric specifications and results  
 




Our aim is to evaluate the factors that are most likely to determine Mafia presence at 
the council level. Our basic model is  
 
               
     
        
 
Mafia Presence is a continuous variable that reflects the level of activity of Mafia.    
  is a 
set of variables, which explains the dependent variable and    a vector of coefficients 
associated with them.     is a normally distributed error term. Unfortunately, we do not 
observe the true presence of Mafia in a given village, but we can only infer it through the 
prosecutors’ analysis, which we coded into 4 categories.  
 
Mafia Index = 




                   
                          
                                       
                            
                                             
                             
                                         
                            
 
 
   represents the threshold parameters. Given that Mafia Index is an ordinal 
multinomial variable, our primarily estimation technique is ordered probit81. The 
interpretation of the maximum likelihood results is troublesome and, so, we consider the 
marginal effects. However, the overall effects might a bit misleading because we do not 
know what happens at the extreme categories (0 and 3 in our case). Therefore, we consider 
the category specific marginal effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Greene, 2005). These are 
simply the derivative of each category probability with respect to the x variables: 
 
      [
             
   
]             
     [
             
   
]   [               
   ]  
                                                 
81
 Bandiera (2003) uses OLS because in case of omitted variables the linear model is inconsistent only if the 
omitted variable is correlated with the included one. In contrast, a nonlinear model gives inconsistent 
estimators if the omitted variable is not correlated with the included ones. Moreover, hetersoskedasticity 
might be an issue with the nonlinear model since it leads to inconsistent estimators. However, we tried to 
regress also with OLS and the results do not change greatly. 
55 
 
     [
             
   
]   [        
            
   ]  
     [
             
   
]   [        
   ]  
 




We first estimate our model including Large Properties as the only independent 
variable. As a robustness check, we also consider a specification with Cereals as only 
explanatory variable. The reason is that the land cultivated with cereals was a synonym of 
the presence of the market for the land and, so, possibility of conflict82. Taking into 
consideration the measurement problems associated with the definition of large properties, 
Cereals could reflect a more “objective” measure of large estates. Again, we expect a 
different sign than the one obtained by Bandiera because we feel that her measure of mafia 
was flawed. We then include all the control variables, having the following model: 
 
                                    
                                                        
                                                            
 
Again, we also estimate this model substituting Cereals for Large Properties. Moreover, 
we propose two different geographical specifications. In the first, we consider all the Sicilian 
councils, whereas in the second we just include those in the four western provinces: 
Girgenti, Palermo, Caltanissetta and Trapani. As we saw in section two, Mafia is mainly 
present in the western section of the island. However, the east also experienced high levels 
of crime after the Unification of Italy. Considering both specifications will allow us to 
evaluate the Mafia driving forces, both at the regional and sub-regional level. 
Ordered probit is our preferred model. However, as a robustness econometric test, we 
also regress the models with a linear probability model (LPM). The main issue with this 
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 Surprisingly, the correlation between the two variables is not very high. This is due to the fact that there was 
not a defined size of a big property in different councils. 
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technique is that does not consider the categorical nature of our data (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005). Since the Bonfadini enquiry lists only the councils with a considerable Mafia 
presence, we decided to employ also a probit analysis. The reason is that we assigned 3 
(highest level) to all councils mentioned in that enquiry. In the case that their “true” value 
was two, we would have measurement error problems with the ordered probit analysis. 
However, it is almost impossible that the same council did not have Mafia activity and, so, 
the probit results would still be indicative.  
 
2.4.3 Econometric concerns 
 
The nature of the dataset we are using poses inevitable econometric concerns. As Table 
2.2 and 2.3 illustrate we have data on the presence of Mafia for less than half of the total 
number of Sicilian councils. This might lead to problems of representativeness.   
Another important problem could be that of measurement error. In case that the error 
is in the Mafia measure the consequences are that it only weakens the model but it does 
not lead to bias in the coefficients (Wooldridge, 2002). In the case there are measurement 
errors in the explanatory variables this could lead to serious biases. This would be the case if 
the measurement error in the dependent variable were linked with the one in the control 
variables. However, Bandiera (2003, p.21) says that it is “hard to find a reason as to why the 
bias should go in a particular direction”.  
Moreover, the analysis could be harmed by the exclusion of important control 
variables, which might be important in explaining the presence of Mafia. Again, this would 
lead to biased estimators. For example, it might have been interesting to employ social 
capital variables (Putnam et al., 1993) or some deterrence ones (Levitt, 1996). In the case of 
the former, it seems that explanations based on socio-cultural traits are very important in 
explaining Mafia presence. Mafia is not a “normal” criminal phenomenon, rather the results 
of a perverse social structure. A way to partially address the omitted variable bias is to 
include provincial dummies, which take into account provincial heterogeneity. Given that 
the omitted variable bias might be quite relevant using ordered probit, we also regressed by 
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OLS (Keele and Park, 2006)83. Since Mafia activity is likely to be correlated amongst 




For ease of interpretation, we report the most interesting results in a table. This 
includes the marginal effects for the highest (3) and lowest (0) category of Mafia presence, 
both employing Large Properties (Maf Ind 3 and Maf Ind 0, respectively) and also with 
Cereals (Maf Ind 3-Cer and Maf Ind 0-Cer). Moreover we report the linear probability 
model’s results (LPM) and the marginal effects with probit. The last two refer to the 
specification with Large Properties in all the cases except for the one with all the control 
variables for the western section. In this case, we report the LPM for Cereals (LPM-Cer). 
Table 2.6 displays the results for all the Sicilian provinces only for the main explanatory 
variables. The first thing to note is that the marginal effects for Mafia Ind 3 and 0 have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. In particular, the councils where the land is 
predominantly large are 12% more likely to have a very strong Mafia, all other variables held 
constant. On the other hand, councils where the small and middle estate dominates, have 
12.3% lower probabilities of having Mafia presence. Again, these results support the view 
that Mafia is more likely to have originated where there were opportunities for competition 
amongst classes, especially emerging ones, which used Mafia as an instrument to control. 
Moreover, we showed that the results obtained by Bandiera (2003) were flawed as they 
considered a  misrepresentation measure of Mafia presence. This result is consistent both 
with probit and LPM. The result with probit is especially important because of issues with 
our new measurement of Mafia activity. In particular, if in a town, large estates dominate, 
we have a probability of having Mafia 20.5% higher than in the rest of the councils. This is a 
significant effect. The last two columns report the results for the highest and lowest Mafia 
ranking values employing Cereals. Even though the signs are according to the predictions, 
none is significant. Moreover, the dummy provinces are generally positive and significant for 
the provinces with more Mafia activity.  
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 At page 3, they show that in an ordered probit model, omitted variables could lead to biased estimators 




Table 2. 6 All Sicily including only Large Properties and Cereals 
 




       
Large Properties 0.120*** -0.123*** 0.315* 0.205**   
 [0.043] [0.041] [0.171] [0.086]   
Cereals     0.029 -0.031 
     [0.066] [0.072] 
Dummy Catania 0.196** -0.196** 0.361** 0.328* 0.134 -0.14 
  [0.097] [0.09] [0.138] [0.18] [0.087] [0.084] 
Dummy Trapani 0.509*** -0.461*** 1.675*** 0.463*** 0.459*** -0.423*** 
 [0.134] [0.077] [0.48] [0.136] [0.153] [0.093] 
Dummy Girgenti 0.653*** -
0.543*** 
2.257*** 0.618*** 0.613*** -0.527*** 
 [0.064] [0.036] [0.149] [0.065] [0.064] [0.04] 
Dummy Messina 0.128 -0.129 0.135 0.217 0.0336 -0.036 
 [0.124] [0.116] [0.157] [0.23] [0.124] [0.13] 
Dummy Palermo 0.547*** -
0.532*** 
10.804*** 0.528*** 0.498*** -0.495*** 

















Observations 136 136 136 136 159 159 
(Pseudo) R 
squared 0.1962 0.1962 0.424 0.215 0.184 0.184 
Log Likelihood -123.775 -123.775  -74.046 -149.5 -149.5 
       
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3 (a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). The 
results for the other categories could be found in the following tables. LPM are the OLS results. The column Probit 
reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable. The last two columns are the corresponding 
for the first two, using Cereals as explanatory variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big 
or “medium and big”. Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] All 
regressions include provincial fixed effects. 
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Table 2. 7 Four Western provinces including only Large Properties and Cereals 
 




       
Large Properties 0.152** -0.119** 0.383 0.152   
 [0.074] [0.054] [0.286] [0.106]   
Cereals     0.046 -0.054 
     [0.076] [0.089] 
Dummy Trapani 0.191 -0.156 0.819 0.022 -0.111 0.138 
 [0.142] 
 
[0.098] [0.584] [0.152] [0.131] [0.183] 
Dummy Girgenti 0.350*** -
0.271*** 




[0.047] [0.360] [0.061] [0.054] [0.085] 














       


















-75.802 -75.802  -39.956 -92.943 -92.943 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3 (a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). The 
results for the other categories could be found in the following tables. LPM are the OLS results. The column Probit 
reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable. The last two columns are the corresponding 
for the first two, using Cereals as explanatory variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big 
or “medium and big”. Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] All 





Table 2.8 shows the results for the same specification but including only the four 
western provinces. There are some differences between the two. As before, we find that 
the marginal coefficient for the top and bottom category are significant and with the 
“correct” sign. The effect of the former on Mafia presence is somewhat higher than in the 
previous specification. This result is important because even if we exclude the control region 
(the east) we still find support for our view. On the other hand, the effect on councils with 
no Mafia activity is very similar to the previous one. In this specification, we do not find 
significant results for the LPM and probit models.  
It is important to note that the coefficients for the dummy provinces are now smaller 
than before which means that we are dealing with more “homogenous” provinces. Finally, 
the goodness of fit measure is encouraging. 
If we include the control variables, we get interesting results as demonstrated in Table 





















Table 2. 8 All Sicily with the additional controls 
 
 Maf Ind 3 Maf Ind 0 LPM Probit Maf Ind 
 3-Cer 
Maf Ind  
0-Cer 
       
Large Properties 0.083** -0.090** 0.263 0.119   
 [.038] [.038] [0.172] [0.114]   
Cereals     0.121 -0.136 
     [0.136] [0.151] 
Rich Agriculture 0.240** 0.274** 0.864* 00.27 0.327** -0.368** 
 [0.010] 
 
[0.111] [0.495] [0.242] [0.166] [0.184] 
Density of Population -0.018* 0.020* -0.064 -0.034 -0.014 0.016 
 [0.010] 
 
[0.012] [0.046] [0.036] [0.011] [0.013] 






























Dummy Trapani 0.209** -0.212** 0.464 0.35 0.204** -0.204** 
 [0.093] [0.086] [0.212] [0.21] [0.09] [0.082] 
Dummy Girgenti 0.521*** -0.477 1.695*** 0.471** 0.515*** 0.471*** 
 [0.118] [0.065] [0.438] [0.16] [0.122] [0.067] 
Dummy Messina 0.113 -0.118 0.1 0.195 0.131 -0.132 
 [0.107] [0.103] [0.197] [0.251] [0.113] [0.104] 
Dummy Palermo 0.514*** -0.490*** 1.711*** 0.500** 0.526*** -
0.498*** 
 [0.091] [0.058] [0.284] [0.151] [0.089] [0.056] 
Dummy Caltanissetta 0.373*** -0.361*** 1.002** 0.444** -0.136 -
0.383*** 
 [0.108] [0.081] [0.486] [0.148] [0.151] [0.074] 
       




0.227 0.227 0.124 0.252 0.252 0.252 
Log Likelihood -97.522 -97.522  -57.045 -102.147 -102.147 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3 (a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). The 
results for the other categories could be found in the following tables. LPM are the OLS results. The column Probit 
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reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable. The last two columns are the corresponding 
for the first two, using Cereals as explanatory variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big 
or “medium and big”. Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] The 




Table 2. 9 Four Western provinces with the additional controls 





















    
     
Cereals    1.131*** 2.657** 0.925*** -0.775*** 
    [0.295] [0.921] [0.231] [0.188] 











































































































        
Observations 57 57 57 57 59 59 59 
(Pseudo) R 
squared 
0.176 0.176 0.501 0.345 0.465 0.191 0.191 




Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3 (a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). The 
results for the other categories could be found in the following tables. LPM are the OLS results. The column Probit 
reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable. The last two columns are the corresponding 
for the first two, using Cereals as explanatory variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big 
or “medium and big”. Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] The 
definitions of the other variables are in the appendix. [5] All regressions include provincial fixed effects. 
 
Large properties for all the Sicilian provinces is still positive and significant only for the 
ordered probit specification. Moreover, its effect is somewhat smaller (about 4%) compared 
to the previous specification. In the previous model, the coefficient of the explanatory 
variable might have captured the indirect effects of some excluded variables. We do not find 
Large Properties to be significant in any other specification, although the signs are in line 
with theory. Cereals is positive but not significant. If we consider only the four western 
provinces, the marginal effects for the top and last category are more positive (negative) 
than the specification with all councils. Again, LPM and probit specification present 
insignificant coefficients. Cereals is strongly significant and with the expected sign with all 
the estimation techniques. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is much higher than in 
the previous case. For example, towns where large estates are more present have an almost 
double likelihood of having Mafia in their territory. As previously argued, cereals seem to be 
a more objective measure of large properties/ low values of the land. Cereal cultivation was 
not very profitable in general terms (Marino, 2007), although it was very profitable for those 
who wanted to rent it.  
Rich Agriculture is positive and significant for most of the specifications, both at a 
regional and sub-regional level. In particular, if we consider the marginal effects for Mafia 
Index level 3 for all Sicily, an increase of one per cent of the rate of valuable land increase 
the probability of having the highest Mafia activity by 24%, all other variables held constant. 
The coefficient for the western section is higher, which reflects the strong interest of the 
developing Mafia in “rich areas”. High valuable lands are associated with better jobs for the 
emerging classes. It also meant greater opportunities not only to control such profitable 
markets but also to offer protection, as suggested by Gambetta (1993). The fact that we find 
Mafia activity linked both with large estates and profitable land is not contradictory and 
confirms that we need to analyse this phenomenon in a broader perspective compared to 
the existing literature. Indeed, Mafia had also protection function although the main 
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emphasis, from our point of view, is on Mafia being an instrument of social struggles 
occurring at that time. As expected, Density of Population is negative. In the specification 
with all Sicilian councils, we do find this to be significant only with Mafia Index 3 and 0. On 
the other hand, if we restrict our attention to the western section we find it to be always 
significant84 and with a stronger negative effect. This confirms the view that the fight for 
resources was especially harsh in the countryside where the aristocrats were slowly but 
inexorably losing their socio-economic powers and the Mafia became an instrument to 
acquire it. The variable Little Influence of Reforms is negative and significant only for the 
western provinces of the island. This could mean that where the 1860s sales of church and 
state property had more impact on the division of the land, Mafia could have played a role. 
In fact, as suggested by Lupo (2004), it was especially in such councils that Mafia could have 
been employed to “settle” the frequent conflicts that arose. It is worth keeping in mind two 
issues: first, we are not dealing with the first reforms that are likely to have created the 
basis for Mafia emergence. Secondly, the fact that Mafia is more likely, at least in the 
western part, to be active in councils where these reforms had greater impact on the 
division of land does not imply that properties were mainly fragmented in those councils. In 
our view, it is best looking at this variable as a proxy for opportunities to fight rather than 
giving it other meanings.  
Few peasants landowners is highly significant and positive for almost all the 
specifications85. For example, if we consider the western section, those councils with few 
peasants who owned the land are 19% more likely not to have the highest levels of Mafia 
activity. The results are similar to the specification with Cereals. This could mean that Mafia 
was most likely to be present where land was less fragmented. In addition, according to 
previous reasoning, Mafia’s services were not acquired by peasants and, so, the sign of the 
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 We refer to the preferred specifications in Table 2.9. 
85
 One might argue that “Large properties” and “Few peasants landowners” might be strongly correlated. At 
the end, in large properties it is almost impossible to have peasants who are landowners. Despite this logical 
argument, the correlation coefficient between these two variables is not very high, about 0.29. Moreover, 
there are two more hints that could show this. First, when we include both variables, as in Table 2.8 or 2.9, the 
coefficients are not very high. Secondly, if we compare the coefficient of “Large properties” in table 2.7 And 
2.9, we note that the coefficient moves from 0.152 to 0.22 and are equally significant.  
On the other side, there is a problem of multicollinearity between “rich agriculture” and “cereals”. They both 
represent the rate of use of plantation of such agricultural goods on the total land.  In fact, the correlation 
between the two variables is - 0.791. Moreover, we see that the coefficient of rich agriculture becomes much 
larger once we consider the specification with cereals. Indeed, it would be ideal to use another proxy for one 




coefficient is reasonable. The province dummies are mostly significant which means that 
there are other variables, which we do not have data on and that explain the presence of 
Mafia. It is worth noting that, especially for the western section, most of the variables 
employed are significant which means that they are useful to predict Mafia presence. 
Finally, the R squared for the LPM specification is quite high. 
The tables with the additional results can be found from 2.10 through 2.13.  
 













       
Large Properties 0.000 0.003     
 [0.005] [0.002]     
Cereals   0.001 0.002 0.120 0.063 
   [0.003] [0.004] [0.115] [0.166] 
Dummy Catania -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.224 0.292** 
 [0.008] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.149] [0.121] 
Dummy Trapani -0.048 -0.009 -0.038 0.002 0.393*** 1.619*** 
 [0.05] [0.011] [0.05] [0.014] [0.137] [0.484] 
Dummy  Girgenti -0.099*** -0.012 -0.078** -0.008 0.584*** 2.176*** 
 [0.038] [0.009] [0.034] [0.001] [0.066] [0.107] 
Dummy Messina -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.074 0.049 
 [0.009] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.217] [0.162] 
Dummy  Palermo -0.024 0.010 -0.018 0.015 0.464*** 1.760*** 
 [0.034] [0.01] [0.031] [0.010] [0.115] [0.183] 
Dummy Caltanissetta -0.019 0.003 -0.011 0.006 0.402*** 1.061** 
 [0.024] [0.005] [0.021] [0.005] [0.116] [0.393] 
       
Observations 136 136 159 159 159 159 
(Pseudo) R squared 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.124 
Log Likelihood -123.77 -123.77 -149.50 -149.50 -88.82  
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 1(little Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for some Mafia activity (2). In 
column three and four we report respectively the marginal effects for category 2 and 1 using Cereals as explanatory 
variable. The column Probit Cer reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable with Cereals as 
explanatory variable. The last column reports the results for the linear probability model using Mafia Index as 
dependent variable for Cereals. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. 
Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] All regressions include 




Table 2. 11 All Sicily with the additional controls (second part) 




Maf Ind 2 –Cer Maf Ind 1- Cer Probit Cer LPM 
Cer 
       
       
Large Properties 0.002 0.004**     
 [0.003] [0.002]     
Cereals   0.007 0.008 0.189 0.189 
   [0.007] [0.010] [0.404] [0.404] 
Rich Agriculture 0.018 0.0151** 0.018 0.023* 0.403 0.403 
 [0.013] [0.007] [0.015] [0.013] [0.438] [0.438] 










































Dummy  Catania -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.341* 0.341* 
 [0.007] [0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.198] [0.198] 
Dummy Trapani -0.048 0.004 -0.047 0.003 0.468*** 0.468*** 
 [0.044] [0.013] [0.044] [0.015] [0.153] [0.153] 
Dummy Girgenti -0.093*** -0.009 -0.093*** -0.013 0.638*** 0.638*** 
 [0.027] [0.011] [0.025] [0.011] [0.076] [0.076] 
Dummy Messina 0.001 0.004* -0.002 0.004* 0.227 0.227 
 [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.002] [0.239] [0.239] 
Dummy Palermo -0.033 0.008 -0.034 0.007 0.527*** 0.527*** 
 [0.029] [0.009] [0.027] [0.010] [0.135] [0.135] 












       
Observations 110 110 114 114 114 114 
(Pseudo) R squared 0.23 0.23 0.468 0.25 0.25 0.464 
Log Likelihood -97.52 -97.52 -57.04 -57.04 -59.11  
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for the Mafia level 1(little Mafia activity). In the 
second we report the marginal effects for some Mafia activity (2). In column three and four we report respectively the marginal effects for 
category 2 and 1 using Cereals as explanatory variable. The column Probit Cer reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable 
with Cereals as explanatory variable. The last column reports the results for the linear probability model using Mafia Index as dependent variable 
for Cereals. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with 






Table 2. 12 Four Western provinces including only Large Properties and Cereals (second part) 
 
 Maf Ind  
1 
Maf Ind  
2 
Maf Ind  
2-Cer 






       
Large Properties -0.025 -0.008     
 [0.020] [0.008]     
Cereals   0.006 0.003 0.063 -0.142 
   [0.009] [0.005] [0.076] [0.234] 
Dummy Trapani -0.027 -0.008 -0.018 -0.009 -0.014 0.533 
 [0.035] [0.013] [0.035] [0.020] [0.162] [0.629] 
Dummy Girgenti -0.058 -0.021 -0.044 -0.0260** 0.278*** 1.110** 
 [0.042] [0.013] [0.039] [0.013] [0.079] [0.392] 
Dummy Palermo -0.027 -0.007 -0.020 -0.009 0.046 0.668 
 [0.023] [0.007] [0.024] [0.011] [0.096] [0.426] 
       
Observations 73 73 86 86 86 86 
(Pseudo) R squared 0.047 0.047 0.028 0.028 0.068 0.079 
Log Likelihood -75.802 -75.802 -92.943 -92.943 -48.330  
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 1(little Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for some Mafia activity (2). In 
column three and four we report respectively the marginal effects for category 2 and 1 using Cereals as explanatory 
variable. The column Probit Cer reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable with Cereals as 
explanatory variable. The last column reports the results for the linear probability model using Mafia Index as 
dependent variable for Cereals. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. 
Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] All regressions include 


















 Table 2. 13 Four Western provinces with the additional controls (second part) 
  
Maf Ind 1 
 
Maf Ind 2 
 
Maf Ind 2- Cer 
 
Maf Ind 1- Cer 
 
Probit 
      
      
Large Properties -0.020 -0.006   -0.011 
 [0.014] [0.006]   [0.092] 
Cereals   -0.122** -0.028  
   [0.062] [0.022]  
Rich Agriculture -0.090*** -0.018 -0.209** -0.048 0.634** 
 [0.032] [0.016] [0.086] [0.037] [0.277] 




































Dummy Trapani -0.014 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 
 [0.024] [0.008] [0.023] [0.007] [0.141] 
Dummy Palermo -0.058 -0.019 -0.057 -0.022 0.408*** 
 [0.039] [0.015] [0.039] [0.018] [0.079] 










      
Observations 57 57 59 59 57 
(Pseudo) R squared 0.176 0.176 0.191 0.191 0.106 
Log Likelihood -53.476 -53.476 -55.026 -55.026 -39.956 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 1(little Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for some Mafia activity (2). In 
column three and four we report respectively the marginal effects for category 2 and 1 using Cereals as explanatory 
variable. The column Probit reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as dependent variable. [3] Large Properties 
is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big” . Cereals is the proportion of the land cultivated 
with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] The other variables are defined in the text and in the appendix. [5] All 




2.5. Sicily and Sardinia: a comparison. 
 
The last section seeks to analyse the origins of the Sicilian Mafia through a comparative 
approach. The institutional changes did not happen only in Sicily but also in many other 
Italian and European regions. It was not only in Sicily that the state failed to exercise its 
legitimate monopoly over violence with a consequent escalation in banditry86. Moreover, 
also in other regions landownership increased due to the end of feudalism87. So, why did 
Mafia originate in Sicily, and few other southern Italian regions, and not elsewhere which 
experienced similar characteristics? 
A useful way to attempt to answer such a difficult question is to compare Sicily with 
another Italian region, Sardinia, which experienced the end of feudalism and a possible 
market for protection but it did not develop Mafia.  
We begin by considering the similarities between them88. They are the two largest 
islands in the Mediterranean Sea, with Sicily being 2’571 square km whereas Sardinia 2’409. 
Both are peripheral89 with all its implications, well explained by Skaperdas (2001). In 1891 
the GDP per capita in Sicily and Sardinia was not that different, with the former at 0.982 of 
the mean Italian GDP per capita, whereas the latter was 0.973 (Daniele and 
Melanima,2007). Moreover, according to some time series reconstructions, in the previous 
thirty years the values were similar (Daniele and Melanima, 2007). Undoubtedly, they were 
not the poorest regions at that time. These were Calabria, Basilicata and Abruzzo. Both 
regions were at some point ruled by the Spaniards which left them inefficient 
administrations and a deep feeling of mistrust towards the state and the public 
authorities90. The end of feudalism happened in both islands in a later stage compared to 
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 Also in France crime increased after the institutional changes but was well repressed by the state. 
87
 For example in the Italian northern regions. 
88
 Obviously we are going to focus on the most relevant ones and we do not pretend to treat them 
exhaustively. 
89
 Which means far from the centres of power. 
90
 This point is also central in the analysis of Gambetta (2000). The author considered distrust as one of the 
major factors in explaining the origin of the Sicilian Mafia. Pirastru (1973, p. 15), referring on Sardinia, argued 
that the economic oppresstion and the excessive taxation “determined that deep feeling of distrust and of 




the continental South91 and the following period saw a substantial increase in banditry and 
violence. In fact, they were the only two regions for which the parliament created ad hoc 
parliamentary surveys designed to public security92. Figure 2.5 below reports the crime rate 
for the period 1890-3, which shows that Sardinia was the Italian region with the highest 
crime rates and Sicily not far behind. In this respect, the 1896 parliamentary enquiry Pais 
Serra (1896, p.48) claimed that “the conditions (of public security) in the island, compared 
to ones of the other Italian regions, and under some aspects even compared to Sicily, are 
abnormal. This is an incontestable thing”. 
 
Figure 2.5 Number of crimes per 100’000 inhabitants in the period 1890-93 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Lei-Spano(1975) 
 
It is interesting to note that the problems of public security in Sardinia seem to have 
similar features to those in Sicily. The law enforcers failed to protect people and belonging 
because of the lack of good organisation and also because of the complicity between 
bandits and population. As in Sicily, public forces were divided into the public and the semi-
public ones. The former were inefficient because unaware of the local conditions, whereas 
                                                 
91
 As we said earlier in Sicily in 1812 whereas in Sardinia in the 1830s. 
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the latter, the so called Baracelli, were formed by people that used to steal in the same 
properties they had to protect. Most of the time, they went unpunished because they also 
had public and administrative roles in the villages93. 
Indeed, in both islands the state failed to impose its legitimate monopoly over violence 
and to secure property rights. Also, as a consequence of the end of feudalism, land 
ownership greatly increased. In particular, in Sardinia these reforms took away the land 
from the lords and many tiny plots were created. For example, Amat di San Filippo (1902), 
talking about the division of land in Sardinia said that there were around 208’706 owners 
and a total of 1’267’071 of holdings. This means that more than a third of the population 
were landowners, a figure much higher than in Sicily (Zamagni, 1990). Therefore, if we 
consider the market for protection, Sardinia exhibited a potential higher demand and supply 
forces. However, except for some types of gangs, it never witnessed the development of a 
sophisticated organisation such as the Sicilian Mafia. The reasons may be various94, but here 
we just concentrate on some that might be interesting for the comparison with Sicily.  
The first main difference is that Sardinia was much less populated compared to Sicily. 
Figure 2.6 below shows the density of population from the 1861 until the 1881 in the two 
regions. As we can see, Sardinia had values around a fourth of Sicily and it kept a stable 
trend over the two following decades, whereas in Sicily it greatly increased. 
Figure 2.6 Density of population in 1861, 1871 and 1881 in Sicily and Sardinia 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Coda (1977) 
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Lei-Spano (1975) explained that Barecellato [...] is an “ancient institution which originated in Sardinia with 
the aim of protecting rural properties and policing the countryside” (p. 128). This type of private police stole 
and damaged the same properties which they should have been protecting. 
94
 Except for the economical ones, there are many others such as cultural and historical ones. However, we are 
















Undoubtedly, a higher density of population meant a greater competition for resources. 
This aspect does not contradict what we found in the empirical section about Sicily, since 
Mafia was more likely to emerge in areas with lower density of population but in a context 
of absolute higher population95.  
Moreover, because of its orographical conditions and low density of population, 
agriculture has never been the major economic sector in Sardinia. For example, as Figure 2.7 
shows, in 1861, well after the end of feudalism, less than 20% of the total agrarian area was 
devoted to cereal cultivation, compared to almost two thirds in Sicily.  
 
Figure 2.7 Area devoted to cereals cultivation vs. pasture in the two islands in 1861 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Svimez (1961) 
 
 
In contrast, most of the land in Sardinia was devoted to pasture. Sheep breeding was 
the most important economic activity (Coda, 2007)96. The prevalence of the sheep breeding 
in agriculture in Sardinia was the exact opposite of what happened in Sicily where “sheep 
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 In Sardinia there has always been abundance of land for all the population. 
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breeding activity was defeated by the large landed estate and the cereal cultivation since 
the 19th century” (Arlacchi, 2007, p.36). As a consequence, the land system and the market 
for the land in Sardinia were very different from that in Sicily. If in Sicily the majority of land 
was in private hands, in Sardinia four fifths of the total area were common or public land, 
suitable for the sheep breeding activity (Arlacchi, 2007). Therefore, in Sardinia there were 
neither the large farms nor the possibility of renting them as the gabellotti did in Sicily. The 
end of feudalism did not lead to a competition over resources similar to that in Sicily 
because of the lower density of population. The abolition of feudalism in Sardinia, decreed 
between 1835 and 1838, was mainly aimed to diminish the role of sheep breeding and 
increase that of agriculture, whereas in Sicily was to fractionise the large estates.   
In fact, the shepherds were the ones who opposed the reforms97 and who committed 
most of the crimes. Rather than having new social classes who wanted to emerge, there was 
the established ruling class of shepherds who wanted to preserve its power. However, by its 
nature the shepherds’ mentality was indeed more individualistic and did not lead to the 
creation of a highly sophisticated organisation as Mafia98.  
Another major difference between the two islands might have been the role of the 
landowners. In Sardinia, landowners were more present in the countryside compared to the 
Sicilian ones (Arlacchi, 2007)99. They had a different type of relationship with their employee 
too100.There was a direct relationship between the owner and the peasants and , although, 
often the owner did not work on the land, he was still involved in its management. In 
contrast, in Sicily the Mafia was usually associated with absenteeism landowners who left 
the gabellotto and the campiere101 to rule their farms. 
Moreover, there were many differences in the economic structure between the two 
islands, especially in the labour force. This might have played a role in the development of 
the Mafia in Sicily and not in Sardinia. In fact, in the latter there was a much higher number 
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 Pirastu (1973) well described such tensions. 
98
 In this respect shepherds might be considered as small entrepreneur who look after their capital, i.e. sheep. 
The high number of such professional figure might have had an impact on Sardinia culture.  
99
 Arlacchi (2007, p. 44): “in Sicily and in the continental South the lord does not work and does not depend on 
anyone. In a society in which the majority of the population is forced to work hard daily, the free consumption 
of his/her own time is the utmost example of status and power”. 
100
 According to Arlacchi (2007) stressed that there are not major differences between landownders or 
shepherds and their employees. “When they live together in the countryside, servant and lord will eat the 
same food while sitting one next to the other” (ibid, p.44). 
101
 The private guard in large estates. 
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of self-employed such as shepherds and small landowners in Sardinia compared to Sicily. 
“Forty years after the law of chiudende102, the census of the population showed a social 
structure in Sardinia not polarized at all. Shepherds, (structured) peasants and similar 
workers constituted 76.5 % of the active workforce in the rural sector, as against 33.1% in 
Sicily. The rural proletarian, daily labourers were three times more numerous in Sicily than 
in Sardinia” Arlacchi (2007, p.45)103. Even the distribution of wealth was different, with Sicily 
having a greater degree of inequality104. As a result the opportunity costs of joining Mafia 
were higher105.  
Finally, if we consider Mafia as an organisation, it is more likely to have emerged in a 
context where the labour market facilitates interactions between workers106. In this respect, 
Mafia might have had more chances of emerging in a region like Sicily, which had a higher 
propensity of associations compared to Sardinia107. A good proxy for evaluating such 
propensity is to look at the co-operative movement, which was rapidly evolving in those 
years108. Despite the small proportion of co-operatives in the southern regions, Sicily had 
the highest number. According to Cancila (1993, p.9), in 1873 “the island could count on 82 
mutual aid societies with 9’392 effective members and 649 honorary (Italy had 1’447 
society, 21’906 effective members, 2’409 honorary), which gave it the lead amongst all the 
southern regions, even if it was still behind from the northern regions’ level (Piedmont 362, 
Lombardy 203, Veneto 144, Liguria 139, Emilia 121 societies)”. In 1878, there were 117 
societies, which put Sicily in eighth place in Italy. In 1880-1885 Sicily had 287 societies and 
ranked sixth in terms of number of societies, after Piedmont (706), Lombardy (533), Tuscany 
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 This law offered the opportunity to fence the communal land. 
103
 By peasant the author means those who regularly work in the field under a landowner. This is opposed to 
daily labourers who work only when their services are requested. The latter were earning much less compared 
to the regular workers.  
104
 The high number of daily workers and the presence of lords made Sicily more unequal than Sardinia. As we 
have seen, in Sardinia the economic structure was much more levelled.  
105
 The higher crime rate in Sardinia cannot be analyzed in the light of the economics of crime approach as the 
criminals were mainly shepherds who opposed the reforms.  
106
 By interactions we mean the repeated possibility of encounters between workers. 
107
 The use of cooperatives as a proxy for the level of associations should be considered as providing some 
simple evidence. Indeed, such comparisons would require much more attention and deeper analysis which are 
far beyond the level of this section. This concept is similar to the one of perverse social capital in Rubio ( 1997). 
108
 As it is well known, a cooperative is an association where people voluntary aggregate for socio and 
economic reasons. The main feature is that it is legally owned by all its members. It is inspired by values as self- 
responsibility, democracy and equality. Therefore, these characteristics make it a good proxy for the level of 
associations in an area. 
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(343), Emilia (318) and Veneto (297). Despite being an urban phenomenon at the beginning, 
the agrarian crisis led to its development in the rural areas too. 
In Sicily, it seems to be two kinds of associations: one for the élites, the big owners 
which wanted to protect themselves and be represented with the governments at all level. 
For example, the agrarian committees were associations of owners, which aimed at 
lobbying with the government in the members’ interest (Lupo, 2004, p.85). Another 
example, still quoted by Cancila (1993), is the creation of the Anglo-Sicilian sulphur company 
which was a joint venture of French and English capitals which sustained the Sicilian mineral 
sector in an economic depression period. On the other hand, the peasants (and low social 
classes) created cooperatives too. This was favoured and encouraged by the church and the 
socialists, even though in different manners. As in the northern regions, the church was a 
central force which helped the creation of the agricultural credit bank (casse rurali)109 which 
had to prevent peasants from turning to usury to get capital. This phenomenon grew so 
strongly during the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century that, just before the 
First World War, Sicily had 360 rural banks, the second highest number in Italy, after 
Veneto, and it was first for number of deposits.  
As Coda (1977, p.140) interestingly pointed out “more than two thirds of them 
(cooperatives) were located in the provinces of Palermo, Girgenti and Caltanissetta “as a 
confirmation that the zone with prevalent extensive cereal cultivation seems to be the most 
adequate to the development of the agricultural cooperation”. Those provinces were also 
the ones where Mafia was most active, along with Trapani. Of course, there is not any 
correlation between Mafia and cooperative movement. We rather want to stress that 
Mafia, being an organisation, was more likely to emerge in a context of a high propensity of 
association and this could be one of the reasons of why it did emerge in Sicily (in the west) 
and not Sardinia.  
On the other hand, the situation is Sardinia looked very different. The socio-economic 
structure had a little role played by the agriculture in comparison to the one of sheep 
breeding. As consequence, this led to a lower development of the cooperative movement in 
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Cancila (1993, p. 14) said “The casse rurali (rural banks) were the instrument used by the catholic forces 
during the crucial years of the agrarian crisis [...] to organise the rural masses”. Or Li Vecchi (1993) said that 
Sicilian cooperativism was not composed by popular banks, nor by the urban cooperative initiatives, but by 
agrarian credit banks. These institutions obtained collective rents and promoted other forms of rural 
cooperation. This was mainly done thanks to the support of the catholics and socialists in order to emancipate 
the peasants from the semi feudal structure of agriculture.  
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the same period. According to Zangheri et al. (1987), Sardinia was in the last place amongst 
the Italian regions for the number of cooperatives. Coda (1977) highlights that the isolation 
worked on the island in two distinct directions: it favoured individualism and the 
development of forms of autonomous cohabitation inside the Sardinian society. This 
explains the lack, until almost the end of the XIX century, of cooperatives or any kind of 
activities which required a certain communion of interests and capitals. Therefore, in such a 




This paper analysed an underexplored field of research such as the origins of the Sicilian 
Mafia. So far, the only empirical paper which deals with this topic is the one of Bandiera 
(2003). This author focused on the market for protection and provided evidence that in the 
western regions Mafia was more likely to be active where land was more fragmented and 
with higher value. Our work takes a different approach closer to the view proposed by 
historians as Lupo (2004) and Pezzino (1987). Rather than considering Mafia only as a 
protection industry, they stress its role as the manu militari in the fights of emerging classes 
that wanted to capture the lords’ legacy. In fact, the end of feudalism and the newly born 
state opened up new commercial and political opportunities. In order to succeed in 
exploiting them, it was necessary the use of violence. This was the result of the inability of 
the state to maintain public order. As we noted in the introduction, this situation resembled 
an anarchic one (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1995). The vacuum created by the inefficacy of 
the state was filled by those individuals who had a competitive advantage over violence, i.e. 
Mafia. In turn, they could enjoy some wealth even though they were not productive at all. 
Moreover, they were better off than peasants who were the ones who actually cultivated 
the land. 
The biggest opportunities, opened up after the institutional changes, were in the inner 
part of the island and in the surroundings of the city. However, they were more acute in the 
former because it was there that the lords were losing much of their powers. The typical 
contests were in the market for the land, either to rent or buy it. In order to empirically 
verify this, we use a newly built database that overcome previous issues with Mafia 
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measurement. Moreover, we extended the analysis to all Sicilian provinces and we also 
included new variables that have never been used before. The results support our 
theoretical approach. In particular, we find that Mafia is present in councils where the land 
income is higher but especially where there are large properties, cereals cultivation, less 
density of population and with few peasants owners of the land. These findings suggest that 
Mafia origins cannot be understood only as a protection agency (Gambetta, 1993). In fact, 
our approach seems to be more adequate in explaining this phenomenon.  
In order to give robustness to our analysis we compared Sicily with Sardinia, another 
Italian region. The former had similar features with Sicily: they are both islands that 
experienced high level of crimes after the end of feudalism. However in Sardinia did not 
originate Mafia as in Sicily. From our basic analysis, it seems that even in Sardinia there was 
a potential market for protection because of the high rate of criminality and the extreme 
fractionalisation of the land. However, on the contrary to Sicily, it did not have the large 
farm system and the market for land did not lead to the fierce competition for resources. 
Moreover, there were more self-employed in Sardinia and a general lower degree of 
inequality which diminished the opportunity cost of joining the Mafia. Finally, it is plausible 
to think that because of the prevalence of sheep breeding over agriculture, the absence of 
large farms and the lower density of population, there was a lower propensity to associate 
compared to Sicily. Eventually this might have played a role in the origins of an association 

















2.7.1 Description of the variables  
 
Mafia Index: In the Jacini survey (Damiani 1881-1886), prosecutors were asked whether 
Mafia was active in their town and, if so, to what extent. Based on this we created four 
ordered categories: 0 that stands for no Mafia activity; 1 if Mafia shows little activity; 2 if 
organised crime is quite active and, finally, 3 whether Mafia is very active. For the reasons 
explained in the text we merged these data with the ones taken from Bonfadini and Borsani 
(1968). The authors just mention the towns where Mafia is most active. We then assigned 
the value three to all the councils listed. 
Mafia Binary: Based on Mafia Index, we assign 1 to all the values between one and 
three and 0 otherwise. 
Large properties: It was asked to describe the main condition of the land, choosing 
among big, medium and big, medium, medium and small, small. I created a dummy variable 
with value one if the answer was big or ”medium and big properties”. It is important to note 
that there was not a unique measure of large estates. In some councils a large property 
would be of 100 hectares, whereas in others 200. Source: Damiani (1881-1886). 
Cereals: It is a continuous variable that expresses the ratio of land cultivated with 
cereals on the total cultivated area. Source: Damiani (1881-1886). 
Rich Agriculture: It is a continuous variable that expresses the ratio of land cultivated 
with olives, citrus and grapes on the total cultivated area. Source: Damiani (1881-1886). 
Little influence of reforms: It was asked how the sales of the state and church owned 
properties influenced the division of the land in their territory. The possible answers were: 
none, a little, positive, and a lot and there a no such kind of properties. On the basis of their 
answers a dummy variable has been created with value one if the answer was one of the 
first two categories. Source: Damiani (1881-1886). 
Few peasants landowners: In the survey, it was asked to describe the level of peasants’ 
landownership. The possible answers were: none, very few, few, many, and very much 
peasants own of the land. I created a dummy variable with value equal one if the 
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Table 2. 14 All Sicily including only Large Properties and Cereals without provincial dummies 
 Maf Ind 3 Maf Ind 0 LPM Probit Maf Ind  
3-Cer 
Maf Ind 0-Cer 
              
Large Properties 0.146** -0.167** 0.427 0.197**   
 [0.069] [0.080] [0.253] [0.088]   
Cereals     0.224* -0.256* 
     [0.118] [0.141] 
       
Observations 136 136 136 136 159 159 
[Pseudo] R squared 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.0192 0.011 0.011 
Log Likelihood -152.398 -152.398  -92.470 -181.121 -181.121 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3(a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). In 
column three we report the ols result. The column Probit reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as 
dependent variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big” . Cereals is 
the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated.  
 
Table 2. 15 Four western provinces including only Large Properties and Cereals without provincial 
dummies 
  Maf Ind 3 Maf Ind 0 LPM Probit Maf Ind  
3-Cer 
Maf Ind 0-Cer 
              
Large Properties 0.170* -0.147* 0.409 0.176   
 [0.094] [0.082] [0.264] [0.117]   
Cereals     -0.067 0.057 
     [0.083] [0.070] 
       
Observations 73 73 73 73 86 86 
[Pseudo] R squared 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.012 0.001 0.001 
Log Likelihood  -78.680 -78.680  -43.793 -95.527. -95.527. 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3(a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). In 
column three we report the ols result. The column Probit reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as 
dependent variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big” . Cereals is 
the proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated.  
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Table 2. 16 All Sicily with the additional controls without provincial dummies 
  Maf Ind 3 Maf Ind 0 LPM Probit Maf Ind 
 3-Cer 
Maf Ind  
0-Cer 
              
Large Properties 0.122* -0.144** 0.378* 0.136   
 [0.067] [0.071] [0.192] [0.117]   
Cereals 0.075 -0.088 0.265 -0.028 0.367 -0.432 
 [0.258] [0.294] [0.827] [0.264] [0.435] [0.456] 
Rich Agriculture -0.024 0.028* -0.069 -0.022 -0.016 0.019 
 [0.018] [0.017] [0.044] [0.022] [0.016] [0.015] 
Density of Population -0.073 0.087 -0.282 -0.045 -0.061 0.072 
 [0.136] [0.153] [0.458] [0.130] [0.128] [0.145] 
Little influence  
of reforms 
0.133* -0.157** 0.416 0.161* 0.161*** -0.190*** 
 [0.068] [0.071] [0.218] [0.091] [0.060] [0.058] 
Few peasants 
 Landowners 
    0.355 -0.419* 
     [0.232] [0.217] 
       
Observations 110 110 110 110 114 114 
[Pseudo] R squared 0.040 0.040 0.078 0.055 0.040 0.040 
Log Likelihood -121.184 -121.184  -72.060 -126.551 -126.551 
       Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3(a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). In 
column three we report the ols result. The column Probit reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as 
dependent variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. Cereals is the 
proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] The other variable are explained in the 


















Table 2. 17 Four Western provinces with the additional controls without provincial dummies 
 Maf Ind 3 Maf Ind 0 LPM Probit Maf Ind 
 3-Cer 
Maf Ind  
0-Cer 
              
Large Properties 0.174* -0.149** 0.479 0.126   
 [0.092] [0.075] [0.270] [0.104]   
Cereals 0.721*** -0.618*** 1.928*** 0.478** 1.420*** -1.194*** 
 [0.192] [0.213] [0.567] [0.233] [0.448] [0.431] 
Rich Agriculture -0.049** 0.042* -0.120* -0.067** -0.038* 0.032* 
 [0.024] [0.022] [0.059] [0.028] [0.021] [0.019] 
Density of Population -0.247* 0.212* -0.659 -0.135 -0.244** 0.206** 
 [0.131] [0.117] [0.400] [0.129] [0.110] [0.100] 
Little influence  
of reforms 
0.171 -0.147 0.505 0.132 0.221** -0.186** 
 [0.107] [0.093] [0.319] [0.128] [0.105] [0.086] 
Few peasants 
 landowners 
    0.781** -0.657** 
     [0.330] [0.286] 
       
Observations 57 57 57 57 59 59 
[Pseudo] R squared 0.128 0.128 0.233 0.144 0.135 0.135 
Log Likelihood -56.609 -56.609   -29.731 -58.890 -58.890 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] In the first column we report the marginal effects for 
the Mafia level 3(a lot of Mafia activity). In the second we report the marginal effects for no Mafia activity (0). In 
column three we report the ols result. The column Probit reports the marginal effects using Mafia Binary as 
dependent variable. [3] Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. Cereals is the 
proportion of the land cultivated with cereals to the total area cultivated. [4] The other variable are explained in the 


































                  
Large Properties 0.478** 0.364* 0.441** 0.414** 0.373 0.445** 0.338* 0.410** 
 
(0.212) (0.206) (0.192) (0.207) (0.235) (0.221) (0.181) (0.193) 
Rich Agriculture 0.225 -0.388 
      
 
(0.390) (0.484) 
      Density of Population 
  
-0.004 -0.016 
    
   
(0.035) (0.039) 
    Little influence 
of reforms 
    
-0.191 -0.089 
  
     
(0.361) (0.295) 
  Few peasants   
Landowners 
      
0.311 0.215 
       
(0.196) (0.146) 

































































































         Observations 136 136 136 136 113 
 
132 132 
Pseudo R-squared 0.197 0.0135 0.196 0.0109 0.199 
 
0.200 0.0164 
Log- Likelhood -123.644 -151.903 -123.771 -152.310 -104.040 -128.351 -118.832 -146.094 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] For each explanatory variable, we 
report the results with and without provincial dummies. The coefficient are the standard ordered probit ones. [3] 
Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. [4] The other variables are 




















Table 2. 19 Order probit results for each variable with and without provincial dummies for the four 
western provinces 
 
Mafia Index Mafia Index Mafia Index Mafia Index Mafia Index Mafia Index Mafia Index Mafia Index 
                  
Large Properties 0.542* 0.544* 0.430 0.449* 0.431 0.420 0.382* 0.425** 
 
(0.313) (0.297) (0.282) (0.250) (0.342) (0.304) (0.216) (0.198) 
Rich Agriculture 0.958** 0.840 
      
 
(0.475) (0.525) 




    
   
(0.053) (0.044) 
    Little influence 
 of reforms 
    
-0.551 -0.531 
  
     
(0.572) (0.488) 
  Few peasants   
Landowners 
      
0.275 0.198 
       
(0.261) (0.235) 

















































         Observations 73 73 73 73 60 60 70 70 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0621 0.0235 0.0469 0.0112 0.0556 0.0275 0.0556 0.0170 
Log- Likelhood -74.593 -77.663 -75.802 -78.644 -63.038 -64.915 -73.353 -76.354 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [2] For each explanatory variable, we 
report the results with and without provincial dummies. The coefficient are the standard ordered probit ones. [3] 
Large Properties is a dummy with value 1 if estates were big or “medium and big”. [4] The other variables are 
































































3.1 Introduction and motivations 
 
Duisburg, 15th of July 2007. In front of the Pizzeria “Da Bruno“, six people belonging to 
the Calabrian Mafia ‘Ndrangheta were killed. They were shot by some members of a rival 
family in San Luca, one of the headquarters of this Italian organised group. This 
manslaughter caused quite a stir all over the word because it was one of the few cases of 
vendetta (vengeance) of Mafia gangs outside their traditional territories. The killings 
revealed how these groups are extremely able to spread to regions very different from their 
original ones.  
Recent academic evidence showed how such a feature of organised crime groups is 
rapidly growing. For example, in a recent work, Forgione (2009) analysed how Italian Mafias 
expanded to northern Italy and abroad. Moreover, the migration of the Sicilian Mafia to the 
USA in the first half of the previous century is well documented. However, Italian Mafias are 
not the only groups who managed to transplant successfully to other regions. For example, 
Glenny (2008) showed the expansions of international cartels, such as the ones from post-
communist countries. This phenomenon has been studied by Varese (2011) who labelled it 
the Mafia transplantation.  
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by focusing on the migration of southern 
Italian based Mafia groups to the central-northern Italian regions. This is an important issue 
as testified by recent judicial evidence110. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 below show the absolute 
number of real estates and firms confiscated to criminal organisations in all the Italian 
regions until the end of 2009111. Although the majority is in the southern Mafia-dominated 
regions, the central and northern regions have relatively high levels too. This gives an idea 






                                                 
110
 For example, at the end of 2011, hundreds of people who belonged to ‘Ndrangheta were arrested in Milan.  
111
 The 1982 law (the so called “La Torre-Rognoni”), which introduced the Mafia- type association crime also 
prescribes that all the property belonging to Mafia groups should be seized. 
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Figure 3.1. Real estates confiscated 
 
Note: This map represents the total cumulative number of real estate properties confiscated by the judicial 
authority to Mafia-type organised crime groups up to the end of 2009. Data are taken from the Italian Ministry 
of Interior (2012). 
 
Figure 3.2 Firms confiscated 
 
Note: This map represents the total cumulative number of firms confiscated by the judicial authority to Mafia-
type organised crime groups up to the end of 2009. Data are taken from the Italian Ministry of Interior (2012). 
 
As many past reports have shown (CPA, 1976), the presence of southern Mafias in the 
Centre-North regions is not a new phenomenon. As we will see in the next section, it started 
in the 1960s but fully developed only from the mid 1970s onwards. Mafia cartels initially 
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controlled illegal sectors such as the drug one but moved on to being major actors also in 
legitimate industries. Moreover, they increased their influence on the local political forces. 
What are the factors which caused this Mafia transplantation to the central and northern 
Italian regions? The literature seems to have reached a consensus on the most important 
causes (CPA, 1976; Dalla Chiesa, 2010; Sciarrone, 2009). The first one is the massive 
migration of southern people to the Centre-North. The second is the implementation of the 
so-called soggiorno obbligato (forced re-settlement), which sent Mafia members to other 
regions in order to set them apart from their original background. The third is the rise of 
Mafia wars or police repressions that led to some Mafia members moving north (Varese, 
2006). The last explanation refers to the opening up of new opportunities in the destination 
provinces, especially in the profitable drug market.  
Despite the reasonable amount of historical literature on this topic (Ciconte, 2010), no 
one has ever quantitatively tested these hypothesis empirically. In fact, there are no 
economic works on the transplantation of the Mafias. The first and foremost contribution of 
this paper is to redress this omission in the literature. We concentrate on the role of 
migration and forced re-settlement. Our empirical analysis is based on a newly built 
database that uses previously unexplored data. We have data on Mafia presence from 1983, 
the first year in which Mafia-type crimes are recorded, until 2008. In addition, we create 
three innovative indices of Mafia activity that aim at avoiding typical problems in the 
economics of crime literature. We further collected new data on intra province migration 
from the South to the rest of Italy, from 1955. The data on forced re-settlement are taken 
from the 1976 parliamentary anti-Mafia Commission (CPA, 1976). Our results suggest that 
migration of southerners is by far the most important variable explaining Mafia presence in 
the central-northern regions; in particular, the one from the Mafia-infested regions. The 
forced re-settlement variable is often insignificant and with negligible coefficients. These 
results are robust to different specifications. 
The paper is organised as follows: section two reviews the literature and provides the 
theoretical background. Section three presents our new data and section four discusses the 
identification and econometric concerns. Section five presents the main results, robustness 




3.2 Literature review  
 
3.2.1 Definition of organised crime 
 
There is no consensus amongst scholars on the definition of organised crime112. One of 
the earliest contributions is that by Thomas Schelling (1971) that identifies two main roles of 
organised crime: as a monopolist or as a government of the underworld. The difference 
depends on the characteristics of the illegal markets. In particular, organised crime will be a 
monopolist in those markets that can be monopolised. Schelling argued that some activities 
are easier to monopolize than others. On the other hand, it will act as a government of the 
underworld in those markets where it is not possible to impose a monopoly. The reason is 
that illegal firms cannot appeal to the law to solve their controversies and, therefore, they 
need protection by the criminal organizations113.  
Fiorentini and Pelzman (1995) produced an interesting synthesis of this concept. They 
say that organised crime could be seen in two perspectives: as a governance structure that 
imposes regulations and supplies public goods to independent illegal firms and, the other, as 
a firm which deals in the illegal markets114. Regarding the first view, they stress the control 
of the turf: “once the monopoly over coercion has been acquired by a criminal organization, 
the latter can perform inside its territory those activities that typically characterize a 
collective decision-makers intervention on the economy: levying of taxes, coercive provision 
of public goods, and regulation of private agents through not fiscal tools” (ibid., p.14)115. 
Therefore, organised crime behaves as a state in the state. Regarding the second view, the 
scholars stressed the importance of its competitive advantage in the use of violence to 
create monopolies and enforce cartel agreements116. The former perspective is generally 
                                                 
112
 For an interesting review on the definition of organised crime, see Becchi (2000). 
113
 This analysis is similar to the view of organised crime we reviewed in the introductory chapter.  
114
 However, in a subsequent paper, Fiorentini (2000) seems to make more distinctively the difference 
between illegal firms and governance structure. This last feature is the one considered as typical of organised 
crime. Fiorentini (2000, p. 438): “the idea that organised crime does not only supply illegal goods to final 
customers and that behind extortion one can see implicit contracts with illegal firms is coherent with the 
available evidence on its internal organisation”. 
115
 They also add, in the same page: “The control over the territory – be it geographical or functional- is a 
necessary condition for criminal organizations to carry out their activities”. 
116
 At page 13 they add: “Even if a significant part of organised criminal activities cannot take place but inside 
local monopolies, there are illegal goods and services that can be produced and marketed efficiently only 
above a relatively large scale of operations (money laundering, manipulation of large scale public 
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referred to as power syndicate, whereas the latter as enterprise syndicate. Moreover, the 
authors highlighted the links between organised crime and authorities: “there is a further 
aspect of the relationship between organised crime and governmental bodies which is not 
usually investigated by the economist supporting one or the other approach to the analysis 
of the organised crime but is central to the analysis of many sociologists working in the field. 
This aspect involves the collusive relations between criminal organizations on the one hand 
and politicians and bureaucrats on the other” (ibid., p.7).  
 
3.2.2 Mafias  
 
Varese (2006) went further and argued that not all criminal groups are the same and 
only some share the characteristics that classify them as Mafia. The author argued that 
“several recent studies have established that a number of criminal organisation – the Sicilian 
Mafia, the Hong Kong Triads, the Russian Mafia and the Japanese Jakuza- are part of the 
same species, collectively referred to as “Mafias” [...] this body of research has shown that 
Mafias emerge in modernizing societies that are undergoing economic expansion, but lack a 
legal structure that reliably protects property rights or settles business disputes” (ibid., 
p.5)117 . Therefore, one of the key elements of Mafia groups is that they deal with protection 
to the legal and illegal sector. 
A formalisation of the industry of protection has been given by Gambetta (1993), 
although he focuses specifically on the Sicilian Cosa Nostra118. Gambetta claims that 
protection is the main good provided by the Mafia. This is what distinguishes a mafioso 
(Mafia member) from a normal entrepreneur. It does not matter what type of illegal goods 
he deals with. “What does make him a mafioso is the fact that he is capable of protecting 
himself as well as others against cheats and competitors. […]” (ibid., p.19). Mafia will then 
                                                                                                                                                        
interventions). In these cases criminal organizations often enter directly into the production and marketing 
stages to prevent some illegal firms under their control from acquiring sufficient financial means to contest 
their monopoly over coercion. Moreover, to prevent the competition for larger market shares from carrying 
over to an open conflict with the criminal organization managing the nearest local monopoly, each criminal 
organization tries to define collusive agreements for the collective management of the supply of such goods 
and services”. 
117
 This is the case of the Italian Mafias, and in particular, the Cosa Nostra (Gambetta 1993 and 1995). 
Moreover, even the Russian Mafia presents similar features. In fact, it originated from the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Varese, 2001). Yakuza (Hill, 2006) and some triads share similar characteristics too.   
118
 Indeed, he is also very much influenced by the works by Schelling.  
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be present every time the supply and demand of protection meets. In particular, it steps in 
when there is a government failure and the basic property rights are not protected. In this 
particular market, supply is represented by all those thugs who are capable and willing to 
use violence to protect property rights. Demand is represented by those individuals who 
cannot rely on to the state and prefer to pay some money to see their rights protected119. 
Given our focus on Italian Mafias, let us briefly see what the main southern-based 
groups are. 
 
3.2.3 The Italian Mafias 
 
Italian Mafias are long lasting organizations which trace their roots way back in the 
past. Therefore, history plays a crucial part in explaining the actual spread of organised 
crime, especially in the south of Italy. At the current time, there are four major Mafia-type 
organizations120: the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria, Camorra in Campania 
and the Sacra Corona Unita in Apulia. As we will see, the first three originated at the 
beginning of the XIX century121 but became crucial social actors after the 1861 Unification of 
Italy122. The latter formed in a subsequent period, and, in particular, in the 1980s. They all 








                                                 
119
 At page 19, Gambetta says that it is typical “given that the Mafia arises in a power vacuum to exercise the 
use of violence in place of the government, it stands to reason that Mafias are less likely to develop in 
countries that are strong, stable democracies with robust institutions and a vibrant civil society”. 
120
 There are some minor ones as basilischi in Basilicata region. Moreover, there is a group in Sicily called 
Stidda.   
121
 Although there were other forms of criminal organization in the previous centuries, for as the picciotteria in 
Calabria. 
122
 The kingdom of the two Sicilies started in 1816 and comprised all the southern regions including Abruzzo 
and Molise. Before 1816, there were essentially two kingdoms: the Neapolitan and the Sicilian one which were 
ruled by different foreign kings. In particular, the Spanish had a long standing presence in these territories. 
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Figure 3.3 Map of origins’ regions of Italian Mafias 
 
 
The first time we hear about the Sicilian Mafia is in the 1863 play “I mafiusi della 
Vicaria”. However the origins can be traced to the pre Unitarian period. It emerged in the 
western provinces and its headquarters was Palermo. There is no consensus on the reasons 
of its emergence (Bandiera, 2003; Lupo, 2004). However, as we argued in the previous 
chapter, it seems that it was the result of the violence used by emerging classes who 
wanted to capture the barons’ power at the end of feudalism.  
If the Sicilian Mafia was deeply rooted in the countryside, where there was mainly grain 
cultivation, in Calabria we find that ‘Ndrangheta emerged in a different context. In fact, 
“‘ndrangheta settled mainly in those areas characterized by fast processes of economic 
development and transformation” (Ciconte, 1992, p.152). It firstly emerged in the southern 
part of the region. In particular, it did so in Reggio Calabria (an area with prosperous citrus 
tree cultivation), Cosenza and Catanzaro. 
The Camorra presents another peculiar history. It emerged in the jails of Naples in the 
first half of the XIX century123. This environment offered criminals the opportunities to bond 
                                                 
123
 Although the first time we hear about the term Camorra is in a 1735 official document, Marc Monnier is the 
first scholar who studied it in 1863. 
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and create alliances. Following an administrative division of Naples into twelve 
neighbourhoods124, it rapidly spread all over the city. However, it exploded after the 
unification of Italy because the then Ministry of Interior, Liborio Romano, entrusted the 
public security to organised crime’s bosses. It did so because of the state’s inability to secure 
public order. The headquarters has always been Naples and its hinterland: it expanded in 
the entire region only in the following years. 
Finally, the most recent Mafia is the Apulean Sacra Corona Unita. In the 1980s, the boss 
of the NCO (newly organised camorra) wanted to create a similar organization in the Apulian 
area to exploit illegal markets. However, the local criminals opposed this project because 
they wanted to run the illegal activities by themselves. Brindisi and Lecce were the most 
“active” cities. It was not until the 1990s that these gangs became known to the local 
authorities.  
As mentioned earlier, all these organisations are similar in the sense that in their 
territories they want to rule as the state does. “In Sicily and in other Italian regions, the 
control over the territory involves all the citizens and institutions, it affects everybody’s life” 
(Becchi, 2000, p.79).  
More recently, these Mafias started expanding outside their original territories. They 
managed to settle in various parts of the world. This phenomenon is called Mafia 
transplantation (Varese, 2006). 
 
3.2.4 Mafia transplantation: theory  
 
We generally refer to Mafia migrating and settling in regions far from their original ones 
as transplantation. This phenomenon has been studied by Varese (2006, 2011) who claimed 
that it “mean[s] the ability of a Mafia group to offer criminal protection over a sustained 
period of time outside its region of origin and routine operation” (Varese ,2006, p.414). 
Moreover, he refers to “made “members: “in other words, they are bona fide Mafiosi who 
have gone through an initiation ritual in the territory of origin. As transplantation succeeds, 
such rituals may then be performed in the new locale and recognised by the group of origin” 
(ibid., p.414). Therefore, all transnational crimes committed occasionally are excluded from 
                                                 
124
 Decided by Murat. 
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this definition. In this respect, Varese notes: “the above definition helps distinguish 
transplantation proper from several phenomena that are often lumped together in the 
category of transnational organised crime. Criminal crossing of a border (physically or 
virtually, as in case of internet frauds) with an illicit good or a person do not automatically 
qualify as either Mafia or transplantation but rather as a form of illegal trade, and need to 
be placed in a conceptual box that differs from attempts to control markets or territories 
abroad do not constitute transplantation of the group, nor do conspiracies between Mafiosi 
and foreign criminals to smuggle workers, drugs, weapons, and other illegal commodities 
either into or out of their country” (ibid., p.415)125.   
There are many examples of Mafia migration. The most well-known case is the one of 
the Sicilian Cosa Nostra to the USA (Lupo, 2008). It occurred in the first decades of the XX 
century when gangs controlled strategic sectors in the illegal world, alcohol during 
prohibition, and legal ones such as carting. Moreover, Italian Mafias are thought to have 
been present in countries as diverse as Canada and Australia. Also, other criminal groups 
managed successfully to settle abroad. For example, Yakuza groups are active in the 
Philippines. Varese (2011) provides a detailed analysis of how the Taiwanese and Hong Kong 
triad managed to transplant to mainland China. Moreover, many Russian groups managed 
to expand in former Soviet states, such as in Romania. Our focus is on the movement of 
southern Italian based criminal groups to the central and northern Italian regions.. 
 
3.2.5 Mafia transplantation in Italy: a brief review 
 
Given the secrecy of the Mafia, it is difficult to be precise on when Mafia groups started 
operating outside their original territories. It seems that the first signs of Mafia activity can 
be traced back to the sixties in Milan126. However, it was not until the second half of the 
1970s that it fully developed.  
Gangs started controlling profitable illegal markets, such as drugs, kidnapping127 and 
gambling. In particular, the former was facilitated by the increased supply of hashish, 
                                                 
125
 In his work on Sicily, Gambetta talks about Mafia transplantation and describes the conditions that need to 
be met in order for it to happen. The author argues that Mafia “is a difficult industry to export. Not unlike 
mining, it is heavily dependent on local environment” (1993, p. 249). 
126
 Some people refer to 1958 when the Italian- American boss Joe Adonis moved to Milan. 
127
 Between the period 1968 and 1998, Lombardy was the region with the highest number of kidnappings. 
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cocaine and heroin at the international level128. As we have seen in chapter one, illegal 
markets offer an ideal situation for an organisation as the Mafia to develop. In fact, the 
state is not involved in such markets. However, firms and agents dealing in such contests 
need their property rights to be secured and contracts to be enforced. Therefore, Mafia can 
exploit its competitive advantage in “fighting technologies” and function as a kind of state of 
the underworld. 
The first Mafia organisation that settled in the central and northern regions was the 
Sicilian La Cosa Nostra. For example, Milan hosted some of the most fearful bosses, such as 
Luciano Leggio, Gaetano Badalamenti, Giuseppe Calderone, Tommaso Buscetta and 
Salvatore Greco. In this initial period, Mafia presence concentrated on the northern western 
part of Italy, especially Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria. It later expanded to the central and 
north-eastern part of the country. 
From the end of the 1970s, Mafia groups started becoming more entrenched in legal 
sectors of the economy (Dalla Chiesa, 2010). In particular, construction has always been 
considered one of the most profitable businesses for Mafia-type organisations. The reason 
is that they could influence the labour market which was composed mainly of migrants. 
Slowly, the Mafia extended its interests to vast sections of the legal sector. It chose to get 
involved in those sectors where it had better knowledge, i.e. those that 
controlled/influenced back in the southern regions. Amongst them, the most important 
ones were hospitality, retail, commerce, transport and entertainment129. For example, they 
started running night clubs, shops and many firms involved in earth moving practices. The 
Mafia could enter legal sectors because it had a large amount of capital coming from the 
illegal businesses which needed to be reinvested130. Moreover, it exploited its natural 
competitive advantage on the use of violence that “facilitates” economic transactions131. As 
it happened in the South, Mafias controlled the firms directly or indirectly through the 
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 For example, the Sicilians were managing this market together with the Corsican Mafia which was operating 
in Marseille. 
129
 Various DIA reports show this. For example the 2009 one.  
130
 It is well established that ‘ndrangheta “took off” thanks to money raised through kidnapping, especially in 
the North. 
131
 Again, this is in line with what we have said in 1.4.1. Even legal transactions in the central and northern 
regions might have been subject to some degree of uncertainty. For example, some firms might not have 
completely fulfilled their duties toward their trading partners. Moreover, the Italian judicial system is 
notoriously very slow. As a consequence, Mafia-related firms can resort to the use (or the threat) of violence 
to have their contracts rapidly enforced. This analysis is similar to the one proposed by Dixit (2004).  
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imposition of labour force and goods. This phenomenon was facilitated by the connivance of 
some local entrepreneurs who preferred to collude instead of fighting. Moreover, Mafia 
took advantage of the greater sophistication of financial sector of the northern regions 
compared to the South. For example, in Milan, Sicilian Mafia members created strong links 
with some actors in the financial system132. In fact, the first Mafia related murder was that 
in 1979 when the lawyer Ambrosoli was killed. He was the liquidator of the Banca Privata 
Italiana that belonged to the Sicilian banker Sindona. The latter was thought to have 
laundered money on behalf of Mafia.  
Even the political system is not immune from its influence. This is particularly true in 
small towns where it is not only easier to get to know local representatives but also to be 
able to influence the elections (Dalla Chiesa, 2010). For example, in 1995 the Bardonecchia 
council, a small town in the Susa valley, was dismissed for Mafia-type infiltration. Until 
recently, it was the only council dismissed for Mafia infiltration. However, in 2012 the 
Ventimiglia council was also dismissed. Indeed the interest of Mafia in public contracting got 
stronger over the years. Many judicial reports show how gangs are continuously looking 
after public money. It is not surprising that the (public) works for the Expo to be held in 
Milan in 2015 are constantly monitored for fear of Mafia infiltration.  
In the last decades, there has been an even stronger ramification of Mafias outside 
their original territories. In particular, they managed to penetrate the rich business of toxic 
waste and, also, health care. Moreover, they created strong links with foreign criminal 
organisations, whilst still keeping the predominance role. 
Indeed, the Sicilian Mafia is no longer the strongest Mafia in these regions. From the 
1980s onward the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta assumed this role (Ciconte, 2010). This is 
particularly true for central and northern western Italy. In contrast, in the northern eastern 
part, the Neapolitan Camorra seems to be stronger. 
 
3.2.6 Factors that fostered Mafia transplantation 
 
What are the factors that caused Mafia transplantation to the Italian central-northern 
regions? The literature seems to have reached a consensus, at least on the most important 
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Mafia groups in the North seem to be very flexible and adaptable to the new environments. This reflects the 
need to incorporate transaction costs in their governance structures. 
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ones. We consider the reasons identified by the Anti Mafia commission (CPA, 1976) because 
they express the mainstream views. These are: 1) the improvident use of the so-called 
soggiorno obbligato (forced re-settlement); 2) the escape of Mafia members from original 
territories to avoid retaliation after Mafia wars; 3) migrant movements from the South to 
the North and 4) the attractive opportunities offered by the province destination: in 
particular, the flourishing drug market. Similar analyses have been proposed by other 
authors such as Della Chiesa (2010) and Varese (2011), although with different emphasis133.  
Although all are supposedly important causes of this expansion, in our empirical 
analysis we focus only on migration and soggiorno obbligato. The reasons for not 
considering the drug market is that there are not enough statistics on the consumption of 
drugs, or on the size of drug market, for the period of our analysis134. Secondly, we consider 
migration and forced re-settlement until the beginning of the 1970s. The opening up of drug 
traffic businesses fully developed only from the 1970s onwards. Therefore, these two sets of 
explanations refer to two different periods which would cause identification problems. Also, 
we could not find precise data on Mafia wars, as it is quite complicate to get the number of 
Mafia members who “escaped” due to these conflicts. 
Having said this, let us proceed in analysing migration and forced re-settlement in more 





Italy has been characterized by a massive migration outflows in the period roughly 
comprised between the Italian unification in 1861 and the Italian economic miracle in the 
1960s. The so-called Italian diaspora concerned nearly 25 million Italians and it is considered 
one of the biggest mass migrations of contemporary times. 
The turning point in Italian economic history has been represented by the so-called 
economic miracle (miracolo economico) between the late 1950s and the early 1970s. In the 
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Varese focused on the supply and demand of protection in new territories. In the former, the author 
included migration, forced re-settlement and fear of punishment. As demand, Varese mentioned the inability 
of the state to protect property rights, the level of trust, the presence of illegal markets and the characteristics 
of the legal markets.  
134
 Still, we also consider the GDP per capita. 
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post-war period, Italy experienced a rapid industrialisation in many strategic industrial 
sectors such as automobiles, textiles, chemistry and electric appliances. The positive fact 
was that it has been a rapid growth, along with a contained inflation and a massive creation 
of new jobs. In particular, it is thought that growth was mainly driven by big firms (Sapelli, 
1997). At the same time, this attracted the creation of small and medium enterprises which 
provided goods and services to the larger ones. This led to a rapid increase of real GDP and 
to a transition from agriculture based economy to an industrialised one. The peak was 
reached in the period 1958 – 1963 when GDP grew at more than 7 % at constant prices.  
Despite a general increase in economic and living conditions, the economic miracle had 
the effect of exacerbating the dualism between the North and the South of the country. The 
economic growth remained predominantly confined to northern and central regions. At 
first, it happened in the industrial triangle formed by the cities of Milan, Turin and Genoa. 
This is where most of the factories and technological improvements happened. This 
development soon after involved the north east and centre135.  
Meanwhile, southern Italy remained impoverished. As a result, the post-war period led 
to a massive increase of Italian internal migration from the south to the rest of Italy. 
Migrants provided a necessary workforce in a rapidly industrialising Italy. Overall, from the 
late 1950s to the early 1970s roughly 4 million people migrated from the southern regions 
(Bonaguidi, 1985). The pattern of this migration flows is not constant as it can be seen in the 
figure below. We can distinguish a first jump which leads to the absolute peak in the early 
1960s. Thereafter, there was a slump that is followed by another jump until the early 1970s. 
From this second peak onwards, there was a slow but constant decrease in the number of 
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 This gap still persists, as the GDP per capita in Agrigento, the poorest province, is still less than half the one 
in Milan, the richest.  
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If we break down the national data into regional data, we have the graphs below. For 
ease of analysis, we report first the four regions with a strong presence of organised crime: 
Sicily, Campania, Calabria and Apulia. As we can see, Apulia is the region that, on average, 
sent the highest number of migrants to the central-northern area. It was closely followed by 
Sicily. Campania shows a particular pattern: until the 1970s it was well below the other two, 






















































The massive internal and interregional migration flows significantly affected the 
demographic composition in the hosting provinces and regions. As shown in Figure 3.6, 
considering the period 1955-1985, Milan, Turin and Rome hosted roughly 1 million 
immigrants each136, while smaller provinces such as Genoa and Varese received more than 
200’000 immigrants. The huge share of migrants moved from the Apulia, Campania, Sicily 
and Calabria regions, which are Mafia strongholds.  
As usual, it is misleading to apply a unique theoretical framework to understand this 
massive internal migration (De Haas, 2008). Indeed, these migration flows were consistent 
with the standard neoclassical framework proposed, amongst the others, by Todaro (1969; 
Harris and Todaro, 1970). This view stressed the geographic differences of supply and 
demand of labour between two areas. People move from the one with surplus of labour to 
the other one. Individuals will consider whether the wage differentials are positive and will 
move according to a cost benefit analysis. Workers also consider other factors such as 
likelihood of unemployment, costs of travel etc. This is consistent with the evidence which 
showed that the unemployment rate in southern Italy was near to 50%, while the North was 
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experiencing a dramatic economic boom. It is also consistent with the rural-urban migration 
theory proposed by these authors. In fact, the South was still largely agricultural and most of 
the migrants were moving from the countryside to the big industrial cities. Migration 
affected the hosting provinces’ development outcomes (Taylor, 1999). As discussed in 
Varese (2006), the demographic composition in the destination provinces experienced a 
dramatic change. For instance, the percentage of residents living in the cities of Turin born 
in Sicily, Calabria or Campania grew from 2.4% in 1951 to 12.2% in 1971, while it grew from 
2.2% in 1951 to 8.8% in 1971 in the city of Milan.  
However, critics of this view (De Haas, 2008) stressed the fact that the neo classical 
view cannot explain alone the causes of migration. For example, it does not explain why 
migrants have favourite destination areas, despite the fact that the cost benefit analysis 
would suggest differently. In order to explain such incongruence, several explanations have 
been proposed137. A major role is played by social capital that is also central in chapter five 
of this thesis. In particular, community networks played a crucial role in affecting migrants’ 
choice (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Moretti, 1999; Munshi, 2001; Vergalli, 2008). Arango 
et al. (1998, p.448) defined networks as “a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, 
former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, 
friendship, and shared community”. Former migrants influence new ones in determining 
destination choices. Moretti (1999) provided evidence that both the timing and the 
destination of Italian immigration at the end of the XIX century were consistent with the 
presence of social networks in the host country. The author showed how migration to the 
USA and Brazil at the beginning of the last century could be explained by path dependency. 
Munshi (2003) analysed how community networks might lead to improvements in job 
market opportunities for new Mexican emigrants in the USA. The same has been done by 
Epstein and Gang (2006). More importantly, in an uncertain environment, migration 
networks provide support for labour market searches or housing, as well as, under network-
externalities, reduce the costs of relocation to a different and foreign country (Carrington et 
al., 1996; Gottlieb, 1987; Chiswick and Miller, 1996). New immigrants aim to integrate in the 
destination country and this may be facilitated through existing community networks. As 
stressed in Vergalli (2008, p.548): “integration is the process by which immigrants become 
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 However, along with the two views of migration we present, many others have been suggested. For 
example, the push-pull and Marxist view. For a review on the theory of migration see De Haas (2008) 
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accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. Therefore, the process of 
integration is not only taking place- as is often supposed- with individual immigrants, but 
also at the collective level of the immigrant group. In fact, when an immigrant enters a new 
society, he/she begins to build a group of people (or enters a group if it is already exists), 
based on affinities, religion, and a similar way of life: this group is generally called a 
‘community’ ”. 
This view seems to apply to the Italian post-war migration case because community 
networks were particularly strong. In fact, the southerners who were living in the central-
northern regions tended to recreate, totally or partially, the social norms, habits and 
customs of the provinces of origin. This strong community feeling was partially a 
consequence of the problematic integration of migrants with the locals. In this respect, the 
1976 Anti-Mafia commission says: “they (the migrants) often felt not really welcomed, if not 
rejected, by the local communities” (CPA, 1976, p.291). Although they belonged to the same 
country, there were still many social and cultural barriers between the southern and the 
northern peoples that affected integration.  
In this perspective, these migrants’ communities, which back home used to live in 
Mafia-dominated societies, might have provided a neutral environment for Mafia groups to 
settle. This is not to say at all that southern migrants provided favourable grounds for Mafia 
to develop. Rather it is more likely that Mafia-type groups settled where people were 
accustomed to the presence of such organisations. On the other hand, societies that never 
experienced such gangs are more reluctant to come to terms with such kind of 
organisations. As shown in many works, from the 1970s onwards, the Mafia started to 
influence the formal economy and, in particular, sectors as the construction one. As a 
consequence, it also started exploiting cheap labour forces, such as the poor migrants from 
the southern regions. It seems logical to expect that Mafia presence might have developed 
in migrant–rich areas. Indeed, Mafia transplantation in the USA, Canada or Australia was 
accompanied by large flows of southern Italian migrants138. Some criminals were hidden 
amongst the large mass of migrants. As Varese (2006, p.416) puts it: “assuming that 
                                                 
138
 In this case, the analysis provided by Dixit (2004) and explained in chapter one seems to be particularly 
relevant. In fact, in these migrants’ networks, information was a valuable good and Mafia could have worked 
as an information provider. Moreover, it could have also performed contract enforcement roles. 
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criminals make up a certain proportion of a given population, the greater the movement of 
individuals, the larger the influx of criminals to a new territory”.  
 
3.2.8 Confino (Forced re-settlement) 
 
The other major factor that recurs as a main cause of Mafia transplantation is the so-
called confino, i.e. forced re-settlement. The law that established it in the post-war period139 
dates from 1956140. It required dangerous convicted criminals to relocate in provinces far 
from their original one for a period between three to five years. In particular, it was a 
measure used against people belonging to southern Italian criminal organisations, especially 
the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta141. The main idea was to remove these 
people from the “infected“ background of origins. Those convicted were sent to 
“uncontaminated” and social capital rich areas that it was hoped would eventually prevent 
them from committing crimes. Moreover, it aimed at redeeming the criminals if possible. 
The majority of law breakers were sent to the central-northern provinces, although some 
were sent to Campania142, Apulia and Sardinia. Moreover, these Mafia members were 
generally settled in small towns with no more than 5,000 inhabitants, far from big cities and 
means of transportation143. In this way, it was believed that public officials could better 
control their everyday activities and their movements144. Many prominent members of 
criminal organisations were relocated through this measure. For example, the well known 
bosses Toto’ Riina and Stefano Bontade145 . 
Considering the period 1961 – 1972, on which there is data availability, we have a total 
number of 2360 forced re-settlers: 2088 were sent to the central-northern regions. In 
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 A measure of forced re-settlement was present also in the XIX century, and it was implemented right after 
the Unification of Italy. 
140
 The law is the n. 1423, L27-12-1956. In 1965 it was revised. 
141
 In fact the Neapolitan Camorra was still in an embryonic phase and it fully developed with the 1980 
earthquake. We find only one member of the Neapolitan Mafia who was sent to the North with this measure. 
The Apulian Sacra Corona Unita was yet to be created. This happened only in the 1980s under the influx of the 
Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta.  
142
 Many historians believe that this led to the creation of solid links between the Sicilian and the local criminal 
organisations (Varese, 2006).  
143
 At least this is what the law stated. In reality, many times criminals were sent to towns close to cities, as in 
the case of Buccinasco, in the outskirts of Milan. 
144
 A Mafia member had to give notice to local authorities of every journey outside the towns of residence.  
145
 Riina has been the head of La Cosa Nostra for many years and ordered the killings of the judges Falcone and 




particular, amongst this macro area, the four regions which hosted the highest number of 
soggiornanti146 were: Lombardy with 22.2% of the total number, followed by Emilia 
Romagna with 14.7%, Tuscany with 13.6% and Piedmont with 12.4 %. Amongst the 
provinces, Bergamo was the first with a total number of 63 re-settlers147. 
This policy has been thought of as a major facilitator of Mafia transplantation for a 
number of reasons. First of all “it happened that these Mafia members, forced to settle in 
the North or in the continental regions, were not isolated at all and were not able to receive 
a beneficial influence from a different social and cultural environment “(CPA, 1976, p.291). 
Even though they could not move from the town where they were assigned, nobody 
prevented relatives and friends from visiting them148. It was wrong to believe that sending 
them that far would have prevented criminals from keeping contacts back home. In fact, the 
post war period saw a dramatic improvement in the means of transportation and the 
systems of communication. In particular, there has been a dramatic increase in the diffusion 
of the telephone. Also, other means of communication became available, such as the 
telegram and the fax machine. In this period, there were also changes in means of transport 
by air, sea or land, notably the availability of the civil aviation. In addition, the mass 
production of cars, mainly due to FIAT, and the improvement in railway technologies 
reduced the distance between places and costs. As a consequence, the policy of the forced 
re-settlement (that did not consider such changes), wrongly assumed that Mafia members 
were isolated. Not surprisingly, it is alleged that Mafia boss could easily rule their gangs 
from the northern provinces as well (Tuscany Region, 2012). Finally, Dalla Chiesa (2011) 
reported that the re-settlers managed to corrupt some police officers who were in charge of 
their surveillance. Also, as already mentioned earlier, it is supposed that the exploitation of 
southern workers was a key driver in Mafia transplantation.  
Some authors are sceptical in identifying this law as a major determinant in Mafia 
development. In particular, Sciarrone (2004) argues that “the only presence of Mafiosi sent 
to confino cannot be considered as a sufficient cause for the diffusion of Mafia-type criminal 
organisations in not traditional area, nor it can be considered as necessary cause” (ibid., p. 




 We need report a problem with these data. In the anti-Mafia commission report the total number for 
Piedmont is 288. However, summing up the results for all single provinces gives us a total of 207. Therefore, 
there might have been some issues in reporting the data. 
148
 There is evidence of initiation rituals in the central and northern regions as well. Moreover, there are also 
documented meetings taking place in these regions (Forgione, 2009) 
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5). This author claimed that whilst this measure was wrong, it does not automatically imply 
it was a “vehicle of Mafia diffusion”. This is because he believed that the major factors were 
the creation of a large drug market and the development of a strong economic and financial 
system in the North.  
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
3.3.1 Crime data issues 
 
Crime statistics present several problems. The most important one is that there is 
generally under-reporting. In fact, police recorded crimes are just a fraction of the true 
number of committed offences, as many victimization surveys have showed (Soares, 2004). 
This dark number might be more or less large depending on many factors, such as 
development, trust in the authorities, and the efficiency of the judicial system149. Along with 
these typical issues associated with crime statistics, there are specific ones related to the 
measurement of organised crime. Just to mention the most relevant ones: the dark number 
of organised crime statistics might be larger than normal crime since victims might be more 
fearful of retaliation by criminal organisations compared to single criminals. Moreover, 
criminal organisations are very complex structures that operate both in the legal and illegal 
sectors (DNA, 2009). Additionally, we are dealing with organised groups operating in a 
diverse environment compared to the original one. Therefore, a measure of crime activity 
needs to take into consideration very diverse issues. Standard crimes such as robbery, 
burglary, and physical assaults are more easily defined even though they still incur under-
reporting. Finally, we cannot rely on victimization surveys as for standard crimes150 and so, 
our main sources are recorded crimes151.  
So far, the scarce economic literature on organised crime did not employ a unique 
measure of Mafia activity. The majority of studies used the number of murders. For example 
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 For example, Soares (2004) compared reporting crimes’ attitude amongst a large number of countries. He 
found that reporting rates are much higher in richer countries.  
150
 To our knowledge, the only victimization report which includes some Mafia– related questions is the 2008 
Italian Business Crime Survey by the Italian Ministry of Interior and Transcrime. However, it is just for one year 
and it is at a regional level. 
151
 In particular, we use the data published by the Italian National institute of Statistics (ISTAT). These crimes 
are reported by the police to the judiciary authority. All crimes are expressed per 100’000 inhabitants. 
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Peri (2004) and Quarella and Tullio (1999) use it as a regressor in their growth studies152. 
The reason for using such a variable is that in Italy there are few street homicides and, so, 
killings are generally associated with criminal organisations. Moreover, it is very unlikely 
that a murder goes unreported, making it a quite reliable measure. Daniele and Mariani 
(2011), in their work on incoming FDI, constructed a provincial index for the period 2002-
2006, summing the crime rates of extortions, criminal associations, bomb attacks and 
arsons.  
In order to improve the measurement of organised crime, we propose an alternative 
approach based mainly on the work carried out by the AntiMafia Investigation Department 
(Direzione Investigativa AntiMafia- D.I.A)153. This body has the task of investigating 
exclusively organised crime related offences. This makes it a perfect reference point for 
identifying the crimes which best represent Mafia presence. Every semester it publishes a 
report in which it assesses the trends of the major criminal organisations in Italy. Based on 
these reports we divided crimes in Mafia-Specific and “Mafia presence revealing” (Mafia–
Spy henceforth) ones. The former are represented by those crimes that the penal code 
defines as committed by Mafia members. In particular, we consider organised crime related 
murders and Mafia-type associations154. We would have liked to use data on seized goods to 
criminal organisations. However, we could not get them at a provincial level and for long 
periods of time155. We did not use the number of councils dismissed for Mafia presence 
either. The reason is that outside the southern Mafia infested regions we do not have many 
cases. For example, in the north of Italy we just had two cases since the law was introduced 
in 1991. Along with organised crime related murders and Mafia-type association, we include 
extortions and standard murders156. Although these are not listed as Mafia-type offences, 
we consider them because these are typical features of Mafia criminal activity in the 
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 Also Del Bianco (2009) used murders as proxy for the presence of criminal organisations. 
153
 This department is also involved in the collection of data on organised crime. 
154
 Mafia-type criminal associations are defined by the art. 416 bis of the penal code: “A Mafia-type 
organisation is an organisation whose members use the power of intimidation deriving from the bonds of 
membership and the atmosphere of coercion and conspiracy of silence that it engenders to commit offences, 
to acquire direct or indirect control of economic activities, licences, authorisation, public procurement 
contracts and services or to obtain unjustified profits or advantages for itself or others, or to prevent or 
obstruct the free exercise of the right to vote, or to procure votes for itself or others at elections” (Lewis et al 
,2005, p. 84) 
155 
Actually there are only cumulative data until the end of 2009. We tried contacting the relevant authorities 
but we could not get these data. 
156
 All recorded murders minus the mafia- type ones. 
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North157. As we can see, there are striking differences between these crimes’ intensity. Both 
types of murders and Mafia-type associations have very small values compared to 
extortions which happen much more often158.  
The trend and magnitude of these crimes can be seen in Figure 3.7. We consider the 
period 1983 – 2008. In fact, 1983 is the first year that Mafia related crimes were recorded. 
All the data are at the provincial level. We report only the situation in the Centre- Northern 
regions. 
 
Figure 3.6 Mafia-Specific crimes in the Centre- North. 
 
Note: crime rates (per 100’000 inhabitants) based on data from ISTAT. 
 
Mafia-type related murders and associations are pretty steady except at the beginning 
of the 1990s, where we have a spike for both crimes. In particular, Mafia- Murders exhibit 
such increase some time before than for associations. This is understandable as it takes 
longer to charge a person of mafia-type associations whereas murders are recorded 
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 Another reason to do so is that our analysis is on the centre northern provinces where the extent of the first 
two Mafia-specific crimes is very limited. Therefore, the use of extortion helps us to give more provincial 
variability in Mafia measurement. 
158
 We feel to exclude the hypothesis that mafia related crimes might be underreported due to corruption by 
gangs’ members. In the main text we already argued about the impossibility of underreporting murders which 
neutralize possible corruption practices. Regarding the other crimes considered, to our knowledge, there have 
not been cases of public officials that did not report mafia related crimes intentionally. Moreover, it is 
compulsory to report a crime in the statistics once a victim has reported it. Therefore, we believe that it would 
be unlikely for mafia in the central-northern regions to corrupt officials at the police station. Nevertheless, we 














immediately. Not surprisingly, general murders have a similar trend than the crimes just 
mentioned. The main explanation of such spikes is that the ongoing mafia wars in Calabria 
(Forgione, 2009) extended also to the North. After its conclusion, the murder rates slowly 
decreased. Even during conflicts, the rates in the Centre-North are much lower compared to 
the south. This further indicates the more business orientated modus operandi of gangs 
outside their original territories. 
 Extortions are by far the most frequent crime rates with rates that peaked almost a 
value of 15 in the last observed years. This exceptionally high volume of crimes could be 
explained in two ways. Firstly, extortion is one of the preferred methods by which Mafia 
controls the territory and ensure itself a constant flux of income (Varese, 2006). Secondly, it 
is worth to remind that there are a variety of actors, other than gangs that can perpetuate 
such crime. This is particularly true in wealthy area as the north of Italy where there is a high 
number of property crimes. 
The Mafia-Spy offences are those crimes that the penal system does not configure as 
specific of Mafia-type criminal organisations, but that are surely linked with their presence. 
Therefore, a higher occurrence of these crimes might be a symptom of the activity of a 
Mafia-type group. As for Mafia-Specific we follow the classification by the DIA. 
Unfortunately, we could not include all the data suggested by the reports because of their 
limited time span or unavailability159. Therefore the crimes we consider are: general criminal 
associations, bomb or fire attacks and arsons. Along with these offences we consider 
kidnapping with extortionist purposes. Moreover, we reconsider “general” murders160. 
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 Attacks, robberies, usury, general conspiracy crimes, money laundering, arsons, damages, damages 
followed by arsons, associations for the productions of drugs, associations for drug trafficking, exploitation of 
prostitution and child pornography, brands and industrial products counterfeiting.  
160
 Kidnapping with extortionist purpose is another typical crime committed by Mafias. 
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Figure 3.7 Mafia-Spy crimes in the Centre- North. 
 
Note: crime rates (per 100’000 inhabitants) based on data from ISTAT. 
 
Arson is by far the most recurrent crime followed by attacks and criminal associations. 
We have a sudden increase in the crime rates at the beginning of the 1990s, followed by an 
increasing stable trend, at least until 2008. This last drop could be due by strong campaigns 
against arsonists. Criminal association has very low value and is quite stable over all the 
considered period. Its trend is almost identical to the mafia-type criminal association in 
Figure 3.7.  Kidnapping with extortionist purpose has the lowest mean. Unfortunately, we 
do not have data for the 1970s where most of kidnappings by mafias took place. 
‘Ndrangheta was the most active criminal organisations from this point of view ( Forgione, 
2009).  Attacks show a notable increase in the early 1990s as for most of mafia- specific 
crimes. It followed a relative stable trend until 2003 when there is a sudden decrease which 
lasted until 2008.  
As we have seen from the analysis of the data, there are crimes which occur much more 
often compared to others. These differences are striking for the Mafia specific crimes. For 
example, there are roughly 20 times more extortions compared to mafia murder. However, 
a single murder might reveal much more about Mafia presence in a province than a single 
extortion case161. Despite this, the indexes used in the literature assign the same weight to a 
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murder and an extortion case. By construction, they simply sum up all the crime rates 
(Daniele and Mariani, 2011). The result is that the most frequent crime category will have a 
disproportionate role/weight in the index. In our case, we would have provinces with 
relatively a high number of extortion cases but zero or none murders might show a higher 
ranking in a mafia index. In order to overcome such issues, we propose a Mafia index where 
each crime represents the same weights in the index, irrespectively of its frequencies162. Of 
course, we judge them equally revealing in term of Mafia presence. In order to do so, for 
each offence, we create a variable comprised between 0 and 1 where every crime rate is 
proportional to the maximum value that is set at 1. For example, supposing that in Naples' 
province we have the highest extortion rate at 5 per 100’000 inhabitants. Moreover, in 
Rome it is 1 per 100,000, so, we will have a Mafia measure equal to one in Naples and 0.2 in 
Rome. If we call α the rescaled variable, i the type of crime and N the number of crime rates 
we are considering, this measure is given by:  
 
             
   
  
       
 
We created three different indices: one with the Mafia specific crimes (Mafia-Specific), 
one with the Mafia-revealing offences (Mafia-Spy) and one that sums all the offences in 
both indices. This last index is called Mafia-Total. Indeed, the one we are mostly interested 
in is Mafia-Specific crimes. Figure 3.9 depicts the trend over our reference period, 1983-
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 Of course, we need to pay attention to the fact that crime indices are generally affected by other problems 
as shown also by Cherry and List (2002). First of all, as we have seen, there is the issue of how to select the 
crimes to be included. In our case, this is particularly problematic given the difficulty of defining criminal 
organisations. Moreover, contrary to what we would have expected, there is not a very high correlation even 
amongst Mafia specific crimes. In particular between extortions and organised crime related murders and 
Mafia-type associations. Secondly, there is the issue of how to scale the crime rates: we used the highest value 
whereas we could have also used the mean.  
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Figure 3.8 Three main indexes in the Centre- North 
 
Source: Indexes based on data from ISTAT. 
 
We note that the Mafia-Specific index is smaller than the Mafia-Spy one. Moreover, the 
differences between the two indices are much more pronounced in the central-northern 
regions. This could be explained by the fact that the crimes we consider in the Mafia-
Specific index are more typical of the modus operandi of the Mafia organisations in the 
south of Italy. Therefore, both types of crime’s indices well describe the situation. 
Moreover, the peaks and jumps are more pronounced in the South compared to the other 
macro area, which reflects a greater volatility.  
Figure 3.10 gives an idea of the heterogeneity of these indices at the provincial level, 
our unit of analysis. Again, Mafia-Specific shows how these crimes are much more present 
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Figure 3.9 Mafia-Specific index for all Italian regions 
 
Source: Graphical representation of the mean of the Mafia-Specific index for all Italian provinces for the period 







Figure 3.10 Mafia-Spy index for all Italian regions 
 
Source: Graphical representation of the mean Mafia-Spy index for all Italian provinces for the period 1983-








Figure 3.11 Mafia-Total index for all Italian regions 
 
Source: Graphical representation of the mean Mafia- Total index for all Italian provinces for the period 1983-








Figure 3.12 Mafia-Specific index for the central- northern Italian provinces 
 
Source: Graphical representation of the mean Mafia-Specific index for the central and northern Italian 
provinces for the period 1983-2008. Darker colours reflect higher values of the index. Class brakes are defined 







Figure 3.13  Mafia-Spy index for the central- northern Italian provinces 
 
Source: Graphical representation of the mean Mafia-Spy index for the central and northern Italian provinces. 








Figure 3.14 Mafia-Total index for the central- northern Italian provinces 
 
Source: Graphical representation of the mean Mafia-Total index for the central and northern Italian provinces. 





Figures 3.13 through Figure 3.15 consider the same indices only for the 61 central and 
northern provinces. Regarding the Mafia-Specific we note that Lombardy, Piedmont, Lazio 
and Emilia Romagna are the regions mostly affected. Finally, we need to bear in mind that 
the idea behind this index is to rank provinces giving the same weight to each crime. We 
need to be cautious when comparing different indices. As a robustness check, we will also 
consider single crime categories. 
The main specification consists of five year average values for the crime and the time 
varying control variables163. The reason for so doing is that Mafia measures are very volatile 
and, as in growth analysis (Peri, 2004), averaging over a quite long period allows us to 
capture more stable criminal trends. As robustness check, we also consider yearly 
observations and the results are quite similar.  
 
3.3.2 Migration, forced re-settlement and control variables  
 
As already mentioned, the migration data refer to intra provincial migration and they 
start in 1955. In total, we have 61 provinces in the central northern regions164. Therefore, 
we know165 how many people in province X were coming from the remaining 94 provinces. 
These data are taken by the IRPPS166 institute. To our knowledge, they have been employed 
only in migration studies (Bonifazi and Heins, 2000). We decided to use the migration flows 
of the period 1965 – 1970167. There are essentially two reasons for so doing. First this is the 
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 Since we cover 26 years, the last period comprises six years. 
164
 Although the current number of provinces is higher we refer to the 1970s 95 provinces. Therefore, we 
ascribed the data of new provinces to one of the 95, according to the geographical repartition process.  
165
 These data refer to registered migrants, which are inevitably a lower bound of the number of total migrants 
a provinces received. However, underreporting rates should be very similar for each province. This would 
attenuate the bias.  
166
 It is a multi- disciplinary research institute, which analyses various topics, ranging from migration to welfare.  
167
 We use flows of migrants rather than stocks.  The reason to do so is that our data on migration start in 
1955. This is the first year in which Italian authorities kept track of changes of residency between provinces. 
Each new registered immigrant had for the first time the opportunity of filling an ad hoc created form where 
he could specify such type of information.  Therefore, we do not know what happened to migration patterns 
before that date and, so, cannot easily calculate the stock. It is true that we could have employed the data 
from the 1971 census but we preferred not do so for a variety of reasons. Firstly, they refer only to the stock of 
migrants in 1971 without specifying the variation of such measure in the years immediately before such date. 
In second place, these data are not available online and are not easily accessible. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, in this way we could employ an instrumental variable approach using the flows of ten years 
earlier than our “endogenous” variable. Using the 1971 data would have prevented us from doing so as they 
just refer to a point in time.  Finally, it is worth reminding that there are not representative household surveys, 




period preceding the explosion of the Mafia spread in the central-northern regions. 
Secondly, using these time specification we are able to capture migration from Campania 
which started a bit later compared to other regions. This is quite important considered the 
strength of Camorra. Finally, it allows us to use an instrumental variable approach with 
migration level for the period 1955-1960. The data are weighted by the destination 
province’s population and multiplied by 100168. We consider the total number of migrants 
from the southern regions169 and then only from Sicily, Calabria, Campania and Apulia.  
Moreover, there are a series of other pull factors which played an important role in 
determining migrants’ choice. Due to data limitations we could not consider them in the 
quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, there is a strong interconnectedness between such 
unobserved factors and the size of the legal and illegal markets. The sign of the correlation 
would depend on different factors. For example, wages for low skilled individuals made 
immigration rewarding and permitted southern citizens to increase their standard of life. 
This increased welfare certainly produced a “negative externality”, i.e. it boosted demand 
also for illegal goods, as drugs and betting. In turn, this would have led to more 
opportunities for mafia to develop. This thesis is in line with the view of many scholars on 
this field (Dalla Chiesa, 2011; Sciarrone, 2004). Citizen security, proxied by some deterrence 
variable, is another aspect we would have liked to consider. It is likely that the highest 
degree of protection of property rights in the north compared to the south was a strong pull 
factor. At the same time, it also influenced opportunities in the legal and, consequently, 
illegal sector (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). Similarly, the quality of institutions in the hosting 
provinces might have convinced people to move north. Amongst such characteristics, we 
could mention local authorities’ efficiency or quality of the public sector. Along with an 
obvious impact on the legal sector (Putnam, 1993), the institutional framework played a 
central role in the development of illegal sectors. 
Continuing, the forced re-settlements data were manually copied from the 1976 anti-
Mafia commission report. They refer to 1961-1972, and therefore, do not cover the whole 
period of this measure170. Unfortunately, we tried to find the data for the remaining years 
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 Therefore, they tell us the number of southern migrants per 100 total residents. 
169
 We adopt the definition of southern regions used by the national institute of statistics.  
170
 This measure was implemented in the following decades but in a small number. 
116 
 
but we could not get them171 .To our knowledge, they have never been used before in any 
economic work. We consider the rate of forced re-settlers on the hosting provinces’ 
population. However, as a robustness check we also consider the ratio.  
Finally, it is likely that Mafia presence in the central-northern regions is due to other 
factors. For example, many authors (Sciarrone, 2009) stress how economic development in 
these regions created opportunities in the drug market and other sectors, such as 
construction. Therefore, we first control for the level of development. We consider GDP per 
capita at 2000 constant prices, as a measure of development, as suggested by Ehrlich 
(1996). For example, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) analysed the determinants of homicides and 
robbery for a number of developed and developing countries172. They consider the period 
1970-1994, using a panel data GMM methodology, without finding strong evidence that the 
average income (GDP) influenced the level of both intentional homicides and robberies. 
Entorf and Spengler (2000a) analysed the determinants of eight different crimes (both 
property and violent ones) for German Leander for the period 1975-1996. As for Italy, 
Germany contains striking regional disparities, but, in this case, between the eastern and 
the western parts. The authors found a strong and significant effect of the average income 
variables for almost all the crime variables. Buonanno (2006) analysed a series of socio-
economic factors that might determine the level of crimes. He considered property crimes, 
thefts and the total number of crimes over the period 1993-2002 at a provincial level. In 
order to account for the striking disparities between the North and the South this author 
ran two additional regressions with only the provinces in the Centre-North and in the South. 
He used two variables: GDP per capita but also the level of wages. He found that GDP is 
significant and positive at the national level. However, when the author considered the 
above mentioned specification, he found that GDP was positive and significant only for the 
South. For wages, the results are similar, although in the Centre-North it is significant for the 
specification total crimes. He found that for the southern regions, the GDP per capita, 
differently for the Centre-North, is positive and significant, “indicating that for southern 
regions improvements in the overall economic condition increase the illegal opportunities, 
thus increasing crime rates” (ibid., p.15). 
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 We checked on past and subsequent parliamentary enquiries but we could not find them. Moreover, we 
tried to contact some prefecture (government houses) in some provinces but they were not able to give us 
these data. 
172
 45 countries for the homicides regression and 34 for robberies.  
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As well as the economic variables, socio-cultural ones play a role in explaining the 
presence of organised crime. Again, there is a reciprocal influence. 
First of all, we consider the composition of the population. We have two variables: the 
percentage of young people in the total population and the density of population. The 
reason for using the former is that, again, crime is typically associated with young people. 
Moreover, regarding the density of population, Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996) suggested 
that crime in cities might be higher than in rural areas for three reasons: a) there is a greater 
concentration of wealth in cities and b) in smaller areas the probability of arrest is much 
lower as it is possible to hide in the crowd. Finally, c) urban areas attract individuals with 
criminal intentions. Young males are generally the typical offender in the vast number of 
crimes. This has been found in many studies, as Fajnzylber et al. (2002) on violent crimes. 
Entorf and Spengler (2000a) found that the percentage of young male in the 15-24 age 
range is always significant for all types of crimes. It is thought that they are more prone to 
commit crimes because of several reasons, such as less acceptance of social norms, greater 
physical strength and social pressure from peers.  
 
Table 3. 1 Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mafia-Specific 305 3.514 1.888 0.500 12.974 
Mafia-Spy 305 3.349 1.343 1.043 10.156 
Mafia-Total 305 3.405 1.367 1.143 9.456 
Mafia Murder 305 0.017 0.043 0.000 0.316 
Not Mafia Murder 305 0.765 0.346 0.091 2.245 
Organised Crime Charge 305 0.080 0.118 0.000 0.870 
Extortion 305 3.993 2.293 0.635 16.523 
Migration All South   61 0.394 0.332 0.080 1.913 
Migration Mafia Regions   61 0.302 0.270 0.058 1.517 
Migration All South 1955-60 61 0.321 0.261 0.074 1.427 
Migration Mafia Regions 1955-60 61 0.302 0.296 0.068 1.824 
Forced  Re-settlement 61 0.546 0.357 0 1.385 
GDP 305 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.054 
Young Male 305 9.861 1.651 5.963 18.520 






3.4. Econometric concerns and strategy  
 
3.4.1 Econometrics concerns  
 
To empirically verify the impact of migration and forced re-settlement on Mafia 
expansion is not an easy task. There are various reasons. First of all, there is the issue of 
measurement errors. As we have seen, organised crime data are intrinsically problematic.  
As stressed in Pinotti (2012), the under-reporting issues, that typically affect all official 
crime statistics, may be particularly acute for mafia-related offences due to omertà (code of 
silence) and intimidations that may discourage victimized individuals to report to the judicial 
authority. If the measurement error is not connected with the explanatory variabiables, 
than it will only affect the variance of the estimators which will be larger than in the case 
without measurement error (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). If the error is linked to one of the 
included explanatory variables, than we would be in trouble. This is true for the 
measurement error in either the dependent and independent variable. In fact, we would 
not only have biased estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) but also unconsistent ones. The 
orthogonality between regressors and error term would be violated and we would incur in 
the famous classical errors in variables (CEV).  In our case, a particular reason of concern 
might come from the explanatory variables, and particularly from the migration one. One 
way to deal with measurement error is to use an instrumental variable approach. In the next 
sections we will do so, using a 10 years lagged measure of migration as an instrument. The 
possible census adjustments should not cause problems since we are considering average 
values173.  
Omitted variables might be another issue, as this would cause endogeneity problems. 
As we have seen in Section 2.7, there are other factors that we do not consider but which 
might be relevant in explaining Mafia expansion. For example, we did not consider any 
measure of the drug market. As already explained, we could not find detailed data that 
could have been used in this analysis. Also, we do not take into consideration any social 
capital measure (Varese, 2006). However, this would not make much sense as the 
differences between provinces are quite small, especially between north-west and north-
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 As we are not dependent too much on single year observations. 
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east. In any case, we add regional level fixed effects which may account for time invariant 
characteristics, as social capital (Putnam et al., 1993). Except for this, we feel confident that 
the model we are estimating is correctly specified.  
Continuing, are our explanatory variables really exogenous in respect to our measure of 
organised crime? Is there reverse causality issue?174 Let us examine each variable 
separately. Our migration measure refers to the period 1965-1970. Therefore, to infer 
causality we need to rule out the possibility that our migration measure is exogenous to 
Mafia presence, for that we have data from 1983175. First of all, we have thirteen years of 
difference between migration and Mafia data. This would make us quite confident of 
exogeneity of our x variable. However, it might be that past level of Mafia activity, on which 
we do not have data, are linked with migration patterns. In turn, this would be the case if 
Mafia presence influenced migration or Mafia members’ migration represented a high influx 
of migrants. We feel we can exclude both possibilities. Regarding the former, it is 
reasonable to think that Mafia presence might have attracted some people where it was 
active. In particular, this was probably true when organised crime groups started controlling 
some industries as construction and hospitality. However, if this was the case it happened 
only after 1970. Moreover, it is more reasonable to think that Mafia groups exploited 
workers that were already present in the destination provinces (Varese, 2006). Regarding 
the latter issue, Mafia members’ migration involved very few people. In fact historical and 
journalistic evidence show that the actual size of people affiliated to organised crime groups 
are really low which rules out that migrant flows might in any way represent Mafia 
migration. However, in order to completely exclude possible endogeneity, we used an 
instrumental variable approach.  
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 Varese (2011, p. 414), argues: “Mafiosi might find themselves in the new territory by an accident of history, 
such as migration, or because they have been forced to reside there by a court order. In such cases, their 
presence is due to exogenous factors rather than explicit ex ante plan to set up shop in a new region. 
Alternatively, or in addition, the Mafia of origin might consciously decide to open a branch in a new land. In 
both scenarios the “foreign” Mafiosi actively work at creating a new group, relying on the skills acquired 
beforehand. The new entity of “family” is either affiliated to or a branch of an established existing Mafia 
family. The outpost might become financially autonomous and able to generate its own profit, or continue to 
rely on transfers from the centre. A rather crude indicator of the phenomenon is whether the Mafiosi in 
question reside in the new territory, although they might be seen occasionally to travel back “home”. Over 
time the branch organisation might drift away from the original “firm” and become fully autonomous as well 
as financially independent, or retain a degree of dependency with the homeland”.  
175
The first year in which Mafia-type crimes were recorded.  
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Forced re-settlement poses fewer problems compared to migration. The reason is that, 
as the term suggests, criminals were forced to relocate to another place. This makes their 
presence in the central-northern regions exogenous to Mafia presence. Indeed, the only 
potential issue is that sometimes criminals were offered a choice between different 
locations selected by the judiciary authority. In turn, this might lead us to think that these 
decisions could have been somewhat endogenous to criminal tastes and, eventually, to 
early Mafia presence. However, it is reasonable to exclude this possibility because a) 
potential locations were not selected by criminals b) they were given limited alternatives. If 
that was not the case, Sicilian criminals would have chosen to go closer to Sicily, for example 
in Apulia or Basilicata, rather than to Cuneo.  
 
3.4.2 Econometric techniques  
 
We have a provincial panel for the period 1983-2008 for only the central northen 
regions. Our two main explanatory variables are time-invariant, whereas the control 
variables are time-varying176. Our dependent variable is continuous. We therefore employed 
a random effect model. This model supposes that the unobservable individual effects, let us 
call them i, are completely independent of the regressors
 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Therefore, these individual characteristics are completely random and are included in the 
error term, which is itself i.i.d. The random effect model is calculated through GLS. The 
advantage of using a random effect model is that it allows estimating time invariant 
variables that have large sample properties. It should not be preferred if the true model was 
a within estimation. Indeed, it would have been interesting to use fixed effects because of 
the possibility of allowing the individual-specific characteristics to be correlated with the 
included regressors. In order to establish causality and correct for omitted variable bias we 
use an instrumental variable approach. 
The econometric model we estimate is: 
 
               α                                                      
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 Obviously, the use of time invariant characteristics (migration and confino) does not allow us to fully exploit 
the nature of the panel. Moreover, since they refer to a period before to the one of the other panel variables, 
we are not able to analyse in details the within province changes in the crime rates. The interpretation of the 




Where i stands for province, r for region and t for time. Again, Mafia Index is one of 
three indices we consider: Mafia-Specific, Mafia-Spy and Mafia-Total. We use five year 
averages to take into consideration the high volatility of crime measure. Migration refers to 
incoming migration in province i from southern regions weighted by population, for the 
period 1965-70. Forced Re-settlement refers to the period 1961-72. Xit are our time- varying 
control variables: GDP per capita (GDP), density of population (Density Population) and the 
percentage of young male (Young Male). All the control variables are averaged over five 
years.       is the error term that summed to the provincial random effect, α , gives the 
composite error term      . We also include regional dummies in order to control for time 
invariant characteristics we have not included but that are uncorrelated with the regressor. 
We added time dummies to capture events that might have affected control variables, such 
as political changes, economic shocks etc. Finally, we use panel-robust standard errors 
which control for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
 


































       Migration All South   1.598** 0.725* 1.055** 
   
 
[0.635] [0.422] [0.465] 
   Migration Mafia Regions   
   
2.140*** 0.986* 1.422** 
    
[0.830] [0.527] [0.597] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.097 -0.110 -0.106 -0.068 -0.093 -0.085 
 
[0.412] [0.425] [0.369] [0.415] [0.415] [0.362] 
       Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.466 0.337 0.474 0.473 0.340 0.481 
 
Note:[1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of five years averaged observations for the central 
and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column. Migration All South 
represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all the eight southern regions weighted by the province’s 
population for the period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions refers only to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania 
and Sicily. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 
weighted by the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). [2] For each regression, robust standard 
errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 










































       Migration All South   1.985*** 0.606 1.133** 
   
 
[0.627] [0.473] [0.496] 
   Migration Mafia 
Regions   
   
2.546*** 0.830 1.483** 
    
[0.783] [0.575] [0.611] 
Forced Re-
settlement -0.319 -0.030 -0.143 -0.313 -0.020 -0.135 
 
[0.437] [0.447] [0.398] [0.440] [0.440] [0.394] 
GDP -1.692 2.592 1.769 -1.623 2.621 1.804 
 
[13.673] [6.492] [6.666] [13.644] [6.501] [6.675] 
Young Male 0.332*** 
0.278**




[0.101] [0.081] [0.064] [0.103] [0.080] [0.063] 
Density Population -0.002** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
       Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.482 0.347 0.482 0.490 0.350 0.488 
 
Note:[1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of five years averaged observations for the central 
and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column. Migration All South 
represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all the eight southern regions weighted by the province’s 
population for the period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions refers only to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania 
and Sicily. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 
weighted by the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found 
in the appendix. [2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] All regressions include time and 
regional fixed effects. 
 
The coefficient for the migration from all southern regions (Migration All South) is 
positive and significant for all three. In particular, an increase of 1 percent of migrants in the 
host province increases the index by 1.6. This is a very high value. Continuing, the effect of 
migration is greater for the Mafia-Specific index compared to the Mafia-Spy one. This result 
is as expected since the former includes the typical Mafia-related crime. The Mafia-Total 
index, which considers all crimes, has a quite high coefficient. Forced Re-settlement is 
positive but not significant in all specifications. Interestingly the R squared is higher when 
the dependent variable is Mafia-Specific. This is a further demonstration that the 
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explanatory variables are more appropriate to explaining those kinds of crimes. Turning now 
to the other three columns, we see that, again, Migration Mafia Regions is positive and 
significant for all three indices. However, the coefficients are higher compared to the 
previous specification. In particular, an increase of 1 percent in the number of migrants from 
Campania, Calabria and Sicily leads to an increase by 2.14 index points. The increase in the 
coefficients is more pronounced in the Mafia-Specific index. Forced Re-settlement is positive 
and insignificant in all cases. In Table 3.3 we include three control variables, i.e. GDP, Young 
Male and Density Population. As before, we consider the two types of migration. Contrary to 
the previous specifications, we have that the result for Mafia–Spy is insignificant. The result 
for Mafia-Specific is greater than the one with only the explanatory variables. The result for 
Mafia-Total is positive and significant. Forced Re-settlement is again insignificant and , in the 
first specification, is negative.  
Regarding the control variables, Young Male is highly significant and positive. An 
increase of 1 percent in the rate of young males in the population leads to a rise of 0.33 
index points of the Mafia-Specific index. This result is consistent with the vast literature on 
crime that finds young males to be more prone to commit crimes (Entorf and Spengler, 
2000b). 
GDP is not significant and negative for the Mafia-Specific specification. We would have 
expected it to be significant and positive, reflecting greater business opportunities for Mafia 
groups. However, it is worth reminding the reader that the North of Italy is quite 
homogenous in terms of development. Density Population plays a negligible role in 
explaining Mafia presence. This could be consistent with the fact that Mafia groups are 
active not only in big cities but also in small towns (Dalla Chiesa, 2010).  
Before continuing with the instrumental variables results, we need to discuss the 
Forced Re-settlement result. How it is possible that one of the factors considered as an 
important facilitator of Mafia migration is not significant? As already mentioned, a possible 
explanation is that we only have the number of criminals who were forced to re-settle. 
However, we do not know their role. It is logical to think that a boss such as Leggio might 
facilitate the creation of Mafia networks more than a low profile Mafia member. In 
particular, we do not know how many Mafia people were attracted to the host regions by 
the presence of the re-settled person. In this respect, a Mafia member said: “the confino has 
been a really important step. Wherever I went I brought another 5, 6, and 10 (people). I had 
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my brother: we are four, all quite smart” (CPA, 1994, p.78). Finally, we have data until 1972 
although this policy continued for some other time, even though with smaller intensity. 
 
3.5.2 Instrumental variables  
 
As we have said in the previous section, we are quite confident that our migration 
measure is exogenous to the crime measure. However, we could not completely rule out 
this eventuality. In this case, the orthogonality condition is violated, rendering our least 
square estimates biased. In order to correct this problem, we need to find an instrument    
which satisfies the condition   [ [           ]    where       is the composite error term of 
the province-specific characteristics,  α   and the regression error,       Therefore, we need 
an excluded instrument that is strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor but that is 
linked to the Mafia measures only via  the regressor (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) . Applying 
an instrumental method will eventually correct omitted variable biases (Angrist, 2001). 
Fortunately, we have data on migration from 1955 and, so, we decided to consider the 
migration flows for the period 1955-1960 as an instrument. We believe that this is a suitable 
instrument for a variety of reasons. First of all, the relevance condition is satisfied. As we 
have seen in Section 2, migration patterns are highly correlated over time. Moreover, we 
are considering a significantly large time gap that would impact on crime levels only through 
the instrumented variable.   
As an estimation technique, we use a random effect 2SLS (Woodridge, 2002).  The main 
idea here is just to apply the usual GLS transformation to the instrument and then continue 
with the standard two stage procedure. Another option was to use the Baltagi’s (2004) error 
components 2SLS (EC2SLS) estimator. The difference from the other one is that instruments 
are constructed passing a within and between transformation. However, the results 
between the two are almost identical and, so, we decided to use the former one.  
Obviously, we could not use a fixed effects 2SLS because of the presence of time 
invariant regressors. Also, we also could not employ GMM because we have a just-identified 
model. However, Baltagi (2006) showed that the use of random effects 2SLS is consistent 
with the crime equation. In fact, he considered a model of crime using a panel on North 
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Carolina’s counties. In his model177, there were two endogenous variables and two 
instruments. He performed a Hausman test based on the difference fixed and random 
effects 2SLS. Given that he could not reject the null hypothesis of the consistency of the 
random effects model, he concluded the legitimacy of using a random effects model.  
Table 3.4 below shows the random effect 2SLS results. These are in line with the 
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 It is a replication of Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) work. 
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       Migration All South   2.358*** 1.215** 1.664*** 
   
 
[0.692] [0.525] [0.512] 
   Migration Mafia Regions   
   
2.968*** 1.526** 2.088*** 
    
[0.874] [0.671] [0.649] 
Forced  
Re-settlement -0.239 0.100 -0.029 -0.241 0.098 -0.032 
 
[0.503] [0.382] [0.373] [0.494] [0.379] [0.367] 
GDP -1.768 2.479 1.672 -1.671 2.556 1.742 
 
[15.139] [12.663] [10.899] [15.148] [12.663] [10.904] 
Young Male 0.327*** 0.270*** 0.301*** 0.312** 0.264*** 0.291*** 
 
[0.122] [0.099] [0.088] [0.121] [0.099] [0.088] 
Density Population -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
       Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.481 0.339 0.477 0.489 0.343 0.484 
   
First Stage 
   
       Migration All South 1955-60 1.079*** 
     
 
[0.017] 




    
[0.032] 
  Partial R-squared 0.888 
  
0.846 
  F-stat[ excluded instruments] 31.2     14.41     
 
Note: [1] The top part of the table shows the results for the random effects two stage least squares (2SLS) on a 
panel of five years averaged observations for the central and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are 
showed at the top of each column. Migration All South shows the percentage of incoming migrants from all the eight 
southern regions weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions refers only 
to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of 
forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All 
others variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [2] The bottom panel represents the first stage results of 
the migration measure on its values for the period 1955-60. All the control variables in the top panel are also 
included in the first stage regression, even though not reported. It also reports the F-statistics which refers to the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to 0. [3] For each regression, 
robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** 





An increase of 1 percent in the number of migrants from all southern regions 
(Migration All South 1955-60) leads to an increase of 2.36 index points. This coefficient is 
slightly higher than the specification when we did not address endogeneity. The migration 
measures, both for the entire South and for Mafia regions are now positive and significant 
also for the Mafia-spy index. The magnitude is well above than the previous specification. 
The coefficient for Mafia –Total is greater than before. Again, we find that Mafia presence is 
greater in provinces with higher rates of migrants coming from regions with a traditional 
strong presence of organised crime. This confirms the view that migrants might have 
facilitated Mafia diffusion by providing a cheap labour force for Mafia bosses. Forced Re-
settlement is always insignificant and even negative for Mafia-Specific.  
The control variables’ results are almost identical to the random effects specification. In 
particular, GDP is positive but never significant. Young Male is positive and always 
significant. An increase in the percentage of young male leads to an increase of Mafia-
Specific, with migrants from all southern regions, of 0.33 index points. Density Population is 
negative and significant only for Mafia-Specific, although the coefficient is negligible.  
The first stage results show that our instruments are strongly correlated with the 
included endogenous regressors. This is particularly true for Migration Mafia Regions 1955-
60 which shows that there is more migration path consistency in the regions with Mafia 
presence. Moreover, the F-statistic of the random effects first stage for the two 
specifications are respectively 31.20 and 14.41. These are well above the threshold of 10 
recommended by Stock and Yogo (2002). These results, along with the coefficient of the 
excluded instrument show that we do not have weak instrument problems (Angrist, 2001).   
 
3.5.3 Robustness checks     
 
In order to verify the robustness of our result we consider several sets of tests.  First of 
all, we re-ran the same regressions using the yearly observations, without averaging for 5 
years. In this new specification we have far more observations, 1’508. Moreover, we have 
the advantage of considering yearly time dummies that might take into account political 
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changes and shocks that happened in particular years178. As Table 3.5 below shows we have 
very similar results to the specifications with average values.  
 















       Migration All South   1.849*** 0.575 1.050** 
   
 
[0.612] [0.461] [0.487] 
   Migration Mafia Regions   
   
2.363*** 0.791 1.376** 
    
[0.762] [0.562] [0.600] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.329 -0.024 -0.136 -0.323 -0.013 -0.127 
 
[0.425] [0.426] [0.381] [0.428] [0.420] [0.378] 
GDP -3.767 -7.088 -5.785 -3.733 -7.080 -5.772 
 
[10.074] [6.597] [5.750] [10.063] [6.598] [5.749] 
Young Male 0.457*** 0.316*** 0.383*** 0.449*** 0.313*** 0.379*** 
 
[0.097] [0.084] [0.059] [0.098] [0.083] [0.059] 
Density Population -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
       Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.353 0.213 0.355 0.356 0.214 0.358 
 
Note:[1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of yearly observations for the central and northern 
Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column. Migration All South represents the 
percentage of incoming migrants from all the eight southern regions weighted by the province’s population for the 
period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions refers only to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily. Data 
are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the 
province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found in the appendix. 
[2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** 
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       Migration All South   2.244*** 1.118** 1.538*** 
   
 
[0.669] [0.516] [0.506] 
   Migration Mafia Regions   
   
2.809*** 1.394** 1.921*** 
    
[0.845] [0.660] [0.641] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.243 0.094 -0.029 -0.245 0.091 -0.033 
 
[0.488] [0.376] [0.369] [0.478] [0.373] [0.363] 
GDP -3.840 -7.189 -5.872 -3.790 -7.153 -5.839 
 
[9.185] [8.334] [6.623] [9.185] [8.333] [6.623] 
Young Male 0.453*** 0.311*** 0.379*** 0.446*** 0.308*** 0.375*** 
 
[0.084] [0.074] [0.061] [0.083] [0.074] [0.061] 
Density Population -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
       Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.352 0.210 0.352 0.356 0.212 0.356 
First Stage 
       Migration  
All South 1955-60 1.079*** 
     
 
[0.017] 
     Migration  
Mafia Regions 1955-60 
   
0.713*** 
  
    
[0.014] 
  Partial R-squared 0.888 
  
0.846 
  F-stat 
[excluded instruments] 4124.99     2604.19     
 
Note: [1] The top part of the table shows the results for the random effects two stage least squares (2SLS) on a 
panel of yearly observations for the central and northern Italian provinces.  The dependent variables are showed at 
the top of each column. Migration All South represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all the eight 
southern regions weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions refers only 
to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of 
forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All 
others variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [2] The bottom panel represents the first stage results of 
the migration measure on its values for the period 1955-60. All the control variables in the top panel are also 
included in the first stage regression, even though not reported. It also reports the F-statistics which refers to the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to 0. [3] For each regression, 
robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** 




For Mafia-Specific we have a coefficient of 1.849 when we use Migration All South. In 
the five years average specification the coefficient was 1.985. Moreover, they are both 
equally highly significant. Again, the result for Mafia-Spy is not significantly different from 0. 
When we consider Migration Mafia Regions¸ an increase of 1 percent in the migrants’ share 
leads to an increase of the Mafia-Specific index by 2.363, a bit lower than before. Turning to 
the control variables, we find similar results with the previous specification.   
As expected, the instrumental variable approach leads to analogous conclusions. We 
find that the coefficient for the migration measures is now significant also for Mafia-Spy. In 
particular, an increase in 1% of Migration Mafia Regions is associated with an increase of 
the Mafia-Spy index by 1.12 points. The control variables results do not differ much either. 
However, the coefficient for Young Male is somewhat higher than the one in Table 3.3. As 
expected, increasing the number of observations leads to an increase in the first stage F 
statistic. 
In the second set of robustness checks, we consider each crime category from the 
Mafia–Specific index separately. Therefore we consider the impact of our explanatory and 
control variables on Mafia Murder, Not Mafia Murder, Mafia–Type Associations and 
Extortion. The results for the linear random effects are in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8.The ones 
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 In Table 3.8 we also report the results with the specification with all the years. 
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     Migration All South 0.029** 0.284** 0.089** 1.967*** 
 
[0.012] [0.120] [0.036] [0.668] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.006 -0.069 -0.034 -0.211 
 
[0.008] [0.096] [0.026] [0.525] 
GDP 0.128 4.754 -0.272 -2.029 
 
[0.300] [2.898] [0.901] [14.526] 
Young Male 0.001 -0.008 0.028*** 0.271** 
 
[0.002] [0.017] [0.005] [0.118] 
Density Population 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** -0.002* 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
     Observations 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.260 0.428 0.209 0.564 
 
Note: [1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of five years averaged observations for the central 
and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column and represent the 
four offences which compose the Mafia- Specific index. Migration All South represents the percentage of incoming 
migrants from all the eight southern regions weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Data 
are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the 
province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found in the appendix. 
[2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** 































     Migration Mafia Regions   0.039*** 0.376*** 0.117** 2.499*** 
 
[0.015] [0.145] [0.046] [0.822] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.005 -0.066 -0.033 -0.208 
 
[0.008] [0.093] [0.026] [0.530] 
GDP 0.134 4.783* -0.270 -1.926 
 
[0.299] [2.897] [0.901] [14.512] 
Young Male 0.001 -0.010 0.027*** 0.257** 
 
[0.002] [0.017] [0.005] [0.119] 
Density Population 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** -0.002* 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
     Observations 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.265 0.435 0.214 0.569 
 
Note: [1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of five years averaged observations for the central 
and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column and represent the 
four offences which compose the Mafia- Specific index. Migration Mafia Regions represents the percentage of incoming 
migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-
1970. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by 
the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found in the 
appendix. [2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, 



















Table 3. 9 Five years: instrumental variables Mafia-Specific crime categories: migration from All 









     Migration All South   0.028** 0.349*** 0.090** 2.442*** 
 
[0.012] [0.108] [0.041] [0.769] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.006 -0.055 -0.033 -0.109 
 
[0.009] [0.079] [0.030] [0.560] 
GDP 0.128 4.740 -0.273 -2.131 
 
[0.476] [3.217] [1.305] [16.791] 
Young Male 0.001 -0.009 0.028*** 0.265* 
 
[0.003] [0.023] [0.009] [0.135] 
Density Population 0.000 0.000** -0.000** -0.002** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
     Observations 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.260 0.427 0.209 0.563 
 
Note: [1] The table reports only the second stage results for the random effects two stage least squares (2SLS) on a 
panel of five years averaged observations for the central and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are 
showed at the top of each column. Migration All South represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all the 
eight southern regions weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Data are taken by IRPPS. 
Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the province’s population. Data 
are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [2] For each regression, 
robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [4] All regressions include time and regional fixed effects. [3] All regressions 




















Table 3. 10 Five years: instrumental variables Mafia-Specific crime categories: migration from 









     Migration Mafia Regions   0.038** 0.469*** 0.112** 3.073*** 
 
[0.016] [0.137] [0.052] [0.978] 
Forced Re-settlement -0.006 -0.050 -0.034 -0.111 
 
[0.009] [0.077] [0.029] [0.552] 
GDP 0.134 4.775 -0.270 -1.996 
 
[0.474] [3.214] [1.304] [16.805] 
Young Male 0.001 -0.012 0.027*** 0.249* 
 
[0.003] [0.023] [0.009] [0.135] 
Density Population 0.000 0.000** -0.000** -0.002** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
     Observations 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.265 0.433 0.214 0.567 
 
Note: [1] The table reports only the second stage results for the random effects two stage least squares (2SLS) on a 
panel of five years averaged observations for the central and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are 
showed at the top of each column. Migration Mafia Regions represents the percentage of incoming migrants from 
Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Data are 
taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the province’s 
population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [2] For 
each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 

























Not Mafia  
Murder 
Organised  









         Migration  
All South   0.028** 0.280** 0.085** 1.836*** 
    
 
[0.011] [0.112] [0.033] [0.666] 
    Migration  
Mafia Regions   
    
0.026** 0.323*** 0.076** 2.094*** 
     
[0.012] [0.074] [0.033] [0.629] 
Forced  
Re-settlement -0.006 -0.078 -0.030 -0.248 -0.009 -0.111 -0.042 -0.471 
 
[0.008] [0.088] [0.024] [0.518] [0.008] [0.088] [0.026] [0.511] 
GDP -0.083 3.348* -0.448 -3.059 -0.072 3.397* -0.423 -2.953 
 
[0.189] [1.909] [0.871] [11.515] [0.186] [1.919] [0.874] [11.507] 
Young Male 0.002 0.005 0.027*** 0.440*** 0.003* 0.006 0.028*** 0.442*** 
 
[0.002] [0.020] [0.006] [0.097] [0.001] [0.021] [0.006] [0.098] 
Density  
Population 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** -0.002 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** -0.001* 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
         Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,586 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.0912 0.177 0.0710 0.448 0.0898 0.179 0.0689 0.450 
 
Note: [1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of yearly observations for the central and northern 
Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column and represent the four offences 
which compose the Mafia- Specific index. Migration All South represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all 
the eight southern regions weighted by the province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions 
refers only to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania and Sicily. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-settlers 
for the period 1961-72 weighted by the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ 
description can be found in the appendix. [2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial 
level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] All regressions 
include time and regional fixed effects. 
 
As expected, the coefficients for Migration All South are all positive and significant. 
Migration has the greatest impact on Extortion. An increase of 1 percent migration from all 
southern regions leads to an increase in the extortion rate per 100’000 inhabitants by 1.97. 
The smallest effect is the one on Mafia Murder. This coefficient is much smaller than Not 
Mafia Murder. However, this result should be interpreted with caution because often Mafia 
murders are classified as “normal” murders. This is particularly true in the period following 
the introduction of Mafia-type charges, i.e. 1982. Especially in the Centre-North, it took 
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some time before the Mafia nature of certain crimes was recognised and recorded. Forced 
Re-settlement is always insignificant. The results in Table 3.8 show that, as before, the 
biggest channel through which Mafia could transplant in the central and northern regions is 
given by migrants from Mafia-infested regions. The coefficients for each crime categories 
are higher than for Migration all South. For example for Organised Crime Charge the 
coefficient is now 0.117 whereas in the other model it was 0.089.  
With respect to the control variables, we find that Young Male is negative and 
significant only for Organised Crime Charge and Extortion. GDP is never significant. 
However, it is positive for the murders measure and negative for the other two crime 
categories. The results for murders is particularly interesting because in the literature 
(Fajnzylber et al., 2002) a negative association between development and murder rates is 
well established. Here, where we consider only quite developed provinces, the direction of 
this relationship seems to have an opposite sign. 
The IV results in Table 3.7 confirm our findings. Again, the coefficients for the migration 
measures are slightly higher than the linear results. 
The third robustness test consists of considering only migration from Campania, 
Calabria and Sicily. As we have seen in Section 3.2.3, the historical Mafias are Camorra, 
‘Ndrangheta and la Cosa Nostra. The Apulean Sacra Corona Unita developed more recently. 
Therefore, the migration from this last region might play a smaller role in the 
transplantation of Mafia outside their traditional territories. Moreover, migrants coming 
from Apulia might have been less used to deal with criminal groups compared to those from 

















Specific Mafia- Spy Mafia- Total 
    Migration from Calabria, 
Campania and Sicily 3.364*** 1.140* 1.985*** 
 
[0.878] [0.676] [0.688] 
Forced  Re-settlement -0.315 -0.015 -0.133 
 
[0.435] [0.429] [0.379] 
GDP -1.444 2.704 1.907 
 
[13.607] [6.512] [6.699] 
Young Male 0.300*** 0.268*** 0.289*** 
 
[0.103] [0.080] [0.063] 
Density Population -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
    Observations 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.502 0.353 0.498 
 
Note: [1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of five years averaged observations for the central 
and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column. Migration from 
Calabria, Campania and Sicily represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all these regions weighted by the 
province’s population for the period 1965-1970. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement is the rate of forced re-
settlers for the period 1961-72 weighted by the province’s population. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others 
variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the 
provincial level are reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] All 
regressions include time and regional fixed effects. 
 
As we can see, the coefficients of Three Mafia Regions are higher than the ones in the 
last three columns in Table 3.2b. In particular, an increase by 1 percent of migrants’ rate 
leads to an increase of the index by 3.36 points of the Mafia-Specific index. This is around 
0.81 points more than the counterpart with Apulia as well. Obviously, there are not many 
differences for the other variables. 
Finally, in the last set of robustness tests, we consider forced re-settlement in levels 
rather than in rates. The reason for doing so is that it could be argued that in provinces as 
Milan or Turin, weighting the number of forced re-settlers for the population might lead to 
very low rates. In turn, this would under-estimate the true impact of this policy in these 
provinces. In order to take into account this eventuality we consider the absolute number of 
re-settled people.  
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       Migration  
All South   2.017*** 0.591 1.137** 
   
 
[0.597] [0.425] [0.461] 
   Migration Mafia Regions   
   
2.585*** 0.811 1.488*** 
    
[0.745] [0.521] [0.570] 
Forced  
Re-settlement  
Levels -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 
 
[0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] 
GDP -0.859 2.842 2.205 -0.752 2.856 2.247 
 
[13.990] [6.359] [6.752] [13.983] [6.364] [6.767] 
Young Male 0.341*** 0.280*** 0.311*** 0.326*** 0.275*** 0.302*** 
 
[0.104] [0.082] [0.066] [0.105] [0.081] [0.065] 
Density Population -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
       Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 
Provinces 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R- squared 0.485 0.348 0.485 0.493 0.351 0.491 
 
Note: [1] This table shows the random effects results on a panel of five years averaged observations for the central 
and northern Italian provinces. The dependent variables are showed at the top of each column. Migration All South 
represents the percentage of incoming migrants from all the eight southern regions weighted by the province’s 
population for the period 1965-1970. Migration Mafia Regions refers only to migrants from Apulia, Calabria, Campania 
and Sicily. Data are taken by IRPPS. Forced Re-settlement Levels is the total numbers of forced re-settlers that went to 
the province in the period 1961-72. Data are taken by CPA (1976). All others variables’ description can be found in 
the appendix. [2] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] All regressions include time and 
regional fixed effects. 
 
The results are given in Table 3.13. Indeed Forced Re-settlement Levels is never 
significant as before. Moreover, it is slightly negative in all the specifications. This means 







3.6. Conclusions and further research   
 
This paper analysed an under-explored field of economic research: the transplantation 
of the southern based Italian criminal groups to the central and northern Italian regions. 
Lately, this topic is receiving much attention from historians and sociologists (Sciarrone, 
2009; Forgione, 2009) who showed how Mafias became more entrenched in the socio-
economic life of these areas. Despite this, there are not contributions from economists who 
can offer insights using econometric techniques. Our research question was exploring the 
factors that might have facilitated the expansion of Mafias in not-traditional territories in 
the North of Italy.  
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we improve the measurement of 
Mafia presence. The existing literature (Peri, 2004; Daniele and Mariani, 2011) has used 
murder rates or employed indices summing crime rates. We created three Mafia indices 
where each crime has the same weight. We did so because the indistinct summations of 
crime rates assign too much “importance” to high frequency crimes. We selected the crimes 
following the reports by the DIA, which is a national agency dedicated to the fight against 
organised crime. Our major interest is on Mafia-Specific index which includes the typical 
Mafia-type offences. In order to empirically answer this question, we constructed a panel 
dataset from 1983 until 2008 using previously unused primary source data for the central 
and northern provinces. 
The historical and sociological literature on Mafia transplantation stressed the role of 
migration and forced re-settlement in influencing Mafia transplantation. The first is thought 
to have facilitated Mafia spread because Mafia bosses might have exploited migrants’ 
networks in the hosting regions. In particular, it is thought that when Mafia started to 
control sectors as construction and earth movement, it recruited heavily amongst migrants. 
Moreover, southern migrants were used back home to dealing with criminal organisations 
and might have not provided a strong opposition to their expansion. We considered the 
amount of southern migrants that each central and northern province hosted in the period 
1965-1970. Most likely migrants from southern Mafia regions might have been associated 
with more possibilities for Mafia to develop. Therefore, we also considered migration from 
the four Mafia-infested regions, along with total migration from the South. Forced re-
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settlement was a policy implemented in mid 1950s that facilitated relocation of southern 
criminals to social capital rich areas in central and northern of Italy. It is thought to have 
been a Mafia spread facilitator because it failed to account the improvements in the system 
of transports and communication. Therefore, relocated Mafia members were not isolated 
and could rule from the North. We managed to find the number of criminals that each of 
the central and northern province hosted for the period 1961-1972. As control variables we 
included: the level of development, the percentage of young males and the density of 
population.  
We found that migration is the most important predictor of Mafia transplantation to 
the North. In the baseline regression (Table 3.2) we find that an increase of 1% in southern 
migrants in the hosting province leads to an increase in the Mafia index by 1.6 point. 
Moreover, we find that if we restrict our attention to migrants from the four Mafia-infested 
regions, this effect is even larger by 0.554 points. This result is consistent when we 
instrument migration by its lagged measure for the period 1955-1960. We further find that 
forced re-settlement is not a channel for Mafia expansion in all the specifications. Probably 
what matters is not the number of criminals transferred to the central and northern regions 
but their “quality”. For example, their role in the organisation or their ability of attracting 
other Mafia members to the North might be more important. Amongst the control 
variables, only the rate of young men in the population seems to significantly and positively 
affect the presence of Mafia. Interestingly, the level of development does not seem to have 
affected Mafia migration. 
Our results are robust to various checks. In particular, we find that migration from the 
three regions where Mafia was historically rooted play the biggest role. Moreover, we also 
checked whether the absolute number, and not the rate, of forced re-settlers affected Mafia 
spread. Again we found that this was not the case. 
Finally, ours is the first attempt to model the determinants of Mafia movements outside 
their original territories. We decided to focus on the two factors that are supposed to have 
played a major role in explaining Mafia migration. Indeed, this field of research looks 
promising. One of the avenues that future research might take is to consider the other 
factors supposed to foster Mafia transplantation (CPA, 1976) we were unable to consider 
here. For example, it would be interesting to look at the role of the drug business or the 





3.7.1 Variables: definition and sources  
 
Mafia–Specific:  Index which considers Mafia murders, general murders, extortions and 
Mafia-type criminal associations. In the text it is explained how we constructed the index. 
Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali- Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Mafia-Spy: Index that considers general criminal associations, bomb or fire attacks, 
kidnapping with extortionist purposes, murders and arsons. In the text it is explained how 
we constructed the index. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali- Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). 
Mafia-Total: Index that considers all the crimes from Mafia-specific and Mafia-spy. The 
index is constructed as the other two. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali- Italian National 
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Mafia Murder: Mafia related murders per 100’000 inhabitants. Source: Statistiche 
Giudiziarie Penali- Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Not Mafia Murder: Total killings, minus the Mafia related ones, per 100’000 inhabitants. 
Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali- Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Extortion: Extortions per 100’000 inhabitants Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali- 
ItalianNational Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Org Crime Charge: Mafia-type criminal associations (Art 416-bis) per 100’000 
inhabitants Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali- Italian National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT). 
Migration All South: Migrants from all southern provinces per 100 inhabitants of 
destination province for the period 1965-1970. Source: IRPPS  
Migration Mafia Regions: Migrants from Calabria, Campania, Apulia and Sicily per 100 
inhabitants of destination province for the period 1965-1970. Source: IRPPS. 
Migration All South 1955-60: Migrants from all southern provinces per 100 inhabitants 
of destination province for the period 1955-1960. Source: IRPPS. 
Migration Mafia Regions 1955-60: Migrants from Calabria, Campania, Apulia and Sicily 
per 100 inhabitants of destination province for the period 1955-1960. Source: IRPPS. 
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Migration from Calabria, Campania and Sicily: Migrants from Calabria, Campania and 
Sicily per 100 inhabitants of destination province for the period 1965-1970. Source: IRPPS. 
Forced Re-settlement: Number of criminals hosted by province following a forced re-
settlement act. The data are weighted per 100’000 people of the destination province’s 
population. Source: CPA (1976). 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product per capita at constant prices of the year 2000. Source: 
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Density Population: Population per square km. Source: Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). 
Young Male: Rate of young male aged 19-29 on total population. Source: Italian 

























Table 3. 14. Indexes description 
 
Index Crimes Included Methodology Sources 
Mafia–
Specific 
Mafia murders, general 












α is a variable comprised between 0 
and 1 where every crime rate (i) at the 
provincial level is proportional to the rate of 
the province with the highest value, set at 
1. Set N the number of crime rates we are 
considering, the measure is given by:  
             
   
  













associations, bomb or 
fire attacks, kidnapping 
with extortionist purposes, 























Table 3. 15 Correlation table amongst indexes 
 
 Mafia–Specific Mafia–Spy Mafia–Total 
Mafia–Specific 1   
Mafia–Spy 0.7776 1  



















Figure 3.16 Average murder rates before and after Mafia expansion 
 
Note: crime rates (per 100’000 inhabitants) based on data from ISTAT. Emilia stands for Emilia Romagna, FVG 
































































































































4.1 Introduction and motivations 
 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), murder rates in 
the Caribbean region are one of the highest in the world. This can be seen from Figure 4.1. 
Despite the few reliable statistics, it seems that Caribbean countries present abnormally 
high rates in other crime categories too180. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, crime and security 
worry citizens in this regions more than any other issue. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Murder rates across subcontinents 
 
Note: Data are taken from UNODC (2012) which gather information from various sources, such as the World 
Health organization (WHO), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and national statistical office. They 
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 For example, in the WB-UNODC (2007) there is a table based on data from different editions of the UN 
crime survey on rape. The findings show that Caribbean countries have some of the highest rates.  






















Figure 4.2 Most serious issues faced in the five countries 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Lapop (2012). Individuals were asked “Most serious problem 
faced by your country?” and were given a series of alternatives. The countries considered are the five of this 
study 
 
In order to understand this phenomenon, many explanations have been offered. Some 
authors stress the geography of Caribbean states which are located in between the 
southern American drug-producing and the North American drug-consuming countries 
(Klein et al., 2004). In the last few years, these states became major transhipment harbours 
for drugs going to USA and Canada181. The surge in drug trafficking attracted and was 
facilitated by many criminal organizations that sought to exploit this profitable market 
(USDS, 2011). Another major issue that is recognised as playing a key role is the constant 
influx of criminal deportees from Canada, USA and UK (UNODC-WB, 2007)182. In fact, it is 
common practice to send back Caribbean criminals to their countries of origins. In turn, this 
might have a crime inducing effects (Jamaica Gleaner, 2006). Others stress the role of the 
increased availability of guns (The Economist, 2008) 183.  
The criminal situation in the Caribbean is not the same all over the region and there are 
relevant intra-country differences, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. For example, Jamaica has one 
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 Of course, the geographical disadvantage is strong in other countries too. For example, some Mexican 
regions became controlled by gangs which exploit this business.  
182
 This phenomenon does not involve all the countries but it especially applies to Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Guyana.  
183
 In this case, the route of trade is the opposite of the drug one. In fact, guns are bought mainly from the 
USA. 














of the highest murder rates in the world. Its murder rate has stayed above 35 per 100’000 
inhabitants for more than a decade (The Economist, 2008). Countries like Cuba and 
Barbados are not in such critical situation, although they still have very high crime rates 
compared to other regions of the world.    
 
Figure 4.3 Murder rates in Caribbean countries 
 
Note: Data are taken from UNODC which gather information from various sources, such as the World Health 
organization (WHO), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and national statistical office. They refer to the 
latest available year. Each crime is weighted by the resident population in that year. Red columns stand for the 
countries included in this study. 
 
Regional and international actors are becoming progressively more involved in the fight 
of criminal practices. For example, the CARICOM group184 has created the Implementation 
Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), based in Trinidad and Tobago185. Several 
international organizations are active in the area. For example, the World Bank and the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007) have produced a comprehensive report on 
this topic. Moreover, many other projects are in the pipeline by other major organizations 
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 A union of Caribbean countries. 
185
 This agency promotes co-ordination in crime security initiatives amongst the CARICOM member states. 
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such as the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), Organization of American States and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)186. 
Despite this growing interest, academic contributions, especially from economists, is 
quite scarce, except for few examples (Gilbert and Sookram, 2010; Saridakis et al., 2009). 
We intend to enrich the existing literature, by analysing the role of trust on victimization 
rates in five countries: the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname and 
Guyana. As it is well established in the literature, higher levels of trust have a beneficial 
effect on many socio-economic variables such as growth and financial decisions (Keefer and 
Knack, 1997; Guiso et al., 2004). These works mainly use macro data at the national level 
(Buonanno et al., 2009; Lederman et al., 2002). They found partial evidence of a crime-
reducing role of social capital. However, little attention has been devoted to analyzing its 
role in determining crime levels. 
In order to contribute to the existing literature, we use individual data from Americas 
Barometer that allow us not only to have a much higher number of observations but also to 
assess the determinants of victimization at the individual level. We consider three 
specifications: one with all crimes, one for property and the last for violent crimes. We also 
control for a variety of individual and local characteristics that are likely to influence 
victimization experience. Given the endogeneity of our social capital measure, trust, and the 
presence of omitted variables we use an instrumental variable technique. In particular, we 
use trust in elections as instrument for trust. The model with the endogenous trust measure 
shows the negative relationship between crime and trust in all the specifications. However, 
when we implement an instrumental variable approach we find evidence that trust causes 
reduction for the comprehensive crime measure and for property crimes. We do not find 
evidence of a crime reducing effect of trust for violent crimes. Sensitivity and robustness 
checks confirm our results. Finally, we also consider separate single country regressions in 
order to verify possible heterogeneity amongst them. This is particularly interesting to 
evaluate differences with the standard literature that started with Becker’s (1968) seminal 
work. 
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 With the term ‘active’ we mean that these organizations are running both citizen security programs and 




The chapter is organised as follows. In the second section, we review the (scarce) 
economics of crime literature in the Caribbean, the works on social capital and the few 
works which link social capital and crime. In the third section, we explore the data and in 
particular the crime and social capital measures. In the fourth, we consider the econometric 
issues. In the fifth section, we present the main results. In section 6 we perform the 
robustness checks and in the seventh we show the single country results. The conclusions 
follow with the summary of the major results and ideas for future research.  
 
4.2 Theory and literature review 
 
4.2.1 Economics of crime in the Caribbean 
 
As demonstrated above, crime is a major issue in the Caribbean. Nevertheless, there 
are few economics papers on crime in this region, whereas there is a more robust literature 
for continental South America (Di Tella et al., 2010; Gaviria and Pagés, 2002). In particular, 
there are few contributions which analyse this topic in a multi country approach. This is 
mainly explained by the lack of directly comparable statistics amongst countries: few 
Caribbean countries adhere to the UN crime trends databases that record crimes according 
to standardized crime definitions (UNCTS). Moreover, the same problem applies to the 
International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), with Barbados being the only Caribbean 
country participating. Some authors have used national recorded statistics to analyse 
different countries. For example, Bennet et al. (1997) considered the determinants of crime 
in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. All these countries have a similar cultural 
and legal heritage, being former English colonies. The authors gathered data from 1975 to 
1995 on a variety of crimes: homicides, rape, burglary etc. All the data were taken from 
governmental agencies. They ran correlation analyses using a variety of social and economic 
factors such as inequality, youth population, urbanization, unemployment, GDP, inflation 
and private consumption. They found little evidence of a significant correlation for each 
crime separately. Moreover, economic variables do not predict homicides well. In general, 
the results for violent crimes are not very robust and show great differences amongst each 
country. Property crimes are also quite problematic, as the authors find that some socio-
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economic variables affect crime in different ways in different countries. For example, all the 
seven explanatory variables employed have different signs for Barbados and Jamaica. Even 
when they considered the macro category of violent and property crimes, the results are 
mixed187. The authors concluded that the standard model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 
1973) might not be adequate in explaining crime in this region, although they recognise that 
more sophisticated statistical models are needed.  
There are more single country studies but only for some, not all countries. This is the 
case for Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago188. Gilbert and Sookram (2010) 
analysed the determinants of crime in Jamaica. In particular, the authors were interested in 
the relationship between clear up rates, the size of the police force and socio-economic 
factors, such as social spending. They considered the period 1978-2008. The data were 
taken from the “Economic and Social Survey Jamaica"(ESSJ) and a VAR strategy was 
employed. They found that all these variables were important in explaining levels of violent 
crimes and, amongst them, the size of the police force was the most important one. They 
also found that clear up rates is not granger causing violent crimes. Another important work 
on Jamaica is that of Alleyne and Boxill (2003) that investigated the impact of crime on 
tourism arrivals. They employed a rich dataset for the period 1960-1999 and used an ARMA 
model. As additional variables, they considered the GDP in the USA, the main origin country 
of tourists, and expenditure on tourism advertising. Moreover, they separated arrivals from 
Europe and other regions. They found that crime exerts a small negative impact, and the 
effect is stronger for European arrivals. 
Saridakis et al. (2009) focused on Trinidad and Tobago. This work studied the 
relationship between the clearance rate189, the unemployment rate, the percentage of the 
labour force with tertiary education and the percentage of females in employment with 
serious crime in Trinidad and Tobago over the last four decades. Data were taken from the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO). Again, they employed an unrestricted VAR model. They 
found that all four variables had an impact on crime. In particular, the results demonstrated 
a strong negative relationship between crime and clear-up rates. This relationship is positive 
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 For example, inequality is negatively associated with burglary for Barbados and positively with Jamaica. 
Inflation has opposite signs for both countries. 
188
 These are also the countries where the campuses of the University of West Indies (UWI) are located. This 
university is quite active in the field of economics of crime.   
189
 Defined by the rate of cleared crimes on the total amount of committed crimes. 
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with unemployment, the percentage of females in employment and the percentage of 
people with tertiary education.  
Warner and Greenidge (2001) considered the determinants of crime in Barbados. They 
used reported crime data to the police for the period 1980-1999. In particular, they 
considered house breaking, manslaughter, murder, rape and drug-related crime. As 
explanatory variables, they considered three for deterrence: the number of police per 
capita, per capita police expenditures, and prison overcrowding. As socio-economic 
variables they used population size, growth in GDP and the unemployment rate. They 
employed a simultaneous equation technique to take into consideration the endogeneity of 
deterrence variables. They found that, amongst the deterrence variables, all were negatively 
related to crime except prison overcrowding. Moreover, they found that GDP growth was 
negatively related to crime whereas positively with education. Along with these, there are 
other papers which analysed crime in the region (Nowak, 2001).    
As demonstrated above, the existing literature on the economics of crime in this region 
is scarce and it covers only few countries. In order to fill some gaps we aim at studying the 
impact of trust on victimization rates. To our knowledge, no studies on the Caribbean have 
considered the role of social capital, and trust in particular. We believe that this analysis 
contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneity of crime experiences in such region 
of the world. 
 
4.2.2 What is trust? 
 
The concept of social capital has been widely used by sociologists since the 1970s190. 
However, it is only from the beginning of the 1990s that economists became interested in 
the topic. This is mainly the result of the pioneering work by Putnam et al. (1993). Their 
work analysed how the current heterogeneity in institutional efficiency191 between the 
north and the south of Italy can be explained by the differences in social capital 
endowments between the two areas. The authors defined social capital as civic engagement 
which they proxied by voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies 
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 However, it is supposed that the term was first employed in 1916 by L. J. Hanifan, as mentioned by Putnam 
(2000). 
191
 As proxy for institutional quality, they considered the efficiency of Italian regions in different areas of 
intervention such as agriculture and health.  
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and football clubs, and confidence in public institutions. Moreover, since social capital is a 
very slowly changing variable, the authors argued that current levels are strongly correlated 
with past levels. In particular, they noted a strong correlation with Medieval Italy. In a 
subsequent work, Putnam (1995) provided a broader definition of social capital, which 
included norms and trust. In this approach, social capital is the “features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit" (ibid., p.6, 7)192. From an economic point of view, this 
suggests that one of the main consequences of social capital is that it reduces transaction 
costs. This is due to the fact that the costs of enforcing contracts decrease with high levels 
of social capital.  
Other authors provide important definitions of this concept. For example, Coleman 
(1990, p.302) argued that "social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, 
but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of 
some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are 
within the structure". His definition captures the heterogeneity of those factors that 
constitute social capital193. In our analysis, we focus on a prominent aspect of social capital: 
trust194. Amongst the scholars who defined social capital, Fukuyama (1999) has focused 
mostly on trust. He argued that “social capital can be defined simply as an instantiated set 
of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to 
cooperate with one another. If members of the group come to expect that others will 
behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust acts like a 
                                                 
192
 As we noted in the introductory chapter, new institutionalist economists place a great emphasis on the role 
of social capital. In particular, North classified them as informal institutions and recognised that they play a 
major role in societies. Williamson (2000) placed them in the first level of his institutional ladder. He defined 
them as the social embeddedness level which includes norms and costumes. These types of social 
arrangements change very slowly over time, in the order of centuries and millenniums. 
193
 That social capital is a multi-faceted concept has been highlighted, amongst the others,  
by Dasgupta and Sarageldin (2000). 
194
 The relationship between social capital and trust is quite debated in the literature. According to Putnam 
(1993), Coleman (1990) and Fukuyama (1999), trust is an important feature of social capital. In particular, trust 
is a precondition for the existence of social capital. For example, Coleman (1988) affirmed that a system of 
mutual trust is an important form of social capital. Moreover, the author says that future obligations and 
expectations will be based on these features. Also relevant for our analysis, Francois (2003) argued that 
trustworthiness is a very economically important component of the culture of a society which includes its 
social capital. Alternatively, it could be considered as one of social capital consequences (Woolcock, 1998). 
Despite the causality debate, the majority of authors agree on the strong correlation between social capital 
and trust.  
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lubricant that makes any group or organization run more efficiently” (ibid., p.16)195. Trust 
amongst people is a facilitator of relationship (trade) between countries which allows 
organizations to reduce transaction costs. Moreover, it is a substitute for formal contracts 
because people are generally perceived as trustworthy. As a consequence, they have less 
incentive to protect themselves through contracts compared to low social capital areas 
(Becchetti and Conzo, 2010).  
Starting from these assumptions, a literature developed which analysed how trust, and 
social capital in general, impacts on a variety of institutional and socio-economic outcomes. 
Scholars have studied its impact on growth from different perspectives. Keefer and Knack 
(1997) is one of the seminal works in this field. The authors used a Solow framework in a 
cross country regression with 29 market economies. As a proxy for social capital, they used 
indices of civic cooperation and trust in other people, taken from the World Values Surveys 
(WVS) questionnaires. Their hypothesis was that higher trusting countries should also be 
those with higher level of growth. In order to address endogeneity, they instrumented trust 
with the rate of law students in the population in 1963 and the percentage of the largest 
“ethnolinguistic” group. They found that an increase by one standard deviation of the trust 
measure led to an increase as high as one and half standard deviation of economic growth. 
However, their econometric specification has been heavily criticized by Durlauf (2002)196. 
Many other papers analysed this relationship using more sophisticated econometric 
techniques. For example, as an instrument for trust, Algan and Cahuc (2010) considered 
inherited trust of descendants of past migrants in the USA. This is because this measure is 
highly correlated with country of origins of migrants and the timing of arrival. In this way, 
they found robust evidence of its (positive) effect on growth197. Tabellini (2010) analysed 
the impact of culture on growth in Europe. Amongst the cultural variables, he considered a 
measure of trust. As instrument for this, the author employed two historical variables, i.e. 
the literacy rate at the end of the XIX century, and the form of ancient political institutions. 
Again, the author found strong evidence that cultural traits have a strong impact on 
development198. Another major role played by trust is on organizations’ efficiency and 
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 Going back, Arrow (1972, p. 357) argued that “much of the economic backwardness in the world can be 
explained by the lack of mutual confidence". 
196
 For example, Durlauf criticized the choice of the instruments and the few growth determinants employed.  
197
 Beugelsdijl et al (2004) also analysed this question. 
198
 Also Knack and Zak (2001) focused on the link between trust and growth. 
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particularly that of institutions. One of the pioneering works on this topic is La Porta et al. 
(1997) who considered the role of trust in determining judicial efficiency, corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, tax compliance and other variables. They found the effect to be quite 
strong: a standard deviation increase in trust leads to 0.7 standard deviation increase in the 
judicial efficiency score. However, this work did not consider endogeneity of trust with 
respect to effectiveness measures. This could be misleading as judicial efficiency could affect 
trust in turn. 
Many other socio-economic outcomes have been associated with trust. Guiso et al. 
(2004) explored the link between social capital and financial development in Italy. These 
authors argued that social capital is a major determinant of trust and that “financial 
contracts are trust intensive contracts par excellence” (ibid., p.526). As a proxy for social 
capital, they used blood donation and electoral turnout, both of which are thought to 
represent civicness. Guiso et al. investigated this question using individual data from the 
Italian Survey on Households and Wealth (SHIW). Their findings demonstrated that people 
with higher levels of social capital make fewer payments by cash, invest more in stocks and 
obtain credit more easily compared with low social capital individuals. Guiso et al. (2009) 
looked at how bilateral trust influences trade and investment in two countries. Their OLS 
results showed that an increase by a standard deviation in the importer’s trust toward the 
exporter has the effect of increasing bilateral trade by 10%. Moreover, they found a positive 
relationship also with FDI and portfolio investments. However, when they instrumented 
trust with cultural characteristics they noticed an abnormal increase in coefficients. 
Therefore, they suspected that their instruments might not be adequate. Uslaner (2004) 
found that more trustworthy societies have also lower corruption level. The problem is that 
trust is a slowly changing variable and, so, from this perspective, it is hard to fight 
corruption. 
As we have seen, trust is likely to affect many different socio-economic variables. These 
studies suggest that trust reduces transaction and enforcements costs, and improves sense 
of responsibility and respect of norms. Despite this growing body of evidence, economists 





4.2.3 Trust and crime: theory and empirical evidence  
 
Whether social capital and trust in particular, is affecting crime decisions at all is a 
recent and promising field of research. Indeed, the (scarce) theoretical and empirical 
literature shows a crime reducing effect.  
Following the standard expected utility model applied to the criminal choice (Becker 
1968; Ehrlich 1973), we can see the channels through which higher level of trust can lead to 
decreased victimization.  
First of all, high level of trust increases the probability of being caught by the police. 
This happens through two channels. Firstly, trust rich societies exert more efficient informal 
surveillance at the local level. This is well explained by Sampson and Wilson (1995, p.8) who  
argued that “it is hypothesized that communities lacking in social cohesion (social capital) 
are less effective in exerting informal means of social control through establishing and 
maintaining norms to reduce violence compared to communities with higher levels of social 
capital”. On the same line, Bellair (1997, p.683) argued that “communities with extensive 
networks are assumed to be more integrated and cohesive, and the residents more likely to 
engage in informal surveillance, to develop movement-governing rules, and to intervene in 
disturbances”. The second channel is that trust enhances also the efficiency of the criminal 
law system and police efficiency. This is mainly due to the reduction of transaction costs 
(Fukuyama, 1999) which improve the efficiency of all types of organisation, even those 
involved in the crime fighting activities. 
An increase in the probability of being arrested, due to improvement of the criminal law 
system or of informal surveillance, will lower the expected utility of the average criminal. 
Crime will then pay less in such societies.  
Secondly, it increases the costs associated with crime. In fact, high trusting societies 
might increase the psychological cost as the stigma ones (Rasmussen, 1996). Such types of 
costs are due to the high level of interconnectedness between people. Again, the higher 
these extra costs for the criminal the less likely that he/ she will commit a crime.  
Thirdly, trust softens the consequences of conflicts. This is well explained by Lederman 
et al. (2002, p.510) who argued that social capital “allows for peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, both interpersonal (at home, in the neighbourhood or workplace) and societal 
(such as a perceived unfair distribution of economic opportunities)”. The reason is that 
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people reach agreement more easily than low trust societies. As a consequence, there will 
be fewer opportunities for committing crime.  
Indeed, trust, and social capital, might be particularly important in developing countries 
such as the Caribbean ones where the rule of law is very weak. As we argued in the 
introductory chapter, in such contexts social capital might function as a substitute for legal 
enforcement in deterring crime199.  
On the other hand, social capital might also have negative effects and increase the 
number of crimes. In order to explain why this might be the case, it is useful to refer to the 
notion of bridging and bonding groups (Putnam, 2000). Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) claimed 
that bridging groups “establish connections with others outside their group increase social 
capital at the community level by expanding the overall network structures of the 
communities in which they are embedded” (ibid., p.994). On the other hand, bonding 
groups are supposed to increase the level of social capital only inside their own groups and, 
eventually, reduce community level social capital. The typical example of the latter is given 
by Banfield (1958) who defined the so–called “amoral familism” of the south of Italy. He 
argued that southern Italians have very strong family ties but are less trustful toward the 
rest of society. 
If in a society there is a prevalence of bonding rather than bridging group, this could 
lead to greater level of crime rather than fewer (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2005)200. This could be 
even more problematic if the group is a criminal one. In this case, a greater level of trust 
amongst gang members would certainly lead to increases in crime and violence.  
Rubio (1997) provided a clarifying example of different types of social capital in 
Colombia. The author affirmed that in this country there are two opposite types of social 
capital: a “productive” and a “perverse” one. The former is the positive one which 
stimulates economic growth. In the latter the rent- seeking behaviour and political activities 
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 Unfortunately, there are no studies which assessed the interaction of social capital and formal institutions 
in deterring crime. However, as we argued in the introduction, in Ollson and Pelle (2009) social capital exerts a 
bigger impact on growth in countries where the formal institutions are weak. 
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 Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) considered religious adherence as a proxy for bridging and bonding groups. 
They argued that typical Protestants and Catholics promote community wide social capital that is associated 
with less crime. On the other hand, evangelical Protestants, focus mainly on the wealth of their inner 
members. In turn, this will increase thin trust and lead to higher levels of crimes. They consider the percentage 
of adherents to each religion in the population as main explanatory variable, along with other control 
variables, and various crime categories as dependent variables. They found evidence that bridging religions 




are detrimental to the growth. The two types of social capital can live together. As an 
example, Rubio talked about the region of Antinoquia where “some cultural characteristics 
that facilitated the accumulation of productive social capital, as trust, were also determining 
elements for the development of perverse social capital, such as trust, were also 
determining elements for the development of perverse social capital. The fact that the first 
major advances in exporting cocaine from Meddellin were based on trust relationship 
among the shipping partners has been relatively well documented” (Rubio 1997, p. 89). 
Therefore, cartels exploited the general low level of trust of a society to dominate more 
efficiently illegal businesses.  
Similar analysis could be made about the Southern Italian mafias. In fact, Sicily has 
always been a low trust the level of trust region (Putnam, 1993). Despite this, as we argued 
in the second chapter Mafia could have been the product of a perverse social capital. In fact, 
there was a lot of trust amongst its members201.  
Continuing, societies with high levels of trust might have higher level of crimes because 
of reduced self-defence mechanisms and/or naive behaviour. As Buonanno et al. (2009) 
explained, societies where people tend to trust others more could be more easily 
approached by potential criminals. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in high trust societies, 
it is not un-common to leave the door open or not to lock the bike. In turn, this would lower 
the probability of being caught regions and increase the expected utility of the criminals. 
This would lead to more offences202. 
Concluding, from a theoretical point of view it appears clear that an increase in the level 
of trust would cause a decline in crime rates. Although trust might reduce crime, the “net 
effect” on the expected utility of an average rational criminal will be necessary negative. 
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 Indeed mafias affect the societal level of (dis)trust. 
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 A formal model of the role of social capital on crime levels has been provided by Lederman et al. 
(2002) incorporated these two types of social capital in a simple theoretical model to assess its effect on crime. 
Using a framework similar to Ehrlich (1973), the author considered a situation with three agents. The agents’ 
net benefit from committing a crime depends on the value of things stolen (positively), foregoing wages 
(negative) and a change in utility due to changes in social capital. Moreover, wages depend on human and 
social capital. The latter is a function of social distance and sympathy with other people, here towards agents j 
and z. Moreover, assuming social distance and stock of capital to be fixed, the author considered the net 
benefit associated with sympathy. Lederman et al. considered three scenarios: community wide social capital 
increases, increases in social capital for group i and j that excludes z, and one that excludes i, the criminal. He 
finds that community social capital has a greater crime reducing effect compared with group-specific ones. 
Therefore, implicitly he agrees with the bridging and bonding view expressed above.   
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Furthermore, we need to remind that our trust data refer to “bridging” social capital rather 
than bonding203. Therefore, we expect a strong crime reducing effect of trust. 
So far, we have reviewed the theoretical explanation of the trust–crime nexus. In the 
following section, we analyse the empirical contributions on this topic. 
 
4.2.4 Trust and crime: empirical evidence 
 
There are not empirical works which specifically consider the impact of trust on crime. 
Still, there are some that consider the link social capital-crime, which also include trust as 
one of the proxies. The following paragraphs briefly review the most important 
contributions. 
 
Trust and crime contributions 
 
Akçomak and Weel (2012) considered the impact of social capital on crime at the municipal 
level in the Netherlands. They use not only variables that represent the presence of social 
capital but also others which reveal its absence. They include trust, voluntary contributions 
per household, blood donations, voter turnout (presence), divorce rates and population 
heterogeneity (absence). The trust variable is taken by the European Social Survey (ESS), 
which asks an analogous question to the World Value Survey one. Moreover, they 
constructed an index based on the variables which represent the presence of social capital. 
As dependent variables, they considered nine crime categories and ran regressions on 142 
municipalities. They recognize that their measures of social capital might be endogenous 
because of simultaneity, measurement errors and omitted variables. In order to tackle this 
issue they employed a 2SLS approach. As instrument, they followed the approach of 
Tabellini (2010), using historical municipal variables which refer back to 1859. These are the 
percentage of foreigners, the percentage of Protestants and the number of schools per 
inhabitants. As the dependent variable, they consider a) an indicator of all recorded crime 
rate and b) each crime separetely. The authors found robust evidence of a crime reducing 
impact of social capital on crime. The OLS results show that, a one standard deviation 
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 This is because our trust question refers to the wide society and not to particular groups. 
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increase in the level of trust leads to a decrease by 0.20 standard deviation of the overall 
crime rate204. On the contrary to other social capital measures, the 2SLS coefficient is 
insignificant. Regarding the single crime categories, trust seems to have more impact on 
violent than to property crimes. In fact, it reduces assault, robbery and rape. However, the 
authors do not explain why this might be the case. 
Another important paper is the one by Lederman et al. (2002). They considered the 
causal impact of social capital on violent crimes, proxied by the rate of intentional 
homicides. The authors considered a cross country regression with 39 countries over the 
period 1980-1994.  As measures of social capital, the authors used trust, membership in 
organizations, membership of a secular organization, participation in meetings, degree of 
religiosity and church attendance. These data are taken from the World Value Survey( WVS) 
which we will describe shortly. OLS results showed that a one percent increase in the 
measure of trust leads to 0.4 percent decrease in the rate of homicides. However, the 
coefficient is insignificant. In order to account for the likely endogeneity of social capital 
measures, Lederman et al. employed regional dummies and radios per capita as 
instruments. The reason for using the last is that the ownership of radios reduces the cost of 
social interactions. As control variables, they used GDP growth and Gini index, standard in 
the economics of crime literature. As econometric strategies they employed a GMM 
procedure as there is over identification. They found that amongst the social capital 
measures, only trust has a negative effect on homicide rate whereas the others do not. In 
particular, an increase of 1% of the trust measure leads to a reduction of crime rates by 
1.21%. The coefficient is higher than the OLS specification. However, it is worth keeping in 
mind that the number of countries considered is quite small, that could pose several doubts 
on its representativeness.  
Baumer et al. (2004) used the SCBS data to explore the link between social capital and 
homicides in the USA. In order to account for the fact that social capital is multi-faceted, the 
authors used different measures, including trust. They found that, amongst all the social 
capital proxies, only the latter exerts a negative and significant effect on the level of 
homicide. These results are confirmed by the inclusion of relevant socio, economic and 
demographic conditions such as resource deprivation and divorce rates. Moreover, the 
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authors found that social activism has a significant positive relationship with homicide. The 
authors considered also the likely reverse causality between homicides rates and social 
capital. Using a simultaneous equation technique, they found that homicides affect 
negatively trust and positively social activism.  
So far,  the works which directly studied the causal effect of trust on crime. Let us see, the 
ones who consider broader definition of social capital. 
 
Social capital, but not trust, and crime contributions 
 
Buonanno et al. (2009) analysed the role of social capital on property crimes for 103 
Italian provinces in a cross sectional study for 2002. As crime categories, they considered 
(all-types) thefts, car thefts and robberies. They chose car theft because it has very high 
reporting rates compared with the other two. As a proxy for social capital they used 
recreational associations, voluntary associations, referenda turnout and blood donations. 
Moreover, they controlled for a number of socio-economic determinants of crime plus two 
deterrence variables205. They employed an instrumental variable approach to tackle 
endogeneity of the network associations’ measures and possible measurement errors. As 
instruments, they used Putnam’s historical measures of associations in Italy. The results 
demonstrated that for thefts and robberies, the relationship with social capital is positive, 
although not significant. In the contrast, the results for auto thefts are generally negative 
and significant. The authors explained by stating that car theft is generally reported, 
whereas “normal” thefts and robberies are not, making their results biased. In particular, 
they found that an increase in a standard deviation of blood donations and association 
density leads to a reduction in car thefts by 9 and 13 percent respectively.  
Chamlin and Cochran (1997) focused on social altruism. As its proxy, they considered 
the amount of money given to United Way, a North American charity. The authors regressed 
this measure of social capital, along with other covariates, on violent and property crimes 
(279 cities for property crimes and 273 for violent crimes). They found a negative and 
significant effect on both crime groups, although slightly more negative for property crimes. 
In particular, the total effect on property crimes is -.12, whereas on violent ones is -.10. 
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Heaton (2006) investigated the impact of religion on crime at county level for the USA. The 
author used data for religiosity from 2000 and regressed it, along with other covariates, on 
property and violent crimes. As in previous studies, the OLS result yielded negative and 
significant results. Heaton then used past level of religiosity (from 1916) as instrument for 
current level and found no significant effect of religiosity on both property and violent 
crimes. Moreover, Heaton used increases in church attendance during Easter as a natural 
experiment206 to check changes in crime rates. Even in this case, he did not find any 
statistical relationship. 
There is also a vast literature which investigates the role of networks on crime.  For 
example, Kling et al (2005) analysed the effect of neighbourhood mobility on youth crime. 
They used data from Moving to Opportunity (MTO). This 2001 experiment randomly 
assigned poor families to wealthy neighbourhoods. They found that young males and 
females respond to relocation in a different way. Treated females had lower propensity to 
commit crimes compared to the control ones, even for some years after the experiment. 
Male results are mixed since after two years, the level of certain types of crimes is higher in 
the treated ones. Glaeser et al. (1996) developed a theoretical model which shows how 
social interactions influence criminal decisions. Then they tested it with data from different 
American cities and across precincts in New York. They found a high degree of interactions 
across crimes and particularly for robbery, assault and burglary207.  
Overall, the majority of these works found that greater social capital, and trust, is 
associated with lower levels of crime levels. One of the problems with these studies is that 
they employ macro data and, generally, few variables. Moreover, their use of many 
different proxies of social capital might deviate from focusing exclusively on trust as we do. 
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Our analysis is based on Americas Barometer data, which is a large household survey 
conducted in all the independent countries in the mainland North, Centre and South 
America. It also includes some Caribbean countries. This database, which is part of the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), is mainly sponsored by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID). However, it is also supported by the Inter-American 
Development bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
Universities such as Vanderbilt and Princeton, amongst the others. The aim of this survey is 
to question people on democratic issues and behaviours. It was first launched in 2004 when 
it covered eleven countries and it is repeated every other year. The latest available edition, 
the 2010 one, covers 26 countries; about 43,000 people were interviewed.  
Survey participants are voting age citizens and are interviewed in person, except for 
Canada and USA where they responded on the web. The survey uses a national probability 
sample design that takes into consideration characteristics such as location and ethnicity208. 
Interviewers had handheld computers where they directly reported respondents’ answers. 
This system is more efficient than paper-based questionnaires. Almost all the countries have 
around 1,500 individual respondents, except for few countries which are not the ones we 
consider209. In general, these data are considered to be reliable and have been used in 
several studies, such as the World Bank Governance Indicators210. 
In our study, we concentrate on five Caribbean countries covered in the survey. These 
countries are: Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominican Republic and Jamaica211. 
We consider a cross section with data from the latest available survey, i.e., 2010. The main 
reason for not considering the previous surveys is that not all these five countries 
participated212. Moreover, even for the rest of the countries we have data for a couple of 
waves which do not provide much evidence on variation over time. Indeed, the use of a 
panel data approach would have been beneficial to capture time-invariant characteristics 
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 They employed sampling error to verify the validity of their result.  
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 More detailed information about each country sampling can be found in the Americas Barometer website.  
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 In the Americas Barometer website there is a list of studies which used these data. 
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 Guyana and Suriname are not geographically in the Caribbean. However, they have always been associated 
to Caribbean countries. For example, because of their national languages (English and  
Dutch) rather than Spanish, which is the most spoken language in continental Latin America. 
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 Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname have data only for the last survey. 
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which might influence trust levels213. After cleaning the data for missing observations we are 
left with 6,940 observations. This is a good advantage compared to other studies on social 
capital and crime, which are mainly based on macro data.  
Haiti is not included in our study. In 2010, Haiti experienced a devastating earthquake. 
As a result, the questionnaires refer only to the six months prior to this event.  Moreover, 
the data in the survey are not self-weighted for Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
4.3.1 Crime data 
 
Crime statistics are problematic for a variety of reasons. Generally, economic studies 
focus on data recorded by the police. This kind of data might suffer from under-reporting, 
i.e. people fail to report their crime experience. The greater is the under-reporting rate, the 
higher is the so-called “dark number”: the difference between the true and recorded crime 
numbers. Many works (MacDonald, 2002; Soares 2004) tried to analyse the driving factors 
behind this phenomenon. They find that there are macro and micro characteristics which 
make the probability of under-reporting lower. For example, Soares (ibid.) finds that, 
contrary to previous work, developed countries seem to exhibit higher crime rates because 
of their higher reporting rates. In fact, low income countries tend to report much less than 
richer counterparts and, so, crime regressions show positive correlations between crime 
and development. MacDonald (2001, 2002) analysed the individual characteristics that are 
more likely to be associated with reporting practices. The author found that unemployed 
people tend to report less than those employed. This result has also been found by Diez-
Ticio et al. (2000). Those who have been victims on many occasions also tend to report less 
because of their “habit” of being victimized. On the other hand, insured individuals tend to 
report more in order to get indemnity from the insurance companies. However, reporting 
rates might depend also on under-recording by the authorities. As Fajnzylber et al. (2000) 
notes in “El Salvador the Fiscalia General de la Republica (the office of the country’s chief 
prosecutor) only records crimes for which there is an indicted suspect” (ibid., p.235). As a 
result, comparisons of recorded crime data between countries are particularly problematic. 
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A further problem is the employment of different definitions of the crimes that compose 
crime categories.  
A way to partially solve these issues is to use victimization surveys. The reason is that 
people are more willing to declare their victimization experience to a neutral interviewer 
rather than to the police. The most famous kind of such survey is the International Crime 
Victimization Survey (ICVS) made by the UNICRI. However, even such data are not immune 
from criticism. This is well explained by Skogan (1975) who argues that victimization surveys 
suffer from sampling issues, because they might not be representative of the population. 
Also, surveys often fail to consider tourists who are preferred victims of criminals (Skogan, 
1975). 
Bearing these considerations in mind, we consider America Barometer data. Although it 
is not a victimization survey, it contains some questions on victimization experiences. The 
advantage of using it is that the same questionnaire was sent out to each country, which 
makes the data comparable. Here, we consider mainly two questions. One is the standard 
victimization question: “have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? 
That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, 
violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?”214 Based on this, we 
created our main dependent variable All Crimes that can take two values, 1 if the answer 
was yes and 0 for no. Figure 4.4 shows the victimization rates for the countries in our 
sample. Suriname is the country with the highest rate, slightly over twenty percent. Jamaica 
is the one with the lowest215. Moreover, Figure 4.5 shows the heterogeneity of victimization 
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 Even though the last part of the question refers to other types of crime, in reality high volume categories 
such as thefts and larcenies have not been considered.  
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 Unfortunately, given the lower number of crime categories we cannot really compare these values with 
other surveys.  
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Figure 4.4 Victimization rates by country 
 





Figure 4.5 Victimization rates by province 
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The other question is more specific and refers to the type of crime. The possibilities 
were: unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats; unarmed robbery with assault or 
physical threats; armed robbery; assault but not robbery; rape or sexual assault; kidnapping; 
vandalism; burglary of the house; extortion and other. Many important crime categories are 
missing. Except for homicides, for obvious reasons, we do not have high volume crimes such 
as motor thefts and larceny thefts. Following the FBI uniform crime report216, we created 
two variables: violent (Violent Crimes/ Violent henceforth) and property crimes (Property 
Crimes/ Property). In the first category, we include rape or sexual assault, unarmed robbery 
with assault or physical threats and assault, unarmed robbery without assault or physical 
threat, armed robbery but not robbery. In the latter, we have just one category: burglary. 
Therefore, violent crimes are much more numerous compared to typical crime statistics 
where property crimes have greater volumes. This is illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 Crime categories 
    
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Lapop (2012). 
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The FBI uses the following categories. Violent crimes: murder and non negligent manslaughter, forcible 





















































4.3.2 Social capital  
 
Our question on trust is: “now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say 
that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very 
trustworthy or untrustworthy?“ We created a dummy equal to 1 if the respondents 
answered yes to one of the first two options. 
Regarding this question there are some considerations to be made. The typical data on 
trust used by scholars are taken from the World Value Survey (WVS) and the General Social 
Survey (GSS). The former is a cross-country study whereas the latter is only for the USA. 
However, in both questionnaires, the question is the same: “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?” Many works have questioned the validity of this result and considered whether it 
truly reflects the level of trust in others. In order to deal with these reservations, Glaeser et 
al. (2000) ran a trust game (Berg et al., 1995), along with asking the WVS-GSS questions, to 
Harvard undergraduate students. The trust game is the standard game where a sender has 
an endowment of some money, who has to choose the fraction of the money to give to the 
receiver. In turn, the receiver obtains a multiple of the amount sent, which was the double 
in the game played by Glaeser et al. (2000). The receiver than chooses how much to return. 
Generally, the sender’s behaviour is considered the trust component whereas the receiver 
behaviour is seen as trustworthiness. Glaeser et al. (2000) showed that the WVS question is 
statistically correlated with the receiver’s behaviour, i.e. trustworthiness. Fehr et al. (2003) 
questioned this result and, using German data, showed a correlation between a WVS type 
question and the sender’s behaviour. In order to clarify this issue, Sapienza et al. (2007) ran 
a similar trust game with the University of Chicago MBA students. They found that trust has 
two components: belief and preference. The relevance of each component might vary 
depending on the homogeneity of the sample considered. Therefore, the different results 
between Glaeser et al. (2000) and Fehr et al. (2003) depend largely on heterogeneity in their 
sample. In particular, in homogenous contests, people answer the WVS question predicting 
their own behaviour and this explains the correlation with trustworthiness. Indeed this last 
result is particularly important to our research217. 
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 We feel that our measure of trust does not create problems of comparability amongst diverse countries as 
the ones considered in this work. Although each of them has specific cultural traits, they all belong to the same 
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As we have seen, our question asks directly to what degree people are trustworthy, not 
the standard WVS question on trust. To our knowledge, there are not laboratory 
experiments which analyse such questions. However, Guiso et al. (2009) found a positive 
relationship between their WVS type question on trust and a question on trustworthiness 
asked in the same survey. They questioned participants: “suppose that a random person you 
do not know personally receives by mistake a sum of 1000 euros that belong to you. He or 
she is aware that the money belongs to you and knows your name and address. He or she 
can keep the money without incurring in any punishment. According to you what is the 
probability (a number between zero and 100) that he or she returns the money?” Although 
this question is different from ours, it still captures trustworthiness. Therefore, we can 
assume that our measure of trustworthiness could also be considered to be related to the 
standard trust questions. We will refer in the same way to trust and trustworthiness in the 
remaining of the paper. 
Figure 4.7 below shows the different levels of trust by country. Moreover, the values are 
quite high and there is less variation than expected. Our suspect is that these results depend 
on the phrasing of the question. In comparison to other surveys’ question, it has a very 
“positive” approach which might lead people to respond excessively optimistic. For 
example, in the WVS the question is set more negatively which might lead to lower “trust 
rates”. Unfortunately, we cannot compare these data with the ones of the World Value 
Survey because only Trinidad and Tobago participated in this survey. Nevertheless in 
Sapienza et al (2007), 58.6% of people answered that most people can be trusted which is a 









                                                                                                                                                        
geographical area and are coming from similar colonial history. Indeed, WVS covers a much more 
heterogenous number of countries and, still, is recognized as reliable by the scientific community. 
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Figure 4.7 Trust levels by province 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Lapop (2012).  Information on how we built Trust is in 
the Appendix. 
 
Geographical specification  
In our analysis, we are not interested in individual levels of trust because they are not 
likely to have an impact on the probability of being victimized218. Therefore, we need to 
aggregate the individual data219. Which geographical specification is more likely to affect the 
probability of being victim of a crime? This question is not trivial since there is not a 
theoretical background that can inform our choice. Figure 4.8 below shows that most of the 
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 Although somebody might argue that for a criminal it would be easier to steal from a person who trusts 
“others” more. This is because criminals might exploit this situation. 
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 In this respect, Baumer et al (2004. p. 886) argued that: “previous studies demonstrate the applicability of 
the social capital concept at diverse levels of aggregation, from countries to nation-states“.  
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Figure 4.8 Place where victimization took place 
 
Note: Data are personal elaborations based on Lapop (2012). 
 
Given that, it would be preferable to choose a smaller geographical unit. Therefore, we 
decided to opt for upm, which in the survey is the primary sampling unit. Each upm 
comprises around 18 people in the survey. This raises questions of representativeness. As a 
robustness check, we consider a higher geographical specification, such as the 
parish/province, where each province represents an average of 120 people. 
 
4.3.3 Control variables 
 
As control variables, we employ standard ones from the economics of crime literature. 
Moreover, we consider these at the individual and aggregated level. The reason for doing so 
is that crime depends not only on individual characteristics, but also on the average 
conditions of the area where people live. This is a common approach in the literature, as per 
Kling and Vollard (2008).  
As individual characteristics, we consider several that are thought to be important 
determinants in the economics of crime models. We consider age groups, gender, years of 
schooling, income, ethnicity, marital status, whether a person is working and if he/she is 
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living in an urban area221. The upm level variables are the rate or means of all individuals in 
the survey which belong to the same geographical specification. We decided to include the 
mean levels of income and education. Moreover, we consider the rates of male, young and 
working people on the population. 
Given that we have individual and aggregated data, we need to be cautious in 
explaining the channels through which they might increase (decrease) the probability of 
being a victim of a crime. For example, as we will discuss below, income at the individual 
level should be negatively related to property crimes whereas at the aggregated one the 
statistical relationship is not clear.  
We now analyse what the literature says about the variables we chose. For the 
individual results, we mainly refer to Fajnzylber et al. (2000) who analyse victimization rates 
in South America. In particular, this study compares four works on victimization for Mexico 
City (Funsalud, 2000), Rio de Janeiro (Piquet, 2000), San Salvador (Cruz et al., 2000) and Sao 
Paolo (Piquet, 2000). For the results at the “macro level “, we can consider a rich literature.  
Young people are supposed to have a greater propensity to commit crimes compared to 
the rest of the population. This has been demonstrated in many studies. Using German data, 
Entorf and Spengler (2000a) found that young people, who represent 21% percent of the 
population, account for 40% of crimes. Similar results have been reported by Freeman 
(1991) and Grogger (1998). Therefore, higher rates of young people should lead to more 
crime. On an individual level, Fajnzylber et al. (2000) showed that the typical victim is often 
young, although for Mexico City this variable was not significant222. We consider a dummy if 
the individual is aged between 18 and 29. At the upm level we consider the rate of young 
people in the survey population. 
Males are supposed to be more likely to commit and be victims of crimes. In almost all 
the specifications based on the four victimization surveys, Fajnzylber et al. (2000) found that 
the dummy male is positive and significant. However, women are more likely to be the 
victims of crimes such as rape and domestic violence. On the upm level, we expect that 
those with more males will be associated with greater victimization experiences.  
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 It would have been really interesting to do network analysis but the data do not allow us to do so. 
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 However, we need to bear in mind that the dependent variable referred to all types of crime. In our analysis 
we will make a distinction between property and violent crime. 
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Lochner and Moretti (2003) analysed the role of education on crime using data from 
the United Crime Report (UCR) and the US census bureau. In order to tackle endogeneity of 
education level223 they considered changes in compulsory schooling laws. Education might 
reduce crime rates because it increases the opportunity costs of committing illegal acts. 
Also, educated people are generally more risk adverse than less educated ones. The authors 
found a strong crime reducing effect. Similar results have been found by Freeman (1991). 
However, Ehrlich (1975b) found a positive relationship between education and crime which 
shows how this link is far to be clear. At the individual level, education seems not to be very 
significant (Fajnzylber et al., 2000). Our individual education variable is the number of years 
of schooling, as employed by the majority of studies. The upm variable is the mean average 
level of the same variable. 
The income of a region could influence criminal behaviour. According to Ehrlich (1973) 
high legal wages should increase participation in the legal activities and reduce crime, 
whereas illegal opportunities should increase criminal opportunities. Analyzing youth wages, 
Grogger (1997) found analogous results. On an individual level, richer people should be 
targeted more because they have more to steal from. However, as pointed out by Gaviria 
and Pages (2002) richer people have greater incentives to invest in protection, which in turn 
would lead to lower victimization rate. Whether this relationship is positive or negative 
depends on the marginal returns to private protection. Gaviria and Pages (2002) showed 
that if these are very low, the rich will not invest in it and will decide to accept some levels 
of crime. For these reasons, we used two dummies at the household level: one for middle 
income and another for those with high incomes. People were questioned to identify their 
household incomes in one of the eleven income classes. Each country had different income 
ranges for each class. We considered High Income for the last three classes, whereas Middle 
(Mid)Income for the ones from the fifth to the eight224. At the upm level we consider the 
mean level of these income classes225. 
Urban settings should provide more opportunities for criminals. Cities offer more 
anonymity that result in lower social control. Therefore, they increase criminal 
opportunities. According to Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996), urbanisation is not important per 
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 As education variable, they consider an indicator for high school completion. 
224
 We did so, taking into consideration the distributions of income across countries. 
225
 We preferred to use this rather than the rate of the individual dummy variables as it provides a better 
indicator of average level of income. 
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se. Rather it leads to higher crimes because it is associated with a series of opportunities for 
the criminals. These are higher pecuniary benefits given the concentration of wealth. Also, 
cities have lower clear up rates of crimes as it is easier to hide from the police compared to 
the country side226. We include a dummy if the single is living in an urban area. 
Entorf and Spengler (2000b) argued that a strong sense of family might have an impact 
on crime. Statistics for Europe show that divorce and separation rates have a positive 
relationship with crime rates227. Also Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolitom (2012) found a strong 
effect of divorce on violent crimes using data from the FBI. Being married is a synonymous 
of conducting a more stable life. In turn, this life style leads to fewer opportunities to be 
victim of crimes. Therefore, we included the dummy married at the individual level. 
We also consider whether a person is working or not. We would have liked to use 
unemployment but the type of data did not allow us to do so228 and we decided not to use 
it. At the upm level we just consider working rate229.  
Ethnicity might affect the likelihood of being victim of a crime (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2002). We included three dummies which equal one if respondent belongs to one of the 
three most numerous ethnic groups in the whole sample. These are black, mixed race (black 
and another race) and Indian. The reason for using these is that we want to see whether the 
most represented ethnicities are more or less likely to be victims of crime. As a further 
control for ethnicity, we employ a measure of ethnic polarisation at the upm level. In more 
heterogeneous societies, there could be more social tensions that eventually will lead to 
higher level of crime230. We consider the one proposed by  Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005). It is constructed in the following way: 
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226
 However, as we stressed in the second chapter, also rural areas offer criminal opportunities. 
227
 They show the positive relationship between crude divorce rates and contact crimes per 100’000 
inhabitants. Data are taken from the 2000 ICVS. 
228
 Question ocup4a in the survey does not ask directly the respondents whether he/she is unemployed or not. 
Rather it asks whether the respondent is working or not.  
229
 This is calculated as the number of working people on total population. 
230
 As we will see, heterogeneity is supposed to be strongly negatively correlated with the level of trust. 
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 represents the share of each ethnicity in the population. We prefer this one because 
it is a better proxy of potential tensions compared to the standard fractionalization measure 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  
A detailed list of the variables can be found in the appendix.  
 
Table 4. 1 Summary statistics 
 
 
Observation Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Individual Level 
  
All Crimes 6940 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Property Crimes 6940 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Violent Crimes 6940 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Property Crimes1 6940 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Violent Crimes1 6940 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Age 1829 6940 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Man 6940 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Education 6940 9.67 3.91 0 18.00 
Working 6940 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Urban 6940 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Mid Income 6940 0.33 0.47 0 1 
High Income 6940 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Married 6940 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Mixed 6940 0.45 0.43 0 1 
Black 6940 0.29 0.48 0 1 
Indian 6940 0.18 0.35 0 1 
            
UPM Level 
  
Trust 6940 0.68 0.16 0.14 1.00 
Age 1829 Rate  6940 31.24 6.83 0.00 57.14 
Man Rate  6940 49.68 3.91 33.33 66.67 
Income Mean  6940 4.04 1.34 1.17 8.09 
Working Rate  6940 0.53 0.14 0.13 1.00 










Table 4. 2 Summary statistics by country 
 
Country Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev 
 
All Crimes Property Crimes Violent Crimes 
Dominican Republic 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.01 
Jamaica 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 
Guyana 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 
Trinidad 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.01 
Suriname 0.22 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 
 
Property Crimes1 Violent Crimes1 Trust 
Dominican Republic 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.64 0.02 
Jamaica 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.68 0.02 
Guyana 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.74 0.02 
Trinidad 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.78 0.01 
Suriname 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.70 0.03 
 
Trust Elections Age 1829 Man 
Dominican Republic 4.14 0.05 0.3 0.01 0.49 0.01 
Jamaica 3.59 0.04 0.25 0.00 0.51 0 
Guyana 3.9 0.01 0.3 0.01 0.5 0 
Trinidad 3.68 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.5 0 
Suriname 5.09 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.5 0 
 
Education Working Urban 
Dominican Republic 8.77 0.21 0.46 0.01 0.73 0.03 
Jamaica 10.09 0.14 0.52 0.02 0.52 0.05 
Guyana 9.31 0.13 0.54 0.02 0.29 0.06 
Trinidad 9.42 0.16 0.61 0.01 0.56 0.04 
Suriname 11.2 0.16 0.56 0.01 0.48 0.03 
 
Mid Income High Income Married 
Dominican Republic 0.34 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.02 
Jamaica 0.36 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.27 0.01 
Guyana 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.02 
Trinidad 0.30 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.38 0.01 
Suriname 0.34 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.36 0.02 
 
Mixed Black Indian* 
Dominican Republic 0.68 0.47 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 
Jamaica 0.09 0.29 0.88 0.33 0.03 0.16 
Guyana 0.21 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 
Trinidad 0.27 0.45 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.46 
Suriname 0.17 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.42 
Note:  [1] * For Dominican Republic, Indian refers to White. The reason is explained in the text. 
 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on deterrence and inequality which are considered 
important predictors of crime level. For example Levitt (1996) demonstrated that the prison 
population strongly reduces crime rates. In order to address endogeneity, this author 
considered prison overcrowding litigation in a state as instrument in changes in prison 
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population. Levitt (1997) showed that the size of police force has a strong deterrent effect 
on crime levels. As instrument the author used the timing of political elections as it is linked 
to the size of the police force but not the crime levels. However, there are many papers that 
analysed the role of deterrence on crime (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Koning and 
Vollaard, 2008)231.  Also, inequality seems to play an important role in explaining crime rates 
(Bourguignon, 2000)232.   
As we will see in the next section, one way to partially take into consideration specific 
characteristics is to use country fixed effects and employ an instrumental variable approach.  
 
4.4 Econometric strategy and results 
 
4.4.1 Econometric issues 
 
Our analysis presents several econometric challenges, as most of the crime regressions 
do. First of all, there is the omitted variable issue. In our study, this aspect might be 
particularly relevant. One of the main reasons is that we lack a series of relevant predictors 
of crime levels. For example, it would have been useful to have data on deterrence 
variables, such as the number of police forces per capita or the efficiency of the juridical 
system233. Unfortunately, we could not find data capturing these factors at the country 
level, not to mention at the small geographical unit we consider. This is a common problem 
when analyzing developing countries. Moreover, we could not even find proxies as the 
Americas Barometer survey do not include other types of variables. The omitted variable 
bias is quite relevant if the excluded variables are correlated with the included explanatory 
variables. This is the so called endogeneity problem. In turn, this leads to biased estimates. 
We can suppose that variables such as the ones reflecting the quality of institutions might 
be correlated with many socio-economic outcomes. We try to partially solve this issue in 
                                                 
231
 Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) consider the increase in police protection following the terrorism attack at 
the main Jewish centre in Buenos Aires in 1994 as a natural experiment. The authors found a strong causal 
deterrent effect of police on crime. Koning and Vollaard (2008) found similar results using the Dutch 
Victimization survey. The authors instrumented the size of the police with the police funding formula. 
232
 This paper considers a cross country analysis with 50 observations. It found that the degree of relative 
poverty or income inequality in a country generally leads to a rise in criminality. 
233
 In the Americas Barometer, individuals were questioned about their opinion on police or judicial system 
efficiency. However, these measures might be upward and downward biased depending on whether the 
individual has been victimised or not. 
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two ways: we include country fixed effects with the hope of capturing some variables such 
as efficiency of the judicial system or police forces. We need to bear in mind that, except for 
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, these are very small countries. The second way of 
dealing with this issue is to use an instrumental variable approach (Angrist and Krueger, 
2001).  
Another major econometric issue is that of measurement errors. Police recorded crime 
statistics are generally affected by underreporting. In our case, since we are using 
victimization data, we are likely to partially avoid this problem. In fact, respondents to 
surveys are generally more prone to report victimization experience. One reason is that they 
are not constrained by fear or shame which prevents many people from reporting. 
Moreover, many people do not trust the police and believe that the crime will go 
unpunished, preferring not to report. Still, even in the survey we consider there is going to 
be underreporting234. In the case that this measurement error is unrelated to the 
explanatory variables, this would lead to a larger error variance but it would not bias our 
estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). On the contrary, if the measurement error is linked with the 
right hand side variables, this would bias our coefficients. For example, this could be the 
case if report rates depended on the level of education, because of more self – 
consciousness. In this case, the error term would be negatively correlated to the education 
variable, leading to a positive bias of the relative coefficient. Again, the instrumental 
variable approach will help us to deal with this issue. 
Finally, the other big problem in estimating the impact of social capital on crime is that 
of reverse causality of our main explanatory variable, Trust. The level of trust could be 
influenced by victimization experience. People who have been victims of crime could trust 
other people less and change the perception of trustworthiness of the people in their 
community as a result. In fact, in his study on the determinant of trust, Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002) included also a measure of crime. From an econometric point of view, the 
likely double direction of the relationship between crime and trust might lead to the trust 
coefficient being biased and inconsistent. This is because the trust variable is correlated to 
the error term, causing an endogeneity problem. Again, an instrumental variable is needed.  
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Having presented all these issues, the equation which link trust and crime is the 
following:  
 
                                                
 
Where i stands for individual, u for upm and c for country. Victimization is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has been a victim of crime. As we have seen in 
the previous section, it could be All Crimes, Property and Violent. Trust is our main 
explanatory variable which is at the upm level, at least in the main specification. For 
robustness we also consider the provincial level too. X represents the individual 
characteristics that we presented in the previous section. T represents the upm 
characteristics.  are the country fixed effects. We believe that, by including them we are 
able to catch some time–invariant characteristics such as the quality and efficiency of 
institutions. It is worth keeping in mind that these are quite small countries which are 
generally centralized235.  is the zero mean error term.  
Since we have a binary dependent variable, we do not have much choice regarding the 
most appropriate estimation technique. We could employ the nonlinear logit and probit 
and/or the linear probability model . Supposing that pi is the probability that an individual is 
victim of a crime, conditional of all our regressors, we have that: 
 
     [       ]         
 
F () is the cumulative distribution function (cdf). If F () is the cdf of a normal 
distribution we have a probit model, whereas if it is of a logistic distribution, we have a logit 
model. The former is   (   ), with  representing the standard normal cdf, whereas the 
latter is    (   ), the logistic one. Both are estimated through maximum likelihood. On 
the other hand, the linear probability model does not consider any distribution function but 
implies that there is a linear relationship, i.e.         . 
The preferred model should be probit or logit, given the discreetness of our dependent 
variable. Both methods could be used. Therefore, we choose to use probit because of it is 
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 As it is shown in Table 4.14. 
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more often used in economic studies. As a robustness check, we will also consider the LPM. 
A disadvantage of using it could be that it leads to predicted outcomes that might be bigger 
than one or smaller than 0 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Also, it leads to heteroskedasticity, 
which could be easily controlled for. However, it has the advantage of producing consistent 
and unbiased estimates. Moreover, the coefficients represent marginal effects. In particular, 
they are easy to interpret when there are dummies as they represent the change in 
probabilities by switching from 0 to 1. Finally, as we discuss later, it presents several 
advantages once we consider an instrumental variable approach. 
Having said this, we estimate the following standard probit specification: 
 
                                                   
 
As it is difficult to interpret the probit results, we calculate the marginal effects. Given 
that there are several ways of calculating it (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) and the fact that 
we are not interested in any specific level of trust we decided to calculate the average 
marginal effects. So we have that marginal effects are given by    
[       ] 
    
    (   )   and 
the average marginal effects are         (  




Table 4.3 reports the main specification results, respectively for the probit and the OLS 
specifications. As mentioned, for the probit specification we do not report the actual 
coefficient but the average marginal effects, Marg Eff. In each table we report the results 
for all crimes, All Crimes, property crimes, Property, and violent crimes, Violent. We include 
the individual and upm controls.  
Given the particular survey designs, we activated survey weights. The reason for doing 
so is to have results that are representative of the population 236. Weights represent the 
inverse probability of an individual to be selected. Ignoring them might lead to 
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 We are dealing with a “one-stage clustered design with stratification”. So basically the population is divided 





unrepresentative results (Lee and Forthofer, 2006). Moreover, all the regressions have 
clustered standard errors at the upm level. As expected, the results for both the linear and 
































 Table 4. 3 Probit and LPM results 
 
  All Crimes              Property Violent 
  Marg Eff LPM Marg. Eff LPM Marg. Eff LPM 
  
      Trust -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.037** -0.036** -0.079*** -0.076*** 
 
[0.033] [0.034] [0.015] [0.014] [0.023] [0.023] 
       Individual Characteristics 
Age 1829 0.016 0.015 -0.010* -0.009* 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
Man 0.022** 0.023** 0.007* 0.008* 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] 
Education 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Working 0.011 0.010 -0.008* -0.009* 0.004 0.004 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
Urban -0.008 -0.007 0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.009 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009] 
Mid Income 0.020* 0.018* 0.000 0.001 0.020** 0.020** 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] 
High Income 0.026 0.027 0.006 0.010 0.012 0.012 
 
[0.016] [0.018] [0.007] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] 
Married -0.016 -0.016* 0.002 0.003 -0.010 -0.010 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] 
Mixed -0.021 -0.023 0.004 0.004 -0.027** -0.029** 
 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.013] 
Black -0.029* -0.030* -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.017 
 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.007] [0.006] [0.012] [0.013] 
Indian -0.027 -0.025 0.002 0.004 -0.024* -0.023* 
 
[0.018] [0.020] [0.007] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] 
       UPM Characteristics 
Age 1829 Rate  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Education Mean  0.010** 0.010** 0.002 0.002 0.007** 0.007** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
Income Mean  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] 
Working Rate  -0.001 0.001 -0.026 -0.019 0.046 0.045 
 
[0.036] [0.035] [0.018] [0.015] [0.029] [0.029] 
Polarization 0.036* 0.027 0.005 0.003 0.016 0.014 
 
[0.028] [0.024] [0.014] [0.009] [0.022] [0.019] 
       Observations 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 












Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Note: [1]  For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level (368) are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All 
Crimes in the first two columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and Violent crimes in the last two columns. 
Trust is the percentage of people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat 
trustworthy. All other variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [3] Marg. Eff are the marginal 
effects of the probit model and LPM are the OLS results. [4] All the regressions employ survey weights.  
 
Trust is negative and strongly significant in all the specifications. In particular, we find 
the crime reducing effect of Trust on All Crimes is the largest. An increase of Trust of 1 
percent reduces the probability of being a victim of any type of crime by 0.15%. This is a 
substantial crime reducing effect. We cannot compare it with other studies (Buonanno et 
al., 2009; Lederman et al., 2002) because we are using different offences and trust 
measures. We further find that the role of trustworthiness in reducing property crimes, i.e. 
burglary, is negative but somewhat smaller than All Crimes and also Violent. An increase of 
one percent leads to a reduction in the probability by 0.037%. For Violent, we find an almost 
double effect of Trust compared to Property.  
The comparison with the two studies which directly study the effect of trust on crime is 
not very simple in this case. This is because each study employed a different measure of 
trust. Moreover, we have a dichotomous variable as dependent whereas the other studies 
used crime rates. Nevertheless, Lederman et al (2002) found an elasticity of trust on 
homicide rates of 0.40. However, this coefficient is not significant. Akçomak and Weel 
(2012) found that their measure of trust has a negative coefficient of 0.203. That means that 
an increase of one of their trust index lead to a decrease in the overall crime rate of 0.203. 
Again, their coefficient is insignificant.  Interestingly, they report that trust is negatively 
affecting robbery, although they do not report the table with such regressions. 
Turning now to the control variables, we find interesting results. If a person is aged 
between 18 and 29 he/she is less likely to be a victim of property crimes, whereas it is the 
opposite for violent crimes. Holding all the other variables constant, being young is 
associated with a 1% lower probability of being victim of a burglary, i.e. property crimes. 
However, if an individual is young, he is 2.1% more likely to be the victim of a violent crimes. 
This result is in line with Fajnzylber et al. (2000) that identified young people as being more 
likely victims of crime. We should bear in mind that Property Crimes consists only of burglary 
and so, those who have a house that might attract the criminals’ attention might be older. 
As expected, Man is positive, although significant only for All Crimes and Property. The 
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coefficient for the former is much higher than the latter. For All Crimes, we find that men 
are 2.2 % more likely than females to be victimized. The coefficient for Violent is really small. 
This could be due to the inclusion of crimes such as rape and physical assault where the 
victim is generally female. The number of years of education is never significant and has an 
almost neutral effect. In a previous work, Fajnzylber et al. (2000) found that the individual 
effect of education is not significant. Indeed, given that we controlled for income, we are 
sure that the education variable is not indirectly capturing the fact that educated people are 
generally richer. Whether a person is working or not is significant only in the property 
crimess specification although with a very small sign. Those who work are 0.8 % less likely to 
be victimized. These results are quite ambiguous as we would have expected that those who 
are working will spend less time at home, leaving it unguarded. However, it is also likely that 
those who are working will also be able to afford protection and, so, have lower 
victimization rates. Contrary to the findings of Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996), we do not find 
any greater probability of being a victim of any type of crime for those living in urban areas. 
Turning to the income variables, we find that people belonging to the middle class are more 
likely to be victims of a crime. However, this result is mainly driven by violent crimes, where 
for property crimes we find an insignificant coefficient. In particular, Mid Income is 
associated with a 2% higher probability of being victim of any of the crimes we consider. 
High Income is never significant although positive. Therefore, we cannot really assess the 
difference between middle and high income individuals. Still we note that the coefficient for 
High Income for Property is higher than for Mid Income. This might mean that richer people 
have more valuable property to be stolen as against the view that they are better equipped 
in protecting their properties (Gaviria and Pages, 2002). 
Married individuals are less likely to be victims of crime, at least if we consider all crime 
categories. This result is quite obvious as married people usually conduct a more stable life 
which leads them to a less exposure to risks. We find that the ethnic variables are quite 
significant. In particular, black people are less likely to be victims for All Crimes. A black 
person has a 2.9% fewer probability of being a victim of any type of crime compared to a 
not black, all other variables kept constant. Mixed race individuals have fewer probabilities 
of being victim of violent crimes, as those of Indian descendents. Given that we have very 
heterogeneous countries from an ethnic point of view, we leave a more detailed analysis to 
the section with the single country results.  
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So far the individual characteristics demonstrated that the results are generally 
acceptable and in line with the theory. We now address the upm characteristics. The first 
thing we note is that we have few significant coefficients, for all the specifications. In 
particular, the rate of young people in the population is never significant and has almost 
negligible coefficients. As said before, we would have expected a positive association (Entorf 
and Spengler, 2000a). The rate of males in the population is significant only for the Violent 
specification. However, the sign is negative, although the size of the coefficient is very small. 
Contrary to what Lochner and Moretti (2003) found, we find a positive association between 
the level of education and crime, except for Property. In fact, an increase by one year of 
education at the upm level leads to an increase of the probability of being a victim of any 
type of crime by 0.1 %. Indeed, a very small effect. The mean income measure is negative 
for all the three specifications but never significant. Again, this is a quite surprising effect for 
economic motivated crime. On the other hand, this could mean that crime is more likely to 
take place in deprived areas. Working Rate is never significant. Finally, ethnic Polarization is 
positively associated with All Crimes. This could be due to the fact that in more polarized 
contexts there might be more social tensions and so higher crime rates. Again, the linear 
probability model results are almost identical to the probit ones. The measure of goodness 
of fit of our models is quite low. The likely importance of deterrence variables is one of the 
main candidates for this result. Finally, the values of the r- squared are quite low. The 
highest is 0.028 for all types of crime. The literature on the economics of crime (Bianchi et 
al., 2011) usually found very low values. The reason is that crime equation is quite difficult 
to model, as opposed to wage ones for example. Nevertheless, our values are particularly 
low which show that the problem of omitted variables is particularly important in our work. 
We do not have data on deterrence which are important determinants of crime. Moreover, 
the upm level’s reliability depends on the right sampling. Finally, it should be reminded that 
we are using opinion polls which present several disadvantages.   
 
4.5 Instrumental variables  
 
The results we exposed so far might be biased because of endogeneity issues, due to 
reverse causality, omitted variable bias and measurement error. A way to solve these issues 
187 
 
is to employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. For example, regarding the 
measurement errors issue, we have that the excluded instrument should be uncorrelated 
with the measurement error in the equation error, but only with the correctly measured 
variable. In turn, this would lead to consistent estimator. Moreover, if our instrument is 
unrelated to the omitted variables and the error term, we can estimate our variable of 
interest consistently. Our result will not depend on the omitted variables then. Finally, an IV 
approach will help us clarify the causality direction of Trust on crime. The main idea is to 
find a variable which is correlated with Trust (relevance condition), excludable from the 
main equation (excludability condition) and unrelated with the error term (ortogonality 
condition).  
However, a good instrument needs to be also theoretically motivated. For example, 
Angrist and Krueger (2001, p.73) say: “in our view, good instruments often come from 
detailed knowledge of the economic mechanism and institutions determining the regressor 
of interest”. On this regard, finding a suitable instrument for Trust proved quite 
troublesome237. 
The literature suggests many possible socio-economic factors that might be correlated 
with the level of trust, whether at the micro or macro level. For example, Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002)238 showed that individual trust is lower for young, black, female, poor, 
educated and divorced people. These results are robust to different specifications. In their 
study on bilateral trust, Guiso et al. (2009) found that people tend to trust more those that 
are similar to them. For example, those individuals who share the same religion or that are 
somatically and genetically closer. Similarly, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found that the 
degree of fractionalization strongly decreases the level of trust. This is true only for racial 
but not for religious heterogeneity. Continuing, Rothstein and Stolle (2008) found that trust 
is affected by the quality of institutions, and particularly police and juridical system. 
Societies that are more trustworthy are more equal, in terms of income and opportunities 
(Gustavsson and Jordhal, 2008).  
For curiosity we also tried to check the individual determinants of crime in our sample. 
The results are in Table 4.4. According to previous studies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), we 
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 For a good survey on the issues related to instrumental variable in criminology, look at Angrist (2005). 
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have that trust is decreasing with age. We do not find statistically significant coefficient for 
gender, education or income at the individual level. However, those who work and are 
married are likely to trust more. Probably, the sense of security given by the marriage leads 
this result. The ethnicity variables are negatively affecting trustworthiness, especially for 
black and Indian individuals. Regarding, the upm characteristics, we find that those with 
higher level of education have greater level of trustworthiness. 
 
Table 4. 4 Individual determinants of trust  
 
  Marginal Effect Standard Error 
Individual Characteristics 
Age 1829 -0.097** [0.038] 
Man 0.048 [0.034] 
Education 0.005 [0.005] 
Working 0.067* [0.036] 
Urban -0.211*** [0.054] 
Mid Income 0.032 [0.040] 
High Income -0.015 [0.061] 
Married 0.250*** [0.043] 
Mixed -0.083 [0.067] 
Black -0.134** [0.064] 
Indian -0.117* [0.066] 
   UPM Characteristics   
Age 1829 Rate  0.009** [0.004] 
Man Rate  -0.001 [0.006] 
Education Mean  0.048** [0.022] 
Income Mean  -0.023 [0.027] 
Working Rate  0.218 [0.189] 
Polarization -0.015 [0.109] 
   Observations 6,940 
 Country FE Yes 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.0223 
 Log Likelihood -3909 
  
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level (368) are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent is the level of 
trust at the individual level. It is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the respondent thinks that people in 
his community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other variables’ description can be found in the 
appendix. [3] Marg. Eff are the marginal effects of the probit model and LPM are the OLS results. [4] All the 




A suitable instrument requires, along with the ortogonality condition, to be excludable 
from the structural equation, meaning that it cannot affect crime in anyway except via 
Trust. However, many variables which affect trust are also, in a way or another, linked with 
crime. Except for the standard socio-economic variables, such as GDP or education, we have 
that others like religion (Heaton, 2006) and ethnic heterogeneity are also invalid. 
Therefore, we opted for a measure of trust in the elections as our single instrument for 
Trust. In the survey, people were asked the following question: “I am going to ask you a 
series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder 
to answer. Remember, you can use any number”. The respondent could choose a number 
between 1, not at all, and 7, a lot. They were asked this question regarding several issues, 
such as their trust on the government, judicial system and national police. One of them was 
“to what extent do you trust election”. Therefore, we interpret it as the trust on the 
instrument of elections. This variable should be appropriated because of a series of reasons. 
First of all it holds the relevance condition. As Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) pointed out, 
general trust is generally correlated with trust in organization, institutions, companies and 
organised labour. In fact, their GSS measure of trust is positively correlated with 10 out of 
the 13 other trust measures. Unfortunately, there is not a specific question on trust in 
election that we can refer to. In our sample, we find that, Trust and trust in elections (Trust 
Elections henceforth) are positively and significantly correlated, although not very strongly. 
This could be seen in the first stage of each instrumental variable regression. Continuing, 
our instrument also passes the excludability condition. Here the question is: should Trust 
Elections be excluded from the main equation? We do not see any reason why the level of 
trust in elections should have any influence on crime. In fact, trust in the elections does not 
represent social capital which might eventually influence crime. Moreover, it is not higher 
for the richer, more educated and so on. When we regress Trust elections on Trust239, crime 
and the other control variables, we found that, apart from Trust and black, all the other 
variables were insignificant. This means that it is independent in respect to socio-economic 
outcomes, both at the individual and upm level. Moreover, the instrument should be 
exogenous with respect of the dependent variables. In fact, there should not be any 
relationship between crime and our instrument at all. This means that crime should not 
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 We did not report these results. 
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influence trust in election at all. Here, it seems a bit trickier but even in this case we do not 
find any link. One could argue that crime and violence during the election period might 
influence the individual trust. However, even though it happened that in some of these 
countries there has been violence or riots in that period240, it never affected the correct 
execution of the electoral process. Moreover, it is likely that corrupted or simply poor 
candidates have been elected. Eventually, this would have influenced the citizens’ 
willingness to vote, not their trust in the elections. For example, in many developed 
countries electoral turnouts have been declining over the last decades. However, those 
people might not go to vote because they do not trust the elected, not the elections241. As a 
consequence, it seems that the measure of trust in the elections is unbiased in relation to 
victimization experience.  
Nevertheless, it must be stressed the low level of standard deviation of our instrument, 
as could be seen in the descriptive statistics.  This might cause some problems in the 
regression analysis.  
Having one instrument, we have a just identified model242. Since, our excluded 
instrument is a continuous variable we have the following first stage regression:  
 
                                                     
 
     is the error term that is normally distributed. Moreover, given the likely 
endogeneity of Trust in the structural equation, we have that      and      are correlated. 
After having estimated the above equation we obtain ̂   . In the second, the dichotomous 
variable Victimization243 is regressed on ̂   , along with Trust and the other covariates. At 
this point, the choice is really between the maximum likelihood estimation or the 
Amemiya’s Generalized Least squares (AGLS), which is often referred as the two step 
estimator, based on, Adkins (1987). Since our instrument is not that strong, there is not 
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 For example, Suriname. However in USDS (2012, p. 1) it is written : “President Bharrat Jagdeo was re-
elected to a second full term in 2006 elections that international observers considered generally free and fair.” 
241
 Moreover, in the Caribbean countries the electoral turnout is quite high compared to developed countries.  
242
 Using a single instrument reduce the bias (Angrist , 2001). Regarding the case of the endogenous probit 
model, Adkins (2008, p. 20) says: “over identification should be avoided if possible. It doesn’t appear to help 
the performance of the IV estimators either in terms of bias or testing”.  
243
 Obviously it includes All Crimes, Property and Violent. 
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much difference between the two (Adkins, 2008)244. We chose to use the maximum 
likelihood estimator. Again, we calculate the partial effects that are computed in a slightly 
different way (Wooldridge, 2002, p.476). We also estimate this model with the linear 
instrumental variables methodology245.  
 
4.5.1 Instrumental variable results 
 
Since we have one excluded variable which function as the identifying instrument we 
have a just-identified model. Table 4.5 below reports the results for all the three crime 
specifications for both the probit (IV-Probit) and linear (2SLS) instrumental variable 
approach. As we can see Trust is significant and negative for All Crimes and Property, but not 
for the violent ones. This result is quite different from the one with the endogenous 
regressor we found earlier. In fact Trust in that model was significant also for Violent. 
Moreover, the IV coefficients are larger. An increase of 1% of Trust leads to a decrease of 
the probability of being a victim of all types of crime of 0.35 % with IV-Probit. This 
coefficient is more than double compared to the one in Table 4.2. Therefore, in the 
endogenous specification we were wrongly assuming a smaller crime-reducing effect of 
social capital. The result for 2SLS is somewhat smaller, 0.32%.  
For Property we have that the increase of 1 of our measure of trust is associated with a 
decline of around 0.29%. In the model with the endogenous regressor we had a coefficient 
of 0.037, almost eight times smaller. The 2SLS coefficient is, again, smaller than the IV-Probit 
ones. Interestingly, the result for Violent is negative, insignificant and smaller than the one 
in Table 4.3. Therefore, we were wrongly assuming a crime reducing effect of social capital 
on violent crimes, whereas that is not the case. As expected, the instrumental approach 
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 Adkins (2008) performed a monte carlo simulation to test the property of different estimator with an 
endogenous probit model. He concluded that when choosing, many aspects should be taken into 
consideration such as the strength of the instrument, sample size, the correlation between the endogenous 
regressor and the equations’ error term. 
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 We could have used LILM as well. However, it is asymptotically equivalent to 2SLS.   
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All Crimes Property Violent 
  IV-Probit IV-2SLS IV-Probit IV-2SLS IV-Probit IV-2SLS 
       Trust -0.354** -0.320** -0.286** -0.175*** -0.056 -0.053 
 
[0.141] [0.127] [0.133] [0.052] [0.108] [0.103] 
      Individual Characteristics 
    Age 1829 0.017 0.016 -0.013* -0.009* 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
Man 0.023** 0.023** 0.010* 0.008* 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
Education 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Working 0.010 0.010 -0.011* -0.009* 0.005 0.004 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] 
Urban -0.022 -0.019 -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 
 
[0.014] [0.013] [0.011] [0.006] [0.011] [0.010] 
Mid Income 0.021** 0.019* 0.001 0.002 0.020** 0.020** 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] 
High Income 0.025 0.026 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.012 
 
[0.016] [0.019] [0.010] [0.010] [0.013] [0.014] 
Married -0.013 -0.013 0.007 0.006 -0.011 -0.010 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
Mixed Race -0.020 -0.023 0.007 0.005 -0.027** -0.029** 
 
[0.014] [0.015] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011] [0.012] 
Black -0.032** -0.033** -0.013 -0.005 -0.016 -0.017 
 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.011] [0.007] [0.012] [0.012] 
Indian -0.031** -0.027 -0.001 0.002 -0.024* -0.023* 
 
[0.016] [0.017] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.012] 
      UPM Characteristics 
     Age 1829 Rate  0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.002* 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Education Mean  0.012*** 0.011*** 0.005 0.003 0.007** 0.007** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
Income Mean  0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
 
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] 
Working Rate  0.003 0.005 -0.030 -0.016 0.045 0.045 
 
[0.036] [0.035] [0.023] [0.015] [0.028] [0.028] 
Polarization 0.030* 0.022 -0.001 -0.001 0.017 0.015 
 
[0.025] [0.021] [0.017] [0.008] [0.020] [0.017] 








Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First Stage 

















Test of Exogeneity 
(p- value) 0.0849 0.1218 0.0107 0.0114 0.7691 0.7942 
Partial R square 0.0357   0.0357   0.0357 
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Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level (368) are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and  Violent Crimes in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] The top part 
of the table report the second stage results instrumenting Trust with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated 
with a probit instrumental variable (IV- Probit) and two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) techniques. The bottom part 
reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections. We also report the F-test of the excluded instruments, the p- 







The work by Lederman et al (2002) found a statistically significant coefficient of 1.21. 
This means that an increase of 1% in the number of respondents who said that “most 
people can be trusted” leads to a decrease in homicide rates. We do not consider homicide 
rates which make the comparison difficult. However, in our case we found that trust reduce 
more property rather than violent crimes. In particular, a one percent increase in our 
measure of trust reduces the probability of being victim of a crime by 0.354%. Although not 
directly comparable, this value looks lower than the one found by Lederman et al. (2002). 
Unfortunately, Akçomak and Weel(2002) do not report the results for the 2SLS for trust. 
Our instrument Trust Elections is strongly correlated with Trust. The first stage statistics 
at the bottom of 4.5 show that our instrument is significant at 1% level. The coefficient is 
nor too high neither too small as to flag a weak instrument issue. Our instrumental variable 
estimators are quite different from the endogenous ones. As Angrist and Krueger (2001) 
said, instrumental variables estimates with very weak instruments tend to be cantered on 
the corresponding ordinary least squares estimate. Moreover, we have that the F test of 
joint significance in the first stage is well above than 10, which is considered as flagging a 
weak instrument problem (Stock and Yogo, 2002). Moreover, the adjusted r square is much 
higher than the one in the model when we did not consider the endogeneity of Trust. This 
means that we are not losing precision by using Trust Elections as instrument. Since we have 
a just identified model, we could not test for instrument validity, using an over identifying 
restriction test. However, we believe that the arguments used in the previous section were 
quite convincing. Finally, we also report the results for the endogeneity test of Trust. This is 
basically a Hausman test which compares the probit (OLS) and instrumental variables 
endogenous regressor. The null is that Trust is exogenous. We reject this null for All Crimes 
194 
 
for IV probit but we could not reject for two stage least square, even though slightly. Also, 
we rejected it for both estimation techniques for Property.   
Turning to the control variables, we have almost identical results as the specification 
with the endogenous regressor. For the individual characteristics there are really little 
differences both in terms of the size of the coefficients and significance. However, in the 
instrumental variable approach we note that the Married coefficient is not significant for All 
Crimes in the LPM specification as before. Moreover, the size is a bit smaller compared to 
this last one. Interestingly, Indian turns out to be significant, at least in the nonlinear 
specification, and with a more pronounced negative effect. This happens only for All Crimes 
but not for Violent which has identical results between the two. Also, the upm level 
characteristics show similar patterns as before. Nevertheless we note that the income 
variable, still insignificant has changed sign for All Crimes and Property. The education 
variable for All Crimes is even more statistically significant than before and it exhibits slightly 
higher coefficients. Interestingly, Polarization for property has now a negative sign, although 
very close to 0.  
 
4.6 Robustness checks 
 
We consider two robustness checks to validate the results we have found in the 
previous sections. In the first we use a different classification of the crime categories, 
whereas in the latter we consider a different geographical level of aggregation.  
 
4.6.1 Different crime categories  
 
Our classification of crime data into violent and property crimes is based on the FBI 
scheme. Here we create two new crime categories that we call Property1 and Violent1. In 
the former we have, as before, burglary, but also unarmed robbery without assault. The 
reason for doing so is that this additional crime does not involve any violence, but only 
material gains. In the latter one we have assault without robbery, sexual assault, armed 
robberies and unarmed robberies with assault. Therefore, we excluded extortion and 
kidnapping from the previous specification. We decided to do so because extortion and 
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kidnapping often do not appear as property crimes. Summary statistics can be found in the 
appendix. 
Table 4. 6 Crime categories 
 
Property1  Violent1 Property1 Violent1 
 Marg. Eff LPM Marg. Eff LPM IV-Probit IV-2SLS IV-Probit IV-2SLS 
     
  
   




0.272*** 0.069 0.064 
 
[0.022] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.130] [0.088] [0.092] [0.082] 
     
  






Age 1829 -0.005 -0.005 0.017*** 0.018*** -0.004 -0.004 0.017*** 0.017** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] 
Man 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Education 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Working -0.005 -0.005 0.006 0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.005 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] 
Urban -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.024** -0.018** 0.010 0.009 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] 
Mid Income 0.009 0.009 0.011** 0.012** 0.011 0.009 0.011* 0.012* 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] 
High Income 0.004 0.002 0.019* 0.020* 0.002 0.001 0.021* 0.021* 
 
[0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] 
Married 0.003 0.003 -0.013** -0.012** 0.008 0.007 -0.015** -0.014** 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
Mixed -0.007 -0.008 -0.016* -0.017 -0.007 -0.008 -0.017* -0.017* 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] 
Black 0.001 0.001 -0.022** -0.023** -0.003 -0.003 -0.021** -0.021** 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] 




[0.014] [0.017] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.010] [0.010] 
     
  




Age 1829 Rate  0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Man Rate  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Education Mean  0.002 0.003 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.005 0.005** 0.005* 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
Income Mean  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Working Rate  0.010 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.017 0.019 0.004 0.004 
 
[0.024] [0.023] [0.021] [0.021] [0.028] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] 
Polarization 0.022 0.017 -0.005 -0.004 0.017 0.011 -0.002 -0.001 
 
[0.021] [0.017] [0.015] [0.013] [0.021] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013] 
     
  
   Observations 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 









0.009   0.001 
 
0.004 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -1588   -1322           
     
First Stage 
Trust Elections 











     
  
   F-stat (excluded instruments) 
   
  244.761 
 
244.761 
Test of Exogeneity 
(p- value) 
    
0.0021 0.0047 0.2322 0.2376 
Partial R square           0.1938   0.1938 
 
Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level (368) are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4 and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] In the left 
side of the table, Marg. Eff are the marginal effects of the probit model and LPM are the OLS results. [5] In 
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the top- right side part of the table we report the second stage results instrumenting Trust with Trust Elections. The 
models have been estimated with a probit instrumental variable (IV- Probit) and two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) 
techniques. The bottom- right part reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections.  We also report the F-test of 
the excluded instruments, the p- value of the endogeneity tests and the adjusted R- square. 
 
Table 4.6 reports the results: in the left side we included the results with the 
endogenous regressor and in the right side we have the instrumental variable ones. As we 
can see, the results are in line with the previous ones, although with some noticeable 
differences. In the model with the endogenous regressor, Trust is negative and significant 
both for Property1 and Violent1. However, in this model we have that the coefficient for 
violent crimes is smaller than for property crimes, indicating a lower crime-reducing effect. 
An increase by one unit of Trust reduces the probability of being victim of a violent crime by 
0.42%. Looking at the instrumental variable results, the coefficient is more negative for 
Property1 than it was for Property. In this case we have a result similar to the one we found 
before for All Crimes. The coefficient is now -0.352. The 2SLS ones are also smaller than 
before. On the other hand, the result for Violent1 is now positive and insignificant. We can 
interpret such change with the fact that unarmed robbery might really be higher in context 
of low social capital.  
Turning to the control variables, we focus on the results using the instrumental variable 
approach246. Here we notice that many variables that were important predictors of 
victimization experience are now not significant. Amongst them Age1829, Man or Working 
for property crimes. On the other side, Urban is now significant and negative for property 
crimes. One explanation might be that it is easier to be a victim of a burglary in rural areas, 
where supposedly patrolling could be difficult. Interestingly, Mid and High Income are 
positive and significant for Violent1. The coefficient for the latter is bigger than for the 
former case. Ethnic variables are similar to the previous specification. Regarding the upm 
level characteristics, we have that education is now positively predicting also property 
crimes. 
 
4.6.2 Different geographical aggregation: provinces 
 
                                                 
246
 The reason is that there are not many differences between the endogenous case and the IV one.  
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As a further robustness check, we also consider Trust and the “local” characteristics at 
the provincial level, rather than upm. We decided to consider this geographical aggregation 
because it represents a bigger area compared to the upm one. The average province is 
composed by an average of 120 individuals in our sample. On the other hand, upm is 






























Table 4. 7 Provinces 
  All Crimes Property Violent 
  Marg. Eff LPM Marg. Eff LPM Marg. Eff LPM 
              
Trust -0.132* -0.149* -0.029 -0.042 -0.091* -0.099* 
 
[0.075] [0.081] [0.034] [0.039] [0.053] [0.059] 
       Individual Characteristics 
Age 1829 0.010 0.008 -0.013** -0.011** 0.019*** 0.020** 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] 
Man 0.022** 0.022** 0.008* 0.009* -0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.009] [0.010] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
Education 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002* 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Working 0.010 0.009 -0.011** -0.011** 0.008 0.008 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
Urban 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.003 
 
[0.012] [0.011] [0.006] [0.004] [0.009] [0.009] 
Mid Income 0.017 0.016 -0.001 0.000 0.019** 0.019** 
 
[0.011] [0.010] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] 
High Income 0.029* 0.031* 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.011 
 
[0.016] [0.018] [0.007] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] 
Married -0.018* -0.018* -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] 
Mixed -0.017 -0.019 0.003 0.003 -0.023* -0.025* 
 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.013] 
Black -0.029* -0.030* -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.018 
 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.007] [0.006] [0.012] [0.013] 
Indian -0.027 -0.027 0.003 0.005 -0.028** -0.029** 
 
[0.017] [0.019] [0.006] [0.009] [0.013] [0.012] 
       Provincial Characteristics 
Age 1829 Rate  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Education Mean  -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Income Mean  -0.012 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.005] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
Working Rate  0.027 0.028 0.058 0.042 -0.041 -0.031 
 
[0.086] [0.089] [0.041] [0.050] [0.072] [0.074] 
Polarization 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       Observations 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 6,940 












Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level (368) are reported in 
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All 
Crimes in the first two columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4 and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. 
Trust is the percentage of people in the province who think that people in their community are very or 
somewhat trustworthy. All other variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [3] Marg. Eff are the 
















































Table 4. 8 Provincial: instrumental variables 
 
All Crimes Property Violent 
 
IV-Probit IV-2SLS IV-Probit IV-2SLS IV-Probit IV-2SLS 
       
Trust -0.696** -0.646* -0.394 -0.164 -0.272 -0.301 
 
[0.338] [0.331] [0.272] [0.141] [0.261] [0.273] 
Individual Characteristics 
Age 1829 0.010 0.009 -0.014** -0.011** 0.020*** 0.020** 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] 
Man 0.022** 0.022** 0.010* 0.009** -0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
Education 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.002* 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Working 0.009 0.008 -0.014** -0.011** 0.008 0.007 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
Urban 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.012] [0.011] [0.007] [0.004] [0.009] [0.009] 
Mid Income 0.018* 0.017* -0.001 0.000 0.019** 0.019** 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] 
High Income 0.028* 0.029 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.011 
 
[0.016] [0.018] [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] 
Married -0.014 -0.014 0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.006 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
Mixed -0.012 -0.015 0.007 0.004 -0.022* -0.024* 
 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.012] 
Black -0.030** -0.031** -0.009 -0.004 -0.017 -0.018 
 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.009] [0.006] [0.012] [0.012] 
Indian -0.030* -0.029* 0.002 0.004 -0.029** -0.030** 
 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.008] [0.009] [0.013] [0.012] 
UPM Characteristics 
Age 1829 Rate  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.003* -0.004** 
 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Education Mean  -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.008 
 
[0.009] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] 
Income Mean  0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 
[0.015] [0.017] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] 
Working Rate  0.061 0.055 0.098* 0.049 -0.031 -0.020 
 
[0.080] [0.082] [0.054] [0.041] [0.063] [0.064] 
Polarization -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       








Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First Stage 





















Test of Exogeneity 
(p- value) 0.0852 0.0762 0.0746 0.0775 0.4705 0.501 










Note: [1]  For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level( 368) are reported in parentheses, 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first 
two columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4 and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the province who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] The top part 
of the table report the second stage results instrumenting Trust with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated 
with a probit instrumental variable (IV- Probit) and two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) techniques. The bottom part 
reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections.  We also report the F-test of the excluded instruments, the p- 
value of the endogeneity tests and the adjusted R- square. 
 
Looking at Table 4.7, we see that Trust is negative in all the specifications. However, in 
the model with upm we do not find it to be significant for Property. The result for All Crimes 
is similar to the previous one. In fact, an increase by 1 unit of the Trust measure at the 
provincial level reduce the probability of being victim of any type of crime 0.13% , compared 
to the 0.15% of before. Also, the coefficient for Violent is a bit smaller than before. 
Regarding the instrumental variable results we find that only the coefficient for All Crimes is 
significant. In particular, the estimated crime – reducing effect is greater than in the 
specification with the endogenous regressor. In fact, now it is -0.696 for the IV-Probit 
specification. Turning to the control variables in Table 4.8, we find some interesting results. 
The age and gender variables’ coefficients are quite similar to the model with upm level 
characteristics. Moreover, Education is significant for All Crimes and Violent. Compared to 
before, High Income in the specification with all the crimes is positive and significant. Its 
magnitude is greater than the one for Mid Income. This might reflect that richer people 
attract more criminals’ attention compared to middle class members.  
Regarding the province level characteristics, it is worth noting that Working Rate is now 
positive for Property for the IV-Probit specification. The first stage results are obviously 
identical to before. However, we can now reject the null of exogeneity of Trust also for IV-
Probit whereas we could not do that before.  Education Mean is negative and not 
significantly different from zero for All Crimes and Violent, whereas before it was positive 
and significant. 
 
4.7 Single country results  
 
So far we have presented the results for the regression with all the countries’ data 
stacked together. Indeed, this has the advantage of increasing the number of observations 
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which lead to a better estimation of the link trust-crime. However, it is also interesting to 
analyse how Trust and the control variables affect the probability of victimization at the 
country level. Indeed, heterogeneity in socio-economic conditions in single countries might 
lead to different responses of the economics of crime model.  
Let us first give a brief overlook on these countries, focusing on the most important 
similarities and differences and then proceeds in analyzing the main findings for each one of 
them. 
 
4.7.1 Key facts on our five countries 
 
As the other Latin American and Caribbean countries, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, 
Suriname, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago share a similar colonial history. In particular, 
Jamaica, Guyana and Suriname were British colonies, whereas Suriname was Dutch and the 
Dominican Republic Spanish247. Indeed, each power left its mark on the language, culture, 
and politics (Barker et al., 2010). These countries were firstly colonized to exploit the 
richness of their territories, through the plantations of various profitable agricultural goods 
such of sugar, cocoa and coffee. Moreover, they were sought after for the preciousness of 
minerals such as gold and bauxite. Given the scarcity of local labour force248, slaves from the 
western part of Africa were brought in and forced to work on the fields (Barker et al., 2010). 
For many centuries they contributed to the cultivation of huge areas. However, when 
slavery was abolished249 each country substituted the freed slaves with other migrants from 
different corners of the world. For example, many Indians moved to Trinidad and Tobago, 
Suriname, and Guyana. Not only, there has been migration from far countries as China and 
Syria. This led to the creation of multi ethnic societies as we see nowadays250. Nevertheless, 
the colonial heritage251 and the slavery period in particular, left remarkable scars on the 
                                                 
247
 However, each country has been ruled by different countries at different period of their history. For 
example, Suriname has been an English Colony for many years. Guyana was a Dutch colony before being ruled 
by the English. Dominican Republic obtained its independence by the Haitians, which was French at that time. 
Trinidad and Tobago has been Spanish until the XIX when it went under British control. Jamaica was Spanish 
until 1655. 
248
 These countries were occupied by indigenous populations, the Amerindian. 
249
 Each country abolished it in different periods. 
250
 With the exception of Jamaica where around 90% is afro-descendent. 
251
 Except the Dominican Republic, they became independent no earlier than fifty years ago. However, other 
dominations took place at different times 
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social class structures. In fact, they reinforced the class colour system and fostered 
inequality. On this regard Barker et al. (2010, p.193) said: “the colonial plantation system, 
therefore, created grossly unequal and inegalitarian social hierarchies that were primarily 
premised on race and skin colour”. That inequality is still one of the major issues in these 
countries as can be seen in Table 4.14 where we report, if available, data on the Gini index. 
Indeed, the high degree of disparity is one of the major responsible for the abnormal levels 
of crime (Di Tella, 2010). 
 
Table 4. 9 Key facts on the five Caribbean countries 
  Dominican  
Republic 
Guyana Jamaica Suriname Trinidad and  
Tobago 
      
Population(thousands) 9957 745 287 492 1228 
GDP per Capita 5195 2945 5179 6255 15206 
Unemployment Rate  14.2 11 11.4 9.5 5.3 
Employment in agriculture   14.5  20.2 8 3.8 
Capital  City Santo  
Domingo 
Georgetown Kingston Paramaribo Port of 
Spain 
Capital Population(thousands) 2138 132 580 259 57 
Ranking HDI  98 117 79 104 62 











 (from  
UK) 
 
Note: [1] The table report the data for the latest available year [2] Population, Unemployment rate (Guyana), Capital 
Population, Gini Index and Independence are taken from CIA (2012). [3] GDP per Capita, Employment in 
agriculture, Unemployment Rate (all countries except Guyana) is taken from WB (2012). Ranking HDI is taken from 
UNDP (2012). 
 
Still, these countries tried to progress from an economic point of view. Except for the 
Dominican Republic they all belong to Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME)252. This economic area, along with the USA, absorbs 
most of countries’ production. Moreover, they are very active in sectors as diverse as 
mining, tourism, light manufacturing and agriculture253. Indeed, there are remarkable cross 
                                                 
252
 Despite the fact that Guyana and Suriname belong geographically to South America, they have always been 
culturally similar to the Caribbean countries. In particular, there have many similarities with the English 
speaking Caribbean countries.   
253
 The share of the contribution of agriculture to the GDP is extremely high even compared to other 
developing countries. The data on employment in this sector could be found in Table 4.14.   
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country differences in many socio-economic aspects, as we can note in Table 4.14. Also, 
they are at very different stage of economic progress. Trinidad and Tobago is middle –high 
income country. It relies on its rich reserves of oil and gas which account for a big 
percentage of the GDP. On the other hand Guyana is one of the poorest in the area, 
although rich in minerals such as gold and bauxite. The Human Development Index (HDI) 
shows further evidence of the differences in terms of life expectancy and literacy rates. Such 
remarkable socio-economic heterogeneity does play a role in crime patterns.   
In order to investigate it, in the following section we report the results for the model we 
presented earlier for each single country. The only difference regards the ethnicity variables 
for the Dominican Republic. We decided to report the linear probability, although the probit 
specification gives analogous results. In some countries we predict victimization rate better 
than others. This is not surprising as the model of crime does not fit in the same way in 






















Table 4.10 Dominican Republic 
 
 
All Crimes Property Violent 
 
LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS 
              
Trust -0.096 -0.685 -0.025 -0.523* -0.058 -0.284 
 
[0.101] [0.847] [0.039] [0.316] [0.091] [0.697] 
Individual Characteristics 
    Age 1829 0.047* 0.048* -0.009 -0.009 0.048** 0.048** 
 
[0.028] [0.026] [0.010] [0.012] [0.020] [0.022] 
Man -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 
 
[0.023] [0.024] [0.009] [0.010] [0.021] [0.020] 
Education 0.006** 0.006** -0.000 -0.000 0.005** 0.005** 
 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Working 0.007 0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.000 0.000 
 
[0.027] [0.024] [0.009] [0.011] [0.021] [0.020] 
Urban 0.061*** 0.029 0.005 -0.022 0.036* 0.024 
 
[0.022] [0.051] [0.009] [0.018] [0.021] [0.043] 
Mid Income 0.029 0.027 0.000 -0.001 0.033 0.033 
 
[0.026] [0.024] [0.010] [0.011] [0.020] [0.021] 
High Income -0.033 -0.043 0.009 -0.000 -0.026 -0.030 
 
[0.051] [0.046] [0.025] [0.022] [0.035] [0.038] 
Married 0.021 0.030 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.015 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.015] [0.013] [0.021] [0.024] 
Mixed -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 -0.000 -0.025 -0.024 
 
[0.033] [0.033] [0.012] [0.014] [0.028] [0.028] 
Black 0.022 0.004 -0.004 -0.019 0.023 0.016 
 
[0.047] [0.054] [0.014] [0.021] [0.041] [0.048] 
White -0.050 -0.050 0.020 0.021 -0.068* -0.068* 
 
[0.041] [0.043] [0.018] [0.022] [0.036] [0.035] 
UPM Characteristics 
     Age 1829 Rate  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002* -0.005** -0.004** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Education Mean  0.005 0.010 0.007** 0.010** 0.001 0.003 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] 
Income Mean  -0.006 0.006 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 -0.000 
 
[0.013] [0.022] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.018] 
Working Rate  0.134 0.075 -0.074* -0.124** 0.128 0.105 
 
[0.117] [0.143] [0.038] [0.057] [0.103] [0.117] 
Polarization -0.034 -0.128 -0.066** -0.146** 0.035 -0.002 
 
[0.064] [0.151] [0.033] [0.065] [0.056] [0.115] 
       Observations 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 
R-squared 0.026 0.024 0.012 0.008 0.035 0.028 
First Stage 












Test of Exogeneity 









Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level (368) are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the Appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] Column 1, 3 
and 5 report the LPM results. [5]Column 2, 4 and 6 report the instrumental variables results, instrumenting Trust 
with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated with a two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) technique. The 
bottom part reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections. We also report the F-test of the excluded 
















































 Table 4.11 Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
All Crimes Property Violent 
 
LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS 
              
Trust -0.180** -0.300 0.011 -0.034 -0.148*** -0.259 
 
[0.077] [0.492] [0.026] [0.190] [0.050] [0.391] 
Individual Characteristics 
    Age 1829 0.015 0.015 -0.013 -0.013 0.033* 0.033* 
 
[0.023] [0.022] [0.009] [0.008] [0.019] [0.018] 
Man 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.014* 0.014* 0.016 0.017 
 
[0.020] [0.020] [0.008] [0.008] [0.017] [0.016] 
Education 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Working 0.030 0.030 -0.011 -0.011 0.014 0.014 
 
[0.024] [0.022] [0.009] [0.010] [0.019] [0.017] 
Urban -0.054** -0.062 0.002 -0.001 -0.026 -0.034 
 
[0.024] [0.039] [0.008] [0.015] [0.018] [0.032] 
Mid Income -0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.023] [0.021] [0.008] [0.009] [0.018] [0.017] 
High Income 0.097** 0.099** 0.000 0.001 0.059 0.061 
 
[0.043] [0.048] [0.014] [0.013] [0.040] [0.040] 
Married -0.008 -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
[0.020] [0.021] [0.010] [0.009] [0.016] [0.016] 
Mixed Race -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Black -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Indian  0.023 0.025 0.012 0.012 -0.051 -0.049 
 
[0.071] [0.078] [0.010] [0.010] [0.070] [0.078] 
UPM Characteristics 
     Age 1829 Rate  0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  0.003 0.003 0.002** 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] 
Education Mean  0.011 0.013 -0.002 -0.001 0.012** 0.014** 
 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] 
Income Mean  -0.007 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 
 
[0.014] [0.027] [0.006] [0.010] [0.011] [0.022] 
Working Rate  0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 0.051 0.043 
 
[0.059] [0.071] [0.020] [0.022] [0.046] [0.058] 
Polarization 0.057 0.057 0.021 0.021 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.035] [0.042] [0.013] [0.014] [0.031] [0.037] 
       Observations 1,390 1,390 1,390 1,390 1,390 1,390 
R-squared 0.035 0.032 0.015 0.012 0.029 0.025 
First Stage 
















Test of Exogeneity 









Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the Appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] Column 1, 3 
and 5 report the LPM results. [5] Column 2, 4 and 6 report the instrumental variables results, instrumenting Trust 
with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated with a two stage least squares (IV-2SLS) technique. The bottom 
part reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections.  We also report the F-test of the excluded instruments, the 





















































Table 4.12 Suriname 
 
 
All Crimes Property Violent 
 
LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS 
              
Trust -0.184* -0.289 -0.025 0.642 -0.059 -1.378*** 
 
[0.109] [0.676] [0.071] [0.418] [0.075] [0.520] 
Individual Characteristics 
    Age 1829 -0.037 -0.037 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 
 
[0.031] [0.030] [0.021] [0.018] [0.017] [0.022] 
Man 0.052 0.052** 0.032* 0.031* 0.004 0.005 
 
[0.033] [0.025] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] 
Education -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Working -0.004 -0.004 -0.034** -0.033* 0.002 0.000 
 
[0.031] [0.028] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] 
Urban 0.008 0.004 0.022 0.046 -0.019 -0.068** 
 
[0.033] [0.048] [0.028] [0.030] [0.029] [0.034] 
Mid Income -0.050 -0.053 0.006 0.026 -0.018 -0.056* 
 
[0.037] [0.044] [0.021] [0.027] [0.027] [0.034] 
High Income -0.010 -0.013 0.030 0.045* -0.012 -0.044 
 
[0.027] [0.040] [0.021] [0.025] [0.023] [0.029] 
Married -0.052* -0.051* 0.025 0.019 -0.045** -0.032 
 
[0.028] [0.028] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.020] 
 Black  -0.025 -0.030 -0.010 0.020 0.011 -0.048 
 
[0.027] [0.046] [0.020] [0.031] [0.022] [0.031] 
Mixed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Indian 0.036 0.032 -0.007 0.017 0.049** 0.002 
 
[0.033] [0.042] [0.021] [0.028] [0.021] [0.031] 
UPM Characteristics 
     Age 1829 Rate  0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 
 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Man Rate  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008** 0.001 0.009* 
 
[0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005] 
Education Mean  0.002 0.003 -0.007 -0.013* -0.005 0.007 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] 
Income Mean  -0.006 -0.009 -0.017 -0.000 0.010 -0.024 
 
[0.014] [0.022] [0.013] [0.015] [0.010] [0.016] 
Working Rate  -0.009 0.003 0.002 -0.073 0.094 0.242** 
 
[0.135] [0.168] [0.099] [0.112] [0.110] [0.119] 
Polarization -0.028 -0.019 0.102 0.048 -0.085 0.021 
 
[0.115] [0.171] [0.132] [0.119] [0.086] [0.110] 
       Observations 1,308 1,308 1,308 1,308 1,308 1,308 
R-squared 0.018 0.017 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.017 
First Stage 
















Test of Exogeneity 









Note: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the Appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] Column 1, 3 
and 5 report the LPM results. [5]Column 2, 4 and 6 report the instrumental variables results, instrumenting Trust 
with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated with a two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) technique. The 
bottom part reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections.  We also report the F-test of the excluded 





















































Table 4.13 Jamaica 
 
 
All Crimes Property Violent 
 
LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS 
             
Trust -0.054 -0.643 -0.015 -0.075 0.013 -0.093 
 
[0.062] [0.508] [0.014] [0.152] [0.042] [0.408] 
       Individual Characteristics 
    Age 1829 0.050** 0.054** -0.001 -0.001 0.025 0.025 
 
[0.022] [0.024] [0.007] [0.008] [0.019] [0.019] 
Man 0.006 0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.006 
 
[0.019] [0.018] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] 
Education -0.004 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Working 0.046** 0.045** 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.022 
 
[0.019] [0.020] [0.010] [0.008] [0.016] [0.016] 
Urban -0.022 -0.108 0.007 -0.001 -0.011 -0.026 
 
[0.024] [0.076] [0.007] [0.023] [0.018] [0.060] 
Mid Income 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 
[0.020] [0.019] [0.006] [0.006] [0.017] [0.015] 
High Income 0.017 0.029 0.017 0.018 -0.004 -0.002 
 
[0.033] [0.036] [0.015] [0.014] [0.029] [0.028] 
Married -0.027 -0.019 -0.013** -0.013** -0.017 -0.015 
 
[0.019] [0.021] [0.005] [0.005] [0.015] [0.017] 
Mixed -0.092 -0.026 0.005 0.012 -0.072 -0.060 
 
[0.056] [0.073] [0.007] [0.017] [0.052] [0.061] 
Black -0.016 -0.004 0.005 0.007 -0.029 -0.027 
 
[0.051] [0.049] [0.005] [0.005] [0.051] [0.045] 
Indian -0.008 0.014 0.014 0.016 -0.048 -0.044 
 
[0.059] [0.057] [0.011] [0.013] [0.053] [0.049] 
       UPM Characteristics 
     Age 1829 Rate  0.004 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Man Rate  -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
Education Mean  0.007 0.019 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.000 
 
[0.012] [0.015] [0.004] [0.005] [0.010] [0.012] 
Income Mean  -0.009 0.033 -0.001 0.003 -0.012 -0.004 
 
[0.013] [0.038] [0.003] [0.011] [0.010] [0.031] 
Working Rate  -0.076 0.034 -0.036 -0.025 -0.037 -0.017 
 
[0.073] [0.118] [0.029] [0.034] [0.055] [0.098] 
Polarization 0.029 0.057 -0.026 -0.024* 0.029 0.034 
 
[0.043] [0.046] [0.019] [0.014] [0.036] [0.037] 
       Observations 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,423 
R-squared 0.017 0.006 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.007 
First Stage 
















Test of Exogeneity 





Partial R square 0.2656   0.2656   0.2656 
 
Note: [1]  For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns. Trust is the percentage of 
people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the Appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] Column 1, 3 
and 5 report the LPM results. [5]Column 2,4 and 6 report the instrumental variables results, instrumenting Trust 
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with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated with a two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) technique. The 
bottom part reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections.  We also report the F-test of the excluded 
instruments, the p- value of the endogeneity tests and the adjusted R- square. 
 
Table 4.14 Guyana 
 
 
All Crimes Property Violent 
 
LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS LPM IV-2SLS 
             
Trust -0.145** 0.029 -0.075** -0.066 -0.019 0.134 
 
[0.066] [0.171] [0.028] [0.061] [0.042] [0.150] 
       Individual Characteristics 
    Age 1829 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.013 0.013 
 
[0.015] [0.018] [0.007] [0.007] [0.015] [0.015] 
Man 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.015 -0.015 
 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011] [0.013] 
Education -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* -0.004 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Working 0.006 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.007 
 
[0.018] [0.016] [0.008] [0.007] [0.013] [0.013] 
Urban 0.016 0.024 0.012 0.012 -0.001 0.006 
 
[0.027] [0.020] [0.014] [0.010] [0.015] [0.016] 
Mid Income 0.028 0.026 -0.002 -0.002 0.028** 0.026* 
 
[0.018] [0.016] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.014] 
High Income 0.167** 0.170** 0.030 0.030 0.128* 0.130** 
 
[0.067] [0.067] [0.036] [0.035] [0.071] [0.058] 
Married -0.008 -0.012 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.005 
 
[0.016] [0.017] [0.008] [0.007] [0.014] [0.015] 
Mixed  -0.033 -0.026 0.022** 0.022* -0.044 -0.038 
 
[0.041] [0.035] [0.011] [0.013] [0.042] [0.031] 
Black -0.081** -0.072** -0.004 -0.004 -0.056 -0.048 
 
[0.034] [0.033] [0.006] [0.010] [0.036] [0.030] 
Indian   -0.073** -0.063** -0.006 -0.006 -0.041 -0.032 
 
[0.034] [0.032] [0.009] [0.009] [0.031] [0.029] 
       UPM Characteristics 
     Age 1829 Rate  0.003* 0.003** -0.000 -0.000 0.002* 0.002** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Man Rate  0.002 -0.001 0.002* 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 
 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] 
Education Mean  0.011 0.009 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 0.009 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.009] 
Income Mean  0.017 0.017 0.010 0.010** 0.005 0.005 
 
[0.013] [0.011] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] 
Working Rate  -0.163** -0.165** -0.073** -0.074** -0.024 -0.025 
 
[0.075] [0.075] [0.034] [0.034] [0.047] [0.063] 
Polarization 0.033 0.047 -0.000 0.000 0.035 0.047 
 
[0.054] [0.034] [0.018] [0.009] [0.034] [0.032] 
       Observations 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,396 
R-squared 0.043 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.020 
First Stage 
















Test of Exogeneity 





Partial R square 0.2725   0.2725   0.2725 
 
Note:  [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the upm-level are reported in parentheses, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.[2] The dependent variables are All Crimes in the first two 
columns, Property Crimes in column 3 and 4  and  Violent Crime s in the last two columns Trust is the percentage of 
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people in the upm who think that people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy. All other 
variables’ description can be found in the Appendix. [3] All the regressions employ survey weights. [4] Column 1, 3 
and 5 report the LPM results. [5]Column 2, 4 and 6 report the instrumental variables results, instrumenting Trust 
with Trust Elections. The models have been estimated with a two stage least squares (IV- 2SLS) technique. The 
bottom   part reports the first stage coefficient for Trust Elections.  We also report the F-test of the excluded 
instruments, the p- value of the endogeneity tests and the adjusted R- square. 
 
Figure 4.9 All Crime rate at the upm level and Trust 
 
Note: This graph represents a scatter plot of the rate of victimization for All Crime at the upm level and Trust. 
Data are personal elaborations based on Lapop (2012). 
 
4.7.2 Dominican republic 
 
The good point about Dominican Republic is that in the UNODC-WB (2007) report there 
are some results about a victimization regression conducted in this country. Therefore, they 
could be used as a benchmark for ours. 
Trust is always negative although we find that it is significant only for property 2SLS. 
The coefficients with the instrumental variable techniques are larger compared to the LPM 
ones. This means that endogeneity is really a problem. Age1829 is positive and quite 
significant. This is not a surprise, since in the Dominican Republic youth violence is 
considered one of the major issues.  The UNODC–WB report (2007, p.62) says: “in 2005, 
young Dominicans aged 11-30 accounted for 46 percent of homicide victims, yet only 
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surprising as the same report (UNODC-WB, 2007) affirms that an extremely high percentage 
of victims are men. However, the result is not significant. Most of the population lives in the 
urban area as we can see from the summary statistics table. However, we find that the 
coefficient for Urban is positive and significant only for All and Violent Crimes in the 
endogenous specification. The income variables and Working are never significant and with 
mixed signs. Regarding the ethnic variable, we decided to include a dummy for White as the 
share of Indians is irrelevant. However, only this last dummy is negative and significant for 
Violent Crimes. Mixed race individuals, who make up the large majority, present a negative 
sign but the parameter is not significant. Education is significant and positive for All and 
Violent Crimes. The coefficient for property crimes is insignificant. On the contrary, the 
UNODC-WB report found a positive effect for property crimes. 
Turning to the upm level, Education is associated with more property crimes, as found 
by the UNODC-WB (2007) report. However, this report takes into consideration 
community/province level. We also find that income is insignificant as it is also found by the 
same report. Man Rate is positively associated with property crimes in the IV specification, 
whereas it is negatively for violent Crimes. Interestingly, Working Rate and Polarization are 
negatively correlated only with Property crimes. Probably, in more homogenous society 
people share more information which might be relevant in being successful in burglaries.  
The instrumental variables result show that Trust Elections is strongly correlated to the 
endogenous variable Trust. Moreover, the F statistic is higher than ten which means we are 




Unfortunately, the literature on the economics of crime in Guyana is almost 
nonexistent. Therefore, we could not rely on other works as comparison. Table 4.10 shows 
the results. We find that Trust is negative and significant in the exogenous specification for 
All Crimes and property crimes. On the contrary, we do not have similar results for the IV 
specification. Regarding the control variables, we have some interesting results. We find 
that Age1829 is positively associated with violent crimes, although the coefficient is not 
significant. Moreover, there are supposedly high levels of crime against women (USDS, 
2009). Years of schooling or whether a person is working seem not to affect the probability 
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of being victim of a crime. Even Urban is negative, although we know that most of crimes 
happen in Georgetown, the capital (OSAC, 2011a). The income variables are quite difficult to 
interpret. In fact, we find that Mid Income and High Income are positive and significant for 
Violent but not property crimes. Indeed we would have expected that for burglaries income 
would matter the most. Indeed, the high incidence of robberies (OSAC, 2011a) might 
influence the result we found for violent crimes.  
Ethnicity tensions are very frequent in Guyana since there are two main ethnicities: the 
Indian and afro-descendent. Freedom House (2009) reported that "racial polarization" has 
eroded law enforcement in Guyana. Many Indo-Guyanese complain they are victimized by 
Afro-Guyanese criminals and inadequately protected by the predominantly Afro-Guyanese 
police. On the other hand, many Afro-Guyanese claim that the police carry out the agenda 
of the primarily Indo-Guyanese controlled government (Freedom House, 2009). Indo-
Guyanese are generally those owning businesses and generally wealthier compared to the 
blacks. Therefore, we would have expected East-Indian descendents to be more victimized 
compared to the other ethnicities. Instead, we find different results. In particular, East-
Indian and afro descendents are less likely to be victims of crime, although the latter with 
lower probabilities.  
Turning to the upm characteristics, we have that the rate of young people has a positive 
small impact on All and Violent Crimes. Interestingly, Income mean and Working Rate have 
opposite signs, although the result for income is significant only in the property IV 
specification. Finally, the polarization measure is never significant. Again we would have 
expected it to be positive and significant. 
The first stage results show that the excluded instrument and the endogenous Trust are 




The results for Jamaica are not particularly good, as many variables turn out not to be 
very significant. This is an issue, as we could have fully compared these results with the ones 
in the UNODC-World Bank report but also with others that analyse this country. Trust is 
never significant, although generally negative. The age variable is positive for All Crimes and 
Violent, although significant only for the former . The result for Property is negative, which is 
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due to the fact that criminals target older people. The results for Man have the same 
tendency although none is significant. Similar results have been found in the UNODC-WB 
(2007) report. Also, analogous conclusions might be drawn looking at the Jamaican National 
Victimization Survey (McCalla et al., 2009). In particular, Education, Urban and the income 
variables are never significant. Indeed we would have expected urban to be positively 
related to crime as found by the report. Regarding the income variables, we note that, 
although insignificant, the coefficient for violent crime is lower than the one for property 
crimes. On this regard, the UNODC-WB report found that (household) income’s sign is 
positive for property crimes whereas it is negative for violent ones. Married people are 
generally less likely to be victim of crime, although the coefficient is significant only for 
property crimes. This is consistent with the view that married people conduct a quieter life. 
Ethnic variables are never significant that might also express the low degree of ethnic 
tensions in the island. In fact, the majority is black and the society is quite homogenous. In 
turn this leads to ethnicity playing a minor role.     
The upm characteristics are generally insignificant. We just find that Polarization is 
negative and significant in the IV specification for property crimes. Again, this could be seen 




Suriname is, along with Guyana, a country with a very little literature to refer to. Not 
surprisingly, these two countries are also the ones with the smallest population. Table 4.11 
shows the results. We found that Trust is negative and significant in All Crimes with the 
endogenous regressor and for Violent Crimes for the 2 stage least square. Continuing, 
Age1829 is always insignificant although, surprisingly, it is negative for each specification. 
This could reflect the absence of youth gangs which systematically commit and are victims 
of crime, as it happens in other Caribbean countries. Moreover, Man is positive for All and 
Property Crimes. The fact that for Violent Crimes is not significant depends on the presence 
of crimes where women are more likely to be victimized. Education is negative in all 
specification but not significant; whereas we find that Working negatively reduce the 
probability of being a victim of Property Crimes. Still, we do find that High Income individuals 
are more likely to be victims of crime. This probably depends on the fact that income is at 
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the household level. Interestingly, married individuals are less likely to be victims of Violent 
Crimes but not Property ones. This could depend on the fact that married people stay 
presumably more often at home. The ethnicity variable reveals that only for Violent crimes, 
in the endogenous specification, Indian descendents are more likely to be victims of crime. 
Probably this result is driven by robberies as this ethnicity is generally wealthier than others.  
Moreover, Man Rate is negatively correlated with Property but positively with Violent. 
Also, Education Mean is negatively associated only with Property Crimes. Polarization is 
never significant. Surprisingly, Suriname is the only country where we find a negative 
correlation between Trust and Trust Elections in the first stage.  
 
4.7.6 Trinidad and Tobago 
 
We find that Trust in Trinidad and Tobago is significant for Property and Violent but only 
in the LPM model. Age1829, Man, Education and Working‘s coefficients are really similar to 
the main specification with all the five Caribbean countries. Males are generally more likely 
to be victims of crime. In particular, being male increases the probability of being victim of 
All Crimes of 0.5%. The result for Urban is quite unexpected. We have a negative sign, 
although significant only for All Crimes with the endogenous regressor. Evidence suggest 
that crime is mainly happening in urban areas and, particularly, in the outskirt of Port of 
Spain (Bennet et al., 1997). Nevertheless, the situation is problematic also in the inner 
villages where there are labourers working on plantations. In turn, this might counter 
balance the urbanization effect (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1996). If Working is never 
significant and with mixed sign, we find that High Income is positive and significant for All 
Crimes. Mid Income is never significant, although it has smaller a coefficient. Ethnical 
variables are never significant. Nevertheless, the coefficient for Indian is a bit bigger which 
might be due to the fact that Indian descendants are historically more involved in business.  
Again, as in the main specification we do not find many significant variables. The results 
for Man Rate are in line with the theory (Entorf and Spengler, 2000b). We also find that 
Education Mean increase the probability of being victimized of a violent crime. This could be 
explained by the relevance of robberies amongst these types of crime. The Polarization 
coefficient is never significant and this could be due to the fact that there are not serious 
tensions between African and Indian descendents. The first stage results reveal that Trust 
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Elections is a good predictor of Trust and that the F-statistic on the excluded instrument 
leads us to conclude that first stage instruments are significantly different from 0.  
Finally, It is worth keeping in mind that in Trinidad and Tobago, most of crimes are 
related to drugs and to gangs. Moreover, this is one of the countries which host the highest 
number of deportees. Unfortunately, there are not detailed statistics which we could use to 




This chapter analyses the impact of trust on victimization experiences in five Caribbean 
countries: the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Trust, and social capital, is associated with many socio-economic outcomes, such as growth 
and institutional efficiency (Keefe and Knack, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997). Despite this, there 
is little evidence on its impact on crime levels, except for few papers (Buonanno et al., 2009; 
Lederman et al., 2002). This question is not trivial as social capital might have both a crime-
reducing and crime-increasing effects (Rubio, 1997).  
As we cannot assess the role of the deterrence variables254, social capital becomes a 
kind of “social deterrence” that can substitute legal solutions and supply to weak 
institutions. Also, the determinants of crime might affect victimization in a different way 
depending on the offences considered. The literature could definitely be improved.  
We aim to do so analyzing the role of trust on crime using data from Americas 
Barometer, which is an opinion survey run in many American countries. Amongst the 
questions there are some on victimization experience. We then created three victimization 
measures: one for all the crimes, one for property and violent crimes each. The trust 
question refers to the perception of trustworthiness of individuals living in the same 
community. Although it is not the standard WVS/GSS question we feel quite confident of its 
reliability. This measure is aggregated from the individuals’ responses at the upm level, 
which is the primary sampling unit in the survey. We also control for a series of standard 
determinants of crime, such as age, gender, income and ethnicity. Crime experiences 
depend not only on individual characteristics but also on the community where the crime is 
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taking place (Kooning and Voolard, 2009). Therefore we added local characteristics to take 
this into account. Endogeneity might cause several problems and invalidate our results. In 
order to address this issue we employed an instrumental variable approach using a measure 
of trust in the elections as instrument for general trust. Given the fact that we cannot rely 
on lagged or historical variables, we believe that the one we choose satisfies all the 
characteristics of a good instrument (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). The results show that our 
measure of trust (worthiness) exerts a crime reducing effect on property but not violent 
crimes. In particular, a one percent increases in our measure of trust leads to a lower 
probability of being victim of property crimes of 0.286%. The analysis of the control 
variables suggests that individual characteristics might be more adequate than the upm 
ones to explain victimization experiences.  
In order to validate our results we run two main robustness checks. In the first we 
employ different definitions of crime categories. In the second we consider province, 
instead of upm, as level of aggregation for trust and the “local” control variables. These 
results strongly support our findings, confirming the crime reducing effect of trust. We also 
run separate regression for each country. We do so to evaluate different patterns of the 
model of crime we are employing. Moreover, we can take into consideration the 
heterogeneity in terms of socio-economic characteristics (Barker et al., 2010). The results 
suggest that crime determinants might have very diverse impact on victimization 
experience. This calls for a deeper analysis on these issues using better quality data.  
We feel that this paper can contribute to the existing literature from many different 
points of views. First of all, we re-considered the link between social capital and crime using 
individual data. In turn this is an advantage because we sensibly increase the number of 
observation and, so, the precision of the estimation. Also, the use of individual data allows 
us to consider the characteristics that make a person more likely of being victimized. Such 
kind of analysis is not possible in studies which employ macro-data (Buonanno et al., 2009; 
Akcomak and Weel, 2012). Second, we focus specifically on trust. We choose to do so 
because typical social capital studies employ a variety of proxies. Indeed, social capital is a 
multi faceted issue but the use of variables ranging from civic to sport participation might be 
quite difficult to interpret. Third, the impact of trust on crime has never been studied for 
Caribbean countries, at least to my knowledge. In fact, the role of social capital on socio-
economic variables has been mainly reserved to developed western countries. Finally, we 
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add to the scarce literature of the economics of crime in the Caribbean. This is particularly 
needed, especially considering that crime is perceived as one of the main issues by the 
population. 
Our research opens the avenue for many other works in different directions. First of all, 
we hope for better measurement of both social capital and crime measures. Indeed the 
issue of social capital in developing countries is becoming crucial as it is testified by the 
various projects by the World Bank255. Moreover, as mentioned, victimization surveys are in 
the pipeline by many different organizations. Such improvement will allow to better 
estimate the impact of trust on crime. In particular, it would be interesting to assess the 
impact on specific crime categories. From a policy point of view, specific social capital 
increasing strategies might prove more efficient than other crime prevention policies. 
Finally, the single country analysis we performed in section 7 can be the basis for a 
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4.9.1 Variables: definition   
 
All Data are taken from the 2010 Americas Barometer survey. More details on this data 
can be found at the website: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/   
All Crimes: Dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent answered yes to the 
question “have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?  “ 
Property Crimes: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent was a victim of burglary in the 
previous 12 months before interview.  
Violent Crimes: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent was a victim of one of the following 
crime category: unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats, unarmed robbery with 
assault or physical threats, armed robbery, assault but not robbery, rape or sexual assault; 
kidnapping and extortion.  
Property1: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent was a victim of one of the following crime 
category in the previous 12 months before the interview: burglary; unarmed robbery, no 
assault or physical threats.  
Violent1: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent was a victim of one of the following crime 
category in the previous 12 months before the interview: unarmed robbery with assault or 
physical threats, armed robbery, assault but not robbery, rape or sexual assault.  
Trust: “Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in 
this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or 
untrustworthy? “. Then we calculate the ratio of people that answered yes to one of the 
first two options of the question at the upm and provincial level. 
Trust Elections: People were asked “To what extent do you trust elections?” Individual 
could choose between 1, the lowest level, to 7, the highest one. We calculated the mean at 
the upm or province level. 
Age1829: Dummy equal 1 if the victim is between 18 and 29 years old.  
Man: Dummy equal 1 if the victim is a male. 
Mid Income: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent lives in a household with an income 
between the 5th and the 8th category (out of 11). 
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High Income: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent lives in a household with an income 
between the 9th and the 11th category (out of 11). 
Education: Number of completed years of education; 
Working: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent answered yes to the following question 
“How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently working?” 
Urban: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent is leaving in an urban area as defined in the 
survey. 
Black: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent considers herself black or afro-descendent. 
Indian: Dummy equal 1 if the respondent considers herself Indian. 
Mixed: Dummy equal 1 if the person considers herself a mix between African and 
another ethical background ethnicity. 
White: Dummy equal 1 if the person considers herself of Caucasian origins. 
Married: Dummy equal 1 if the person is married. 
Age1829 Rate: Ratio of the respondents aged between 18 and 29 out of the total 
number of respondents. 
Man Rate: Rate of males at the upm (province) on total respondents. 
Education Mean: Mean of individual Education at the upm (province) level. 
Income Mean: Mean income classes amongst all respondents in the upm (province). 
Working Rate: Rate of people working out of the total number of respondents in the 
upm (province). 















Figure 4.10 Trust and All Crimes: predicted probabilities 
 
Note: This graph represents the predicted probabilities derived from the non linear estimation of the model of 





































































The economics of crime is a recent field of research. The seminal work on this topic is 
Becker (1968), who considered criminals as rational agents who maximize their expected 
utility. In this framework, the decision to commit a crime depends on the benefits and costs 
of offending. This contribution spawned a rich literature which investigated crime from 
different economics’ angles. For example, it has been analysed the role of deterrence 
variables, unemployment and education on crime levels (Entorf and Spengler, 2000b). 
Recently, the analysis extended to more sophisticated forms of crime, as those perpetuated 
by criminal groups (Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995; Pinotti, 2011; Skaperdas, 2001). 
In this PhD thesis we contribute to the existing literature with three original research 
papers. The first two deal with organised crime, whereas the latter is on standard crime.  
The first is titled “Emerging Classes and the Fight for Resources: an Empirical 
Investigation into the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia“. The quantitative approach on the origins 
of the Sicilian Mafia is still largely underexplored. The seminal work on this topic is Bandiera 
(2003) which modelled Mafia as a supplier of protection in Sicily after the Unification of 
Italy. The author found that Mafia is more likely to emerge where land is more fragmented 
and with higher value. On the other hand, our contribution follows an approach closer to 
those of leading historians as Lupo (2004) and Pezzino (1987). We reckon that, the market 
for protection hypothesis needs to be considered along with the social “turmoils” that 
happened at that time in Sicily. In particular, the institutional changes opened up new 
business and political opportunities. These could be exploited only by a small number of 
emerging actors, which started competing to get them. However, since property rights were 
unsecure, Mafia became an instrument to win such competition. Therefore, we predict that 
Mafia emerged not only where there were favourable conditions for the protection industry 
but especially where these opportunities were greater, which we proxied with the presence 
of large properties. We tested this hypothesis using a new measure of Mafia activity and 
new variables. The key results support our view. Mafia is likely to be active where there 
were large properties, land value was higher, density of population lower and there were 
few peasants who own the land. In order to give robustness to our results, we provide a 
comparison between Sicily and Sardinia at that time, that show how the market for 
protection cannot be the only reason for the emergence of an organization as the Mafia. 
The second contribution is “Migrating Mafia” that deals with the transplantation 
(Varese, 2006) of southern Italian organised crime groups to the central and northern Italian 
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regions after the Second World War. At first, Mafia groups got involved in illegal business, 
such as drug traffic and gambling. Soon after, they became entrenched in the legal sector 
and corrupted some members of the political class. In this paper we explore the channels 
that made it possible for such organizations to settle in not traditional areas. On this regard, 
the historical and sociological literature agrees on two of the most important factors. The 
first is the migration of southern citizens to the central and northern Italian regions. The 
second is the policy of confino (forced re-settlement of criminals), which imposed perilous 
southern criminals to be relocated up north. So far, no one has ever quantitatively tested 
such hypothesis using econometric techniques. In order to fill this gap, we created a panel 
data at the provincial level for the period 1983-2008. The data on migration and forced re-
settlement have never been used in any economic study before. We ran several robustness 
and sensitivity analysis to sustain our findings. Consistently with the community network 
approach (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Moretti, 1999) we find that migration is by far the 
most important predictor of Mafia presence in the hosting provinces. Not only, is migration 
from Mafia-infested regions even more important. Contrary to the expectations, we do not 
find forced re-settlement significantly affecting Mafia expansion. We argue that probably 
what mattered was not the number of the Mafia members sent to the North, rather their 
rank in the hierarchy or their ability to create criminal opportunities in the new 
environment. Unfortunately, we do not have such information. 
The last contribution is “Trust and victimization: evidence from five Caribbean 
countries”. Trust, and social capital, have been associated with many positive socio – 
economic outcomes, such as development, trade and investment (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Guiso et al., 2009). However, little attention has been devoted to analyse its impact on 
crime levels, except for few works (Buonanno et al., 2009; Lederman et al., 2002). This is not 
a trivial question as social capital might have two opposite effects. On one side, it can lead 
to fewer crimes because it reduces transaction costs and increase social control. On the 
other side, high levels of social capital might lead to lower defence mechanisms. The 
literature found some crime reducing effects of social capital. However, these works mainly 
employed macro data and, so, few observations that lead to a loss of precision in 
estimation. Moreover, none of them focused specifically on trust. In this paper we evaluate 
the role of trust on crime in five Caribbean countries: Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Dominican Republic. We use individual data taken from Americas 
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Barometer for 2010 which contains information on victimization experience. Our measure 
of trust is not the standard World Value Survey (WVS) one but it rather represents 
trustworthiness. In order to tackle endogeneity we employ an instrumental variable 
approach. We use a single instrument as the level of trust in elections that is unrelated to 
the endogenous regressor. The results show that our measure of trust (worthiness) exerts a 
crime reducing effect on property but not violent crimes. In particular, a one percent 
increases in our measure of trust leads to a lower probability of being victim of property 
crimes by 0.286%.   
As we argued in the introductory chapter, these three contributions can be read 
through the lens of the new institutional economics approach and close theories. In fact, 
North and Williamson explicitly considered situations in which property rights are not 
secured and contract not enforced. This is an important deviation from the assumptions 
made by the neo classical economy. Following this approach, we reviewed those works that 
dealt with crime. In particular, we consider Dixit (2004), Skaperdas and Syropolous (1995), 
Hirshflier (1989) and Anderson (1995), amongst the others. Summarising, it was argued that 
organised crime emerged out of an anarchic situation to supply to the deficiencies of the 
state. This perfectly describes Sicily in the XIX century. In fact, at that time the state was not 
able to accomplish its duty. As a consequence, the Sicilian Mafia originated to offer such 
services. The same reasoning applied to the situation we describe in the third chapter. In 
this case, we do not have an anarchic situation similar to the previous one. However, 
organised crime could (and still does!) offer such services in the illegal sector or in some 
sections of the legal one. In the former, the state does not get involved by law, whereas in 
the second we have a situation of partial state failure that Mafia is able to exploit. Finally, 
North (1990) and Williamson (2000) recognised the important role played by informal 
agreements, such as social capital. We argue that social capital can be considered as a 
substitute or a complement of the state in deterring crimes. This is particularly true for 
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